Appendix part of: "**Understanding Partisan Cue Receptivity: Tests of Predictions from the Bounded Rationality and Expressive Utility Models**"

Contents

A. Food Irradiation Experiment

A.1 Sample characteristics

Survey Sampling International (SSI) fielded the experiment in the United States on their online panel between July 4 and July 6, 2016. In exchange for participation, SSI compensates panelists with points that can be exchanged for various rewards. In total, 883 respondents were randomly assigned to participate in the cue-taking experiment. We only include people who identified with or leaned toward a party. The sample consisted of 467 self-identified Democrats and 280 self-identified Republicans. The sample was moderately representative of the US population in terms of key demographics: 57 percent female, 81 percent non-hispanic white and 12 percent black, and 9 percent hispanic. The median age was 39 (min=16, max=66), and 47 percent of participants had at least a college degree. Recent research suggests that probability and non-probability samples tended to yield similar results in between-subjects experiments (Mullinix, Leeper, Druckman, & Freese, 2016).

A.2 Treatments

We provide the full text that was shown to participants in all three conditions. Note that the manipulation is whether the article lists no party cues (control condition) or indicates that Democrats or Republicans propose or oppose the ban.

Condition 1: Control condition

Lawmakers consider ban on food irradiation

Lawmakers consider ban on food irradiation Washington – The House of Representatives is considering a ban on the irradiation of beef, pork, and lamb as a possible means of attacking the problem of severe food poisoning. Irradiation involves exposing food to brief doses of gamma rays or electron rays. These rays kill micro-organisms, including potentially deadly bacteria like E. colli, salmonella, and listeria. Yet irradiation is proving to be a controversial solution to the food poisoning problem. The House of Representatives is considering a five-year ban on the sale and production of irradiated food.

Proponents of a ban

Proponents claim that irradiation changes the taste, odor, color, and texture of food. They also believe irradiation could encourage careless food handling in the food industry, since workers will know that poor hygiene could be disguised by eventual irradiation.

Proponents also point to the environment concerns. Irradiation increases the risk of radioactive leaks, increased worker contamination and possible accidents involved in moving nuclear material. These legislators say food irradiation causes more problems than it could solve. Instead of rushing to irradiate, proponents argue that the House should prevent contamination in the first place. They promote stronger regulations on sanitation and hygiene in feedlots and processing plants, and claim that opponents are succumbing to the influence of agricultural corporations and the nuclear waste industry.

As one proponent of the five-year ban noted: "Irradiation is a deal with the devil. Consumers have a right to a safe food supply, unzapped by nuclear radiation".

Opponents of a ban

Opponents believe the House should allow food irradiation to occur immediately, and they strongly oppose the five-year ban. They say that proponents are trying to scare the public with wild myths about irradiation, and that enough research has been done to prove the technique is safe.

Opponents note that irradiation has been used for decades on a number of medical and consumer goods, including contact lenses, medical supplies, cosmetics and milk cartons. Hospitals serve irradiated food to burn victims and chemotherapy patients. And astronauts have been eating irradiated food since the 1960s.

Opponents disagree with the claim that irradiation alters the food value, taste, texture or color. Canning, they say, alters food more than irradiation.

Though opponents of the ban concede that there are some environmental risks to allowing irradiation of food, they note that in the fifty years the technique has been used on medical supplies and other foods, not single nuclear accident has been blamed on irradiation.

Opponents deny accusations that they see irradiation as the solution for every food safety problem. Instead, they say, irradiation complements, not replaces, proper food handling practices.

Finally, opponents also note that consumers should have the right to choose which food they want. "Irradiation did for beef what pasteurization did for milk. Food irradiation saves lives", said one prominent opponent.

Condition 2: Democrats propose ban; Republicans oppose ban

Lawmakers consider ban on food irradiation

Lawmakers consider ban on food irradiation Washington – The House of Representatives is considering a ban on the irradiation of beef, pork, and lamb as a possible means of attacking the problem of severe food poisoning.

Irradiation involves exposing food to brief doses of gamma rays or electron rays. These rays kill micro-organisms, including potentially deadly bacteria like E. colli, salmonella, and listeria. Yet irradiation is proving to be a controversial solution to the food poisoning problem. The House of Representatives is considering a five-year ban on the sale and production of irradiated food.

Democrats support ban Democrats claim that irradiation changes the taste, odor, color, and texture of food. They also believe irradiation could encourage careless food handling in the food industry, since workers will know that poor hygiene could be disguised by eventual irradiation.

Democratic lawmakers also point to the environment concerns. Irradiation increases the risk of radioactive leaks, increased worker contamination and possible accidents involved in moving nuclear material.

These legislators say food irradiation causes more problems than it could solve. Instead of rushing to irradiate, Democrats argue that the House should prevent contamination in the first place. They promote stronger regulations on sanitation and hygiene in feedlots and processing plants, and claim that Republicans are succumbing to the influence of agricultural corporations and the nuclear waste industry.

As one Democratic proponent of the five-year ban noted: "Irradiation is a deal with the devil. Consumers have a right to a safe food supply, unzapped by nuclear radiation".

Republicans oppose ban

Republicans believe the House should allow food irradiation to occur immediately, and they strongly oppose the five-year ban. They say that Democrats are trying to scare the public with wild myths about irradiation, and that enough research has been done to prove the technique is safe.

Republicans note that irradiation has been used for decades on a number of medical and consumer goods, including contact lenses, medical supplies, cosmetics and milk cartons.

Hospitals serve irradiated food to burn victims and chemotherapy patients. And astronauts have been eating irradiated food since the 1960s.

Republicans disagree with the claim that irradiation alters the food value, taste, texture or color. Canning, they say, alters food more than irradiation.

Though opponents of the ban concede that there are some environmental risks to allowing irradiation of food, they note that in the fifty years the technique has been used on medical supplies and other foods, not single nuclear accident has been blamed on irradiation.

Republicans deny accusations that they see irradiation as the solution for every food safety problem. Instead, they say, irradiation complements, not replaces, proper food handling practices. Finally, Republicans also note that consumers should have the right to choose which food they want. "Irradiation did for beef what pasteurization did for milk. Food irradiation saves lives", said one prominent Republican.

Condition 3: Republicans support ban; Democrats oppose ban

Lawmakers consider ban on food irradiation

Lawmakers consider ban on food irradiation Washington – The House of Representatives is considering a ban on the irradiation of beef, pork, and lamb as a possible means of attacking the problem of severe food poisoning.Irradiation involves exposing food to brief doses of gamma rays or electron rays. These rays kill micro-organisms, including potentially deadly bacteria like E. colli, salmonella, and listeria. Yet irradiation is proving to be a controversial solution to the food poisoning problem. The House of Representatives is considering a five-year ban on the sale and production of irradiated food.

Republicans propose ban

Republicans claim that irradiation changes the taste, odor, color, and texture of food. They also believe irradiation could encourage careless food handling in the food industry, since workers will know that poor hygiene could be disguised by eventual irradiation.

Republicans lawmakers also point to the environment concerns. Irradiation increases the risk of radioactive leaks, increased worker contamination and possible accidents involved in moving nuclear material.

These legislators say food irradiation causes more problems than it could solve. Instead of rushing to irradiate, Republicans argue that the House should prevent contamination in the first place. They promote stronger regulations on sanitation and hygiene in feedlots and processing plants, and claim that Democrats are succumbing to the influence of agricultural corporations and the nuclear waste industry.

As one Republican proponent of the five-year ban noted: "Irradiation is a deal with the devil. Consumers have a right to a safe food supply, unzapped by nuclear radiation".

Democrats oppose ban

Democrats believe the House should allow food irradiation to occur immediately, and they strongly oppose the five-year ban. They say that Republicans are trying to scare the public with wild myths about irradiation, and that enough research has been done to prove the technique is safe.

Democrats note that irradiation has been used for decades on a number of medical and consumer goods, including contact lenses, medical supplies, cosmetics and milk cartons. Hospitals serve irradiated food to burn victims and chemotherapy patients. And astronauts have been eating irradiated food since the 1960s.

Democrats disagree with the claim that irradiation alters the food value, taste, texture or color. Canning, they say, alters food more than irradiation.

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Democrats deny accusations that they see irradiation as the solution for every food safety problem. Instead, they say, irradiation complements, not replaces, proper food handling practices.

Finally, Democrats also note that consumers should have the right to choose which food they want. "Irradiation did for beef what pasteurization did for milk. Food irradiation saves lives", said one prominent Democrat.

A.3 Partisan social identity strength

We employed the 8-item strength of party identity battery introduced by Bankert, Huddy, and Rosema (2017). The item wording of the 8-items are provided below. Each item is scored on a four-point Likert-type scale ranging from "Always" (1), "Often" (2), "Sometimes" (3), "Never" (4). This response scale has been used by Bankert et al. (2017, in their Dutch and Swedish samples) as well as Kelly (1989). Table A1 provides the factor loadings showing that the items generally have an acceptable loading on the latent dimension. Figure A1, plots the distribution of the Partisan Social Identity Strength battery – showing a relatively normal distribution. Note that the Partisan Social Identity Strength battery has the following psychometric properties: m=.43, sd=.25, skweness=.44, kurtosis=2.38, α=.91 and ω=.94.

- 1. When I speak about the [Democratic/Republican] party, I usually say "we" instead of "they".
- 2. I am interested in what other people think about the [Democratic/Republican] party.
- 3. When people criticize the [Democratic/Republican] party, it feels like a personal insult.
- 4. I have a lot in common with other supporters of the [Democratic/Republican] party.
- 5. If the [Democratic/Republican] party does badly in opinion polls, my day is ruined.
- 6. When I meet someone who supports the [Democratic/Republican] party, I feel connected with this person.
- 7. When I speak about the [Democratic/Republican] party, I refer to them as "my party".
- 8. When people praise the [Democratic/Republican] party, it makes me feel good.

Table A1
Partisan Social Identity Strength: Standardized Factor Loadings

	Standardized Factor Loading	p-value
1	0.81	0.00
2	0.65	0.00
3	0.79	0.00
4	0.75	0.00
5	0.82	0.00
6	0.84	0.00
7	0.88	0.00
8	0.88	0.00

Figure A1. Distribution of Partisan Social Identity Strength



A.4 Cognitive resources

Cognitive Reflection Test. We employ the three item Cognitive Reflection Test (Frederick, 2005). The item wording with the correct answers in bold as well as the intuitive answers in parentheses. The 3-item CRT was scored to range from the lowest observed value on the test (0) to the highest (1). In Table A2 we show the tetrachoric correlations between the three CRT items. We find strong and positive correlations between all items. The distribution is provided in Figure A2 and the psychometric properties are: m=.15, sd=.26, skweness=1.79, kurtosis=5.30, α=.62 and ω=.64.

- (1) A bat and a ball cost $1.10 in total. The bat costs a dollar more than the ball. How much does the ball cost? (**Correct answer = 5 cents**; intuitive answer = 10 cents)
- (2) If it takes 5 machines 5 minutes to make 5 widgets, how long would it take 100 machines to make 100 widgets? (**Correct answer = 5 minutes**; intuitive answer = 100 minutes)
- (3) In a lake, there is a patch of lily pads. Every day, the patch doubles in size. If it takes 48 days for the patch to cover the entire lake, how long would it take for the patch to cover half of the lake? [**Correct answer = 47 days**; intuitive answer = 24 days]

Table A2
CRT: Tetrachoric Correlations

	CRT1	CRT2	CRT3
CRT1	1.00	0.54	0.64
CRT2		1.00	0.68
CRT3			1.00

Figure A2. Distribution of Cognitive Reflection Task



Need for Cognition. We employ the validated 18-item Need for Cognition battery developed by Cacioppo, Petty, and Kao (1984). The item wording of the 18-items are provided below. Each item is scored on a five-point Likert scale ranging from "Extremely uncharacteristic" (1) through "Extremely characteristic" (5). The order of the items was randomized. Table A3 provides the factor loadings showing that the items generally have an acceptable loading on the latent dimension. Figure A3, plots the distribution of the Need for Cognition showing a relatively normal distribution. Moreover, the NfC has the following psychometric properties: m=.59, sd=.14, skweness=.04, kurtosis=3.27, α=.82 and ω=.86.

- (1) I would prefer complex to simple problems.
- (2) I like to have the responsibility of handling a situation that requires a lot of thinking.
- (3) Thinking is not my idea of fun. (*Reversed coded)*
- (4) I would rather do something that requires little thought than something that is sure to challenge my thinking abilities. (*Reversed coded)*
- (5) I try to anticipate and avoid situations where there is likely a chance I will have to think in depth about something. (*Reversed coded)*
- (6) I find satisfaction in deliberating hard and for long hours.
- (7) I only think as hard as I have to. (*Reversed coded)*
- (8) I prefer to think about small, daily projects to long-term ones. (*Reversed coded)*
- (9) I like tasks that require little thought once I've learned them. (*Reversed coded)*
- (10) The idea of relying on thought to make my way to the top appeals to me.
- (11) I really enjoy a task that involves coming up with new solutions to problems.

- (12) Learning new ways to think doesn't excite me very much. (*Reversed coded)*
- (13) I prefer my life to be filled with puzzles that I must solve.
- (14) The notion of thinking abstractly is appealing to me.
- (15) I would prefer a task that is intellectual, difficult, and important to one that is somewhat important but does not require much thought.
- (16) I feel relief rather than satisfaction after completing a task that required a lot of mental effort. (*Reversed coded)*
- (17) It's enough for me that something gets the job done; I don't care how or why it works. (*Reversed coded)*
- (18) I usually end up deliberating about issues even when they do not affect me personally.

Table A3
Need for Cognition: Standardized Factor Loadings

	Standardized Factor Loading	p-value
1	0.60	0.00
2	0.69	0.00
3	0.72	0.00
4	0.64	0.00
5	0.60	0.00
6	0.51	0.00
7	0.53	0.00
8	0.31	0.00
9	0.37	0.00
10	0.65	0.00
11	0.65	0.00
12	0.62	0.00
13	0.54	0.00
14	0.58	0.00
15	0.58	0.00
16	0.24	0.00
17	0.44	0.00
18	0.36	0.00

Figure A3. Distribution of Need for Cognition



Latent cognitive resources. We estimated a confirmatory factor analysis for the overarching cognitive resources variable using a 3-item CRT battery and the 18 item NfC inventory. Table A4 provides the factor loadings showing that the items generally have an acceptable loading on the latent dimension. Figure A4, plots the distribution of the Cognitive Resources variable, showing a relatively normal distribution. The cognitive resources variable has the following psychometric properties: m=.62, sd=.18, skewness=-.51, kurtosis=3.28, α=.81, ω=.87).

Figure A4. Cognitive Resources



Table A4

Cognitive resources: Standardized Factor Loadings

	Standardized Factor Loading	p-value	Battery
1	0.25	0.00	CRT
2	0.15	0.01	CRT
3	0.34	0.00	CRT
4	0.67	0.00	NfC
5	0.73	0.00	NfC
6	0.25	0.00	NfC
7	0.14	0.00	NfC
8	0.12	0.00	NfC
9	0.67	0.00	NfC
10	0.06	0.09	NfC
11	-0.02	0.63	NfC
12	0.04	0.27	NfC
13	0.69	0.00	NfC
14	0.69	0.00	NfC
15	0.14	0.00	NfC
16	0.62	0.00	NfC
17	0.69	0.00	NfC
18	0.67	0.00	NfC
19	-0.06	0.11	NfC
20	0.05	0.15	NfC
21	0.52	0.00	NfC

A.5 Randomization checks

We checked whether CRT, NfC, cognitive resources and partisan social identity strength were equally distributed across the different conditions in our experiment. As can be seen in Table A5 there is no systematic difference in CRT, NfC, cognitive resources or party identity strength across out treatments.

Table A5
Balance checks: moderators

	Dependent variable:			
	CRT	NfC	Cog resources	Partisan Social Identity Strength
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Democrats support	−0.02	−0.02	−0.02	−0.02
	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Republicans support	−0.01	−0.01	−0.01	−0.01
	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Constant	0.16*	0.60*	0.63*	0.44*
	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.02)
Observations	747	747	747	747
R^2	0.001	0.002	0.002	0.001

Note: *p<0.05

In our analyses we use a recoded version of the treatment indicator capturing whether the party the respondents supports is endorsing the policy (1) or not (0). In Table A6 we present the results whereby we regress our moderators on the In-party cue and the Out-party cue. CRT (column 1, Table A6) and party identity strength (column 4, Table A6) are balanced across the conditions as indicated by the lack of significant effects of the treatment indicator on the dependent variables. NfC and cognitive resources are slightly lower in the In-party cue condition compared to the baseline but this effect is very small (column 2 and 3, Table A6)

Table A6
Party cues: Balance checks moderators per treatment condition

	Dependent variable:			
	CRT	NfC	Cog resources	Party Identity Strength
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
In-party cue	−0.03	−0.03*	−0.03*	−0.01
	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Out-party cue	0.001	0.01	0.01	−0.03
	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Constant	0.16*	0.60*	0.63*	0.44*
	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.02)
Observations	747	747	747	747
R^2	0.002	0.01	0.01	0.002

Note: *p<0.05

Our study also contained a set of covariates. We also assessed whether the covariates were balanced across conditions. We show in Table A7 that sex, age, income and partisanship (Democrat=0; Republican=1) were equally distributed across the different conditions.

Table A7
Balance Checks Demographics

	Dependent variable:				
	Sex	Age	Education	Income	Partisanship
	logistic	*OLS*	*ordered logistic*	*OLS*	*logistic*
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Democratic party supports	0.03	−2.15	−0.03	0.03	−0.19
	(0.18)	(1.16)	(0.17)	(0.30)	(0.18)
Republican party supports	0.11	−1.59	0.02	−0.20	−0.03
	(0.18)	(1.20)	(0.17)	(0.31)	(0.19)
Constant	0.23	42.39*		6.83*	−0.43*
	(0.13)	(0.83)		(0.21)	(0.13)
Observations	747	747	747	747	747
R^2		0.005		0.001	
Akaike Inf. Crit.	1,026.96				992.96
Note:					*p<0.05

In Table A8 we show that sex, education, income and partisanship were equally distributed across the in-party and out-party cues – compared to the no-cues condition. The participants in the in-party cue condition seem a little bit younger (see column 2 of Table A8). But this is effect is small.

Table A8
In-party vs. Out-party: Balance Checks Demographics

	Dependent variable:				
	Sex	Age	Education	Income	Partisanship
	logistic	*OLS*	*ordered logistic*	*OLS*	*logistic*
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
In-party cue	−0.06	−2.45*	−0.05	−0.24	−0.24
	(0.18)	(1.16)	(0.17)	(0.30)	(0.18)
Out-party cue	0.21	−1.27	0.05	0.11	0.01
	(0.18)	(1.20)	(0.17)	(0.31)	(0.19)
Constant	0.23	42.39*		6.83*	−0.43*
	(0.13)	(0.83)		(0.21)	(0.13)
Observations	747	747	747	747	747
R^2		0.01		0.002	
Akaike Inf. Crit.	1,025.01				991.93
Note:					*p<0.05

A.6 Main effects

Here we discuss the main effect of party cues on the policy support. We do so by using an OLS model and regressing support for food irradiation on cue condition (in-party cue and out-party cue vs. no-cue condition), partisan identity strength and cognitive reflection score (Column 1, Table A9). Participants decreased their support for food irradiation by about .06 points (on a 0 to 1 scale) when the party with which they do not identify supported the policy relative to when no party supported the policy (see also, Kam, 2005). The In-party cue did not result in more support for the policy.

Turning to the covariates, partisan social identity strength was not associated with policy support. We do find that those higher on CRT are somewhat less supportive of the policy, although we had no prior hypothesis about this effect, while NfC and the latent cognitive resources variable are not associated with policy support. In column 2 and 3 of Table (A9) we show that the main effect of the party cues do not change when we substitute CRT for the Need for Cognition or the latent cognitive resources variable.

Table A9
Main Effect of Party Cues on Support for Food Irradiation

	Policy support		
	(1)	(2)	(3)
In-Party cue	0.03	0.03	0.03
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Out-Party cue	−0.06*	−0.06*	−0.06*
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
PID Strength	0.04	0.06	0.06
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
CRT	−0.07*		
	(0.03)		
NfC		−0.06	
		(0.05)	
Cognitive resources			−0.03
			(0.04)
Age	−0.001	−0.001	−0.001
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
Female	0.03	0.04*	0.03*
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Race: non-white	0.01	0.01	0.01
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Education: Some college	0.01	0.01	0.01
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Education: College	−0.03	−0.03	−0.03
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Party: Republican	0.01	0.01	0.01
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Constant	0.56*	0.57*	0.56*
	(0.04)	(0.05)	(0.04)
Observations	747	747	747
R^2	0.07	0.06	0.06
Note:			*p<0.05

A.7 Direct replication results Kam (2005)

Here we present a series of models directly replicating the analyses by Kam. First, in Model 1 of Table A10, we estimate a direct replication of the results acquired by Kam (2005) using the original one-item that was used in that study (i.e, "Do you support or oppose a ban on food irradiation?"), recoded to range from strongly oppose [0] to strongly support [1]; M=.51, SD=.29) and the continuous indicator whether participants received the party-cue which ranged from -1 (strong or weak partisan exposed to out-partisan endorsement) to 0 (no party cues) to 1 (strong or weak partisan exposed to in-partisan endorsement). As can be seen there is a positive interaction effect between the party cue and the NfC (b=.20, se=.10, p<.05). In model 2, we apply the three-item dependent variable, and here we also find a positive interaction effect between the Party Cue and the NfC (b=.15, se=.07, p<.05). This means that there is more reliance upon the party cue among those that score higher on the NfC. Kam (2005, p.175) concluded that "in this particular case" the "need for cognition does not effectively pull apart systematic from heuristic processors". Our replication shows that in our case, NfC condtions the reliance upon party cues.

Table A10
Moderation of Party Cues Following Kam (2005)

	Policy support	
	(1)	(2)
Party Cue	−0.06	−0.04
	(0.06)	(0.04)
NfC	−0.08	−0.07
	(0.07)	(0.05)
Party Cue * NfC	0.20*	0.15*
	(0.10)	(0.07)
Constant	0.55*	0.58*
	(0.04)	(0.03)
Observations	747	747
R^2	0.03	0.04
Note:	OLS Regession models; *p<0.05	

A.8 Item-by -item analysis

The dependent variable in this experiment consists of three items: The first – *Support* – asked to rate support for the ban on food irradiation on a five point scale ranging from 1 ("strongly support the ban on food irradiation") to 5 ("strongly oppose the ban on food irradiation"). This was the original dependent variable used by Kam (2005). The second – *Cost-benefit* asked about agreement with the statement "The costs of food irradiation outweigh the benefits" on a scale from 1 ("strongly agree") to 5 ("strongly disagree"). The third item – *Good vs. Bad* asked "All things considered, food irradiation is a good thing" on a scale ranging from 1 ("food irradiation is bad") to 5 ("food irradiation is good"). We analyze the experiment based upon the composite measure of the three items – see main text. Yet, one might wonder if the results are similar for each individual item. To test this, we rerun the two-way and three-way interaction models for each of the three different dependent variables.

The results for the two-way interactions do not differ from the results that we arrive using the composite scale in the main text.

Similarly, the result of our three-way interaction effects do not change substantially across the three items that make-up the dependent variable. For CRT the results mirror each other closely across the three items that make-up the dependent variable. If anything, the increasing positive effect of the in-party cue over the range of partisan social identity strength among those with higher levels of NfC is a bit stronger for the first item compared to the second and third item. This can be seen by the significant interaction effect in Table A11, while the positive but non-significant interaction effects for item 2 tapping into *Cost-benefit* (see Table A12) and item 3 tapping into *Good vs. Bad* (see Table A13). To interpret the three-way interaction effects, we also plotted the figures of the marginal effect of the in-party and out-party cue across levels of partisan social identity strength and different levels of cognitive resources. Figure A5 indeed shows the clearest positive effect of the in-party cue as partisan social identity strength increases among those with higher levels of NfC. Importantly, the slope of the in-party cue is very similar for item 2 (see Figure A6) and item 3 (see Figure A7).

A similar pattern is seen for the effect of the out-party cue. Here we see that the negative interaction effect between the out-party cue, partisan social identity strength and NfC is the strongest and significant for the analyses using item 2 (see Table A12 and Figure A6). Inspection of item 1 and 3, shows that the effect of the out-party cue on policy support becomes stronger as partisan social identity increases among those with higher levels of NfC – but the effect is somewhat weaker compared to item 2.

To conclude, the result of the Food Irradiation Experiment do not seem to be dependent on one of the three specific items of the dependent variable. Obviously, there is some heterogeneity but the results always point in the same direction.

Table A11

Food Irradiation item 1 "Support": Policy support, party cues, cognitive resources and social identity strength

	Policy support					
	CRT		NFC		Cog resources	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
In-party cue	0.05	0.06	0.02	0.42*	0.05	0.18
	(0.05)	(0.06)	(0.11)	(0.20)	(0.09)	(0.17)
Out-party cue	0.05	0.04	0.22	0.33	0.15	0.46*
	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.12)	(0.22)	(0.10)	(0.20)
Partisan Identity Strength (PSID)	0.05	0.07	0.16	0.57	0.21	0.46
	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.19)	(0.29)	(0.15)	(0.24)
Cognitive resource	0.03	0.07	0.10	0.40	0.10	0.30
	(0.10)	(0.15)	(0.18)	(0.24)	(0.15)	(0.21)
In-party * PSID	0.02	−0.02	0.03	−0.94*	0.02	−0.26
	(0.10)	(0.11)	(0.10)	(0.41)	(0.10)	(0.30)
Out-party * PSID	−0.20	−0.20	−0.18	−0.44	−0.14	−0.80*
	(0.11)	(0.12)	(0.11)	(0.46)	(0.11)	(0.39)
In-party * Cognitive	−0.14	−0.28	0.0004	−0.70*	−0.04	−0.26
	(0.10)	(0.20)	(0.17)	(0.34)	(0.14)	(0.28)
Out-party * Cognitive	−0.17	−0.17	−0.35	−0.55	−0.25	−0.74*
	(0.10)	(0.20)	(0.18)	(0.36)	(0.16)	(0.32)
PSID * Cognitive	0.11	0.001	−0.16	−0.87	−0.23	−0.65
	(0.19)	(0.31)	(0.31)	(0.48)	(0.21)	(0.36)
In-party * PSID * Cognitive		0.36		1.72*		0.45
		(0.45)		(0.71)		(0.48)
Out-party * PSID * Cognitive		−0.04		0.47		1.01
		(0.46)		(0.74)		(0.58)
Age	−0.0004	−0.0004	−0.0003	−0.0002	−0.0003	−0.0004
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
Female	0.03	0.03	0.03	0.03	0.03	0.03
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Race: non-white	0.03	0.03	0.03	0.03	0.02	0.02
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Education: Some college	0.01	0.01	0.02	0.01	0.02	0.02
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Education: College	−0.07*	−0.07*	−0.07*	−0.07*	−0.07*	−0.07*
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Party: Republican	0.03	0.03	0.03	0.03	0.03	0.03
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Constant	0.49*	0.49*	0.43*	0.26	0.43*	0.31*
	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.12)	(0.15)	(0.11)	(0.14)
Observations	747	747	747	747	747	747
R^2	0.06	0.06	0.06	0.07	0.06	0.07

Note: *p<0.05

Table A12

Food Irradiation item 2 "Cost versus Benefit": Policy support, party cues, cognitive resources and social identity strength

	Policy support					
	CRT		NFC		Cog resources	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
In-party cue	−0.002	0.02	−0.16	−0.04	0.01	−0.18
	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.10)	(0.18)	(0.08)	(0.15)
Out-party cue	−0.01	0.01	−0.02	−0.37	−0.02	−0.21
	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.11)	(0.19)	(0.09)	(0.18)
Partisan Identity Strength (PSID)	0.15*	0.18*	0.30	0.19	−0.002	−0.26
	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.17)	(0.26)	(0.14)	(0.21)
Cognitive resource	−0.13	−0.001	−0.16	−0.25	−0.17	−0.37*
	(0.09)	(0.13)	(0.16)	(0.21)	(0.13)	(0.18)
In-party * PSID	0.08	0.03	0.07	−0.24	0.10	0.48
	(0.09)	(0.10)	(0.09)	(0.37)	(0.09)	(0.27)
Out-party * PSID	−0.07	−0.13	−0.08	0.78	−0.08	0.32
	(0.09)	(0.10)	(0.09)	(0.41)	(0.10)	(0.35)
In-party * Cognitive	−0.07	−0.26	0.26	0.04	−0.05	0.27
	(0.09)	(0.18)	(0.15)	(0.30)	(0.12)	(0.25)
Out-party * Cognitive	−0.03	−0.22	0.01	0.59	0.02	0.32
	(0.09)	(0.18)	(0.16)	(0.32)	(0.14)	(0.29)
PSID * Cognitive	0.20	−0.10	−0.18	0.02	0.30	0.71*
	(0.17)	(0.28)	(0.27)	(0.43)	(0.19)	(0.32)
In-party * PSID * Cognitive		0.46		0.57		−0.62
		(0.40)		(0.63)		(0.43)
Out-party * PSID * Cognitive		0.48		−1.41*		−0.63
		(0.41)		(0.66)		(0.52)
Age	−0.002*	−0.003*	−0.002*	−0.002*	−0.002*	−0.002*
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
Female	0.003	0.001	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Race: non-white	0.02	0.02	0.02	0.02	0.02	0.02
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Education: Some college	−0.03	−0.03	−0.02	−0.02	−0.03	−0.03
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Education: College	0.003	0.003	0.005	0.004	−0.0001	0.003
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Party: Republican	0.01	0.01	0.004	0.001	0.005	0.004
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Constant	0.60*	0.59*	0.66*	0.70*	0.68*	0.80*
	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.11)	(0.13)	(0.10)	(0.12)
Observations	747	747	747	747	747	747
R^2	0.09	0.09	0.09	0.10	0.08	0.08

Note: *p<0.05

Table A13

Food Irradiation item 3 "Good versus Bad": Policy support, party cues, cognitive resources and social identity strength

	Policy support					
	CRT		NFC		Cog resources	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
In-party cue	0.02	0.04	−0.05	0.16	−0.14	0.06
	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.11)	(0.19)	(0.09)	(0.16)
Out-party cue	−0.07	−0.05	−0.02	−0.18	−0.05	−0.04
	(0.05)	(0.06)	(0.11)	(0.21)	(0.10)	(0.19)
Partisan Identity Strength (PSID)	−0.09	−0.06	0.05	0.13	−0.01	0.18
	(0.07)	(0.08)	(0.18)	(0.28)	(0.14)	(0.22)
Cognitive resource	−0.06	0.03	0.12	0.18	0.01	0.16
	(0.10)	(0.14)	(0.17)	(0.23)	(0.14)	(0.19)
In-party * PSID	0.07	0.04	0.08	−0.44	0.07	−0.33
	(0.10)	(0.11)	(0.10)	(0.39)	(0.10)	(0.29)
Out-party * PSID	0.003	−0.05	0.02	0.42	0.02	0.02
	(0.10)	(0.11)	(0.10)	(0.43)	(0.10)	(0.37)
In-party * Cognitive	−0.15	−0.25	0.09	−0.29	0.24	−0.11
	(0.09)	(0.19)	(0.16)	(0.32)	(0.13)	(0.27)
Out-party * Cognitive	−0.01	−0.18	−0.09	0.17	−0.05	−0.07
	(0.09)	(0.19)	(0.17)	(0.34)	(0.15)	(0.30)
PSID * Cognitive	−0.005	−0.22	−0.22	−0.36	−0.10	−0.41
	(0.18)	(0.29)	(0.29)	(0.46)	(0.20)	(0.34)
In-party * PSID * Cognitive		0.25		0.95		0.68
		(0.42)		(0.67)		(0.45)
Out-party * PSID * Cognitive		0.43		−0.65		0.02
		(0.43)		(0.70)		(0.55)
Age	0.0004	0.0004	0.001	0.001	0.001	0.001
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
Female	0.05*	0.05*	0.06*	0.06*	0.06*	0.06*
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Race: non-white	−0.02	−0.02	−0.02	−0.02	−0.02	−0.02
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Education: Some college	0.04	0.04	0.03	0.03	0.03	0.02
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Education: College	−0.02	−0.02	−0.03	−0.03	−0.03	−0.04
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Party: Republican	0.001	0.001	−0.01	−0.01	−0.004	−0.005
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Constant	0.57*	0.56*	0.48*	0.45*	0.55*	0.46*
	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.11)	(0.14)	(0.10)	(0.13)
Observations	747	747	747	747	747	747
R^2	0.07	0.07	0.06	0.07	0.06	0.07
Note:						*p<0.05

Figure A5. Food Irradiation –**item 1 "Support"**: Marginal Effect of In-party and Out-party Cues on Policy Support across Levels of Partisan Social Identity Strength and Cognitive Resources



See model 2 (CRT), model 4 (NfC) and model 6 (Cognitive resources) of Table A11 for the output of the regression analysis.

Figure A6. Food Irradiation –**item 2 "Cost-benefit"**: Marginal Effect of In-party and Out-party Cues on Policy Support across Levels of Partisan Social Identity Strength and Cognitive Resources



See model 2 (CRT) and model 4 (NfC) of Table A12 for the output of the regression analysis.

Figure A7. Food Irradiation –**item 3 "Good vs. Bad"**: Marginal Effect of In-party and Out-party Cues on Policy Support across Levels of Partisan Social Identity Strength and Cognitive Resources



See model 2 (CRT) and model 4 (NfC) of Table A13 for the output of the regression analysis.

A.9 Inspection of non-linearity

We tested whether our results hold once we do not assume that partisan social identity strength has a linear effect. We grouped partisan social identity strength in each of the three studies in a categorical variable capturing the lowest tertile, the middle tertile and upper tertile of partisan social identity strength. We reran our models using this categorical variable.

In Figure A8 we plot the results of the analyses of the categorical partisan social identity strength measure. The results do not show any signs of non-linearity. The effect of the party cues tends to become stronger among those with a strong partisan identity and a high level of cognitive resources. The results also clearly mirror those presented in Figure 1 of the paper.

Figure A8. **Food Irradiation Experiment**: Inspection of non-linearity



B. Farm Subsidy Experiment

B.1 Sample characteristics

The Farm Subsidy Experiment was conducted in June of 2017 with 1,302 members of the Qualtrics online panel who had, in a previous assessment, indicated an identification with one of the two major parties. In our survey, participants responded to the party identification question again, and those who identified with or leaned toward the Democratic Party (N=647, 49.7%) or the Republican Party (N=655, 50.3%) were included in the analyses.

In exchange for participation, Qualtrics panelists receive points which they can exchange for various rewards. The sample was 50 percent female, 83 percent non-hispanic white, 10 percent black, and 10 percent hispanic. The median age interval was between 45 and 54, and 40 percent of participants had at least a college degree.

B.2 Treatments

The item-wording of the Farm Policy Experiment was as follows:

> The U.S. government gives billions of dollars to American farmers every year. The reasons for this policy, which is supported by [*Republicans / Democrats / various groups*], are to protect American farmers from losing their jobs and to keep the cost of food low for Americans.
>
> However, [*Democrats / Republicans / various other groups*] have argued that the government should stop giving money to farmers. They note that this policy prevents poor agricultural countries from growing economically and bringing their citizens out of poverty. Also, the money saved by Americans in food costs is taken from them in taxes anyway.

B.3 Partisan social identity strength

Again, we employ the 8-item strength of party identity battery (Bankert et al., 2017). The item wording of the 8-items are provided in Appendix A.3. In the Farm Policy Experiment respondents answer the eight items on a scale from ranging from “strongly agree” (1) to "strongly disagree" (5). We chose this response options because this would create consistency in the response scales across different batteries. Importantly, the agree-disagree wording has been used by others that relied upon the same (Bankert et al., 2017, in their U.K. sample) or very similar batteries (Greene, 1999, 2000). Table B14 provides the factor loadings showing that the items generally have an acceptable loading on the latent dimension. Figure B9, plots the distribution of the partisan social identity strength measure showing a relatively normal distribution. The partisan social identity strength measure has the following psychometric properties: m=.64, sd=.21, skewness=-.33, kurtosis=2.69, α=.89, ω=.92).

Table B14
Study 2 Farm Policy Experiment: Standardized Factor Loadings Partisan Social Identity Strength

	Standardized Factor Loading	p-value
1	0.78	0.00
2	0.61	0.00
3	0.78	0.00
4	0.73	0.00
5	0.67	0.00
6	0.81	0.00
7	0.86	0.00
8	0.82	0.00

Figure B9. Study 2 Farm Policy Experiment: Histogram Partisan Social Identity Strength



B.4 Cognitive resources

Cognitive Reflection Test. We employ a 7-item cognitive reflection test introduced by Toplak, West, and Stanovich (2014). The correct answer as well as the intuitive but incorrect answer are provided in parentheses. Note that the first three items were exactly the same items as we employed in study 1 (see also, Frederick, 2005). In Table B15 we show the tetrachoric correlations between the seven CRT items. We find strong and positive correlations between all items. Figure B10 provides a histogram of the distribution of the CRT. Note that the CRT has the following psychometric properties: m=.19, sd=.24, skewness=1.58, kurtosis=4.99, α=.74, ω=.85).

Figure B10. Study 2 Farm Policy Experiment: Histogram Cognitive Reflection Test



Table B15
Study 2 Farm Policy Experiment: Tetrachoric Correlations Cognitive Reflection Test

	CRT1	CRT2	CRT3	CRT4	CRT5	CRT6	CRT7
CRT1	1.00	0.62	0.71	0.59	0.68	0.34	0.46
CRT2		1.00	0.71	0.63	0.66	0.21	0.48
CRT3			1.00	0.66	0.78	0.28	0.64
CRT4				1.00	0.66	0.28	0.55
CRT5					1.00	0.37	0.63
CRT6						1.00	0.25
CRT7							1.00

- (1) A bat and a ball cost $1.10 in total. The bat costs a dollar more than the ball. How much does the ball cost? (**Correct answer = 5 cents**; intuitive answer = 10 cents)
- (2) If it takes 5 machines 5 minutes to make 5 widgets, how long would it take 100 machines to make 100 widgets? (**Correct answer = 5 minutes**; intuitive answer = 100 minutes)
- (3) In a lake, there is a patch of lily pads. Every day, the patch doubles in size. If it takes 48 days for the patch to cover the entire lake, how long would it take for the patch to cover half of the lake? [**Correct answer = 47 days**; intuitive answer = 24 days]
- (4) If John can drink one barrel of water in 6 days, and Mary can drink one barrel of water in 12 days, how long would it take them to drink one barrel of water together? (**Correct answer = 4 days**; intuitive answer = 9 days)

- (5) Jerry received both the 15th highest and the 15th lowest mark in the class. How many students are in the class? (**correct answer = 29 students**; intuitive answer = 30 students)
- (6) A man buys a pig for $60, sells it for $70, buys it back for $80, and sells it finally for $90. How much has he made? (**Correct answer = $20**; intuitive answer = $10)
- (7) Simon decided to invest $8,000 in the stock market one day early in 2008. Six months after he invested, on July 17, the stocks he had purchased were down 50%. Fortunately for Simon, from July 17 to October 17, the stocks he had purchased went up 75%. At this point, Simon has: a. broken even in the stock market, b. is ahead of where he began, c. has lost money (**Correct answer = c** because the value at this point is $7000; intuitive answer = b).

Need for Cognition. In line with the Food Irradiation Experiment, we employ the validated 18-item Need for Cognition battery developed by Cacioppo et al. (1984). The item wording of the 18-items are provided in Appendix A.4. In this Study the items were scored on a five-point Likert-type scale ranging from "Extremely uncharacteristic of me" (1) through "Extremely characteristic of me". Note, the addition "of me" to the "Extremely uncharacteristic", is slightly different compared to the wording in the Food Irradiation Experiment. We don't expect this to affect the results as both have been used in the past (Arceneaux & Vander Wielen, 2017; Bakker & Lelkes, 2018; Bullock, 2011). Table B16 provides the factor loadings showing that the items generally have an acceptable loading on the latent dimension. Figure B11, plots the distribution of the Need for Cognition showing a relatively normal distribution. The NfC has the following psychometric properties: m=.54, sd=.16, skewness=-.13, kurtosis=3.50, α=.85, ω=.88)

Table B16
Study 2 Farm Policy Experiment: Standardized Factor Loadings Need for Cognition:

	Standardized Factor Loading	p-value
1	0.63	
2	0.66	0.00
3	0.65	0.00
4	0.70	0.00
5	0.71	0.00
6	0.63	0.00
7	0.65	0.00
8	0.58	0.00
9	0.58	0.00
10	0.60	0.00
11	0.66	0.00
12	0.69	0.00
13	0.61	0.00
14	0.55	0.00
15	0.61	0.00
16	0.61	0.00
17	0.64	0.00
18	0.61	0.00

Figure B11. Study 2 Farm Policy Experiment: Histogram Need for Cognition



Political Knowledge. We employed a ten item political knowledge battery adopted from the ANES and Clifford and Jerit (2016). The items are listed below with the correct answers boldfaced. In Table B17 we show the tetrachoric correlations between the seven CRT items. We find strong and positive correlations between all items. Figure B12 provides a histogram of the distribution of the knowledge inventory. Note that the political knowledge inventory has the following psychometric properties: m=.59, sd=.29, skewness=-.26, kurtosis=1.89, α=.81, ω=.85).

Table B17
Study 2 Farm Policy Experiment: Tetrachoric Correlations Political Knowledge

	data.CRT1	data.CRT2	data.CRT3	data.CRT4	data.CRT5	data.CRT6	data.CRT7
data.CRT1	1.00	0.62	0.71	0.59	0.68	0.34	0.46
data.CRT2		1.00	0.71	0.63	0.66	0.21	0.48
data.CRT3			1.00	0.66	0.78	0.28	0.64
data.CRT4				1.00	0.66	0.28	0.55
data.CRT5					1.00	0.37	0.63
data.CRT6						1.00	0.25
data.CRT7							1.00

Figure B12. Political Knowledge



(1) What job or political office does Mike Pence now hold?

- Governor of Pennsylvania
- Majority leader in the Senate
- Speaker of the House of Representatives
- **Vice President**
- Chair of the Federal Reserve Board

(2) What job or political office does Paul Ryan now hold?

- Governor of Pennsylvania
- Majority leader in the Senate
- **Speaker of the House of Representatives**
- Vice President
- Chair of the Federal Reserve Board

(3) Who is currently the Chancellor of Germany?

- Nigel Farage
- Marine Le Pen
- Emmanuel Macron
- **Angela Merkel**
- Gerhardt Schroder

(4) Who is currently the Managing Director of the International Monetary Fund?

- **Christine Lagarde**
- Mitch McConnell
- Ban Ki Moon
- Vladimir Putin
- Janet Yellen

(5) What job or political office does John Roberts now hold?

- Attorney General
- **Chief Justice of the Supreme Court**
- Deputy Attorney General
- Secretary of State

- White House Chief of Staff

(6) What does the term "Common Core" refer to?

- A plan to mandate English as the official language
- A set of nutrition standards for school lunches
- An international treaty for dealing with global climate change
- **School curriculum standards for language and math**
- The military's code of conduct

(7) How long is the term of office for a senator in the United States Senate?

- 1 year
- 2 years
- 4 years
- 5 years
- **6 years**

(8) Who is the current Prime Minister of Israel?

- **Benjamin Netanyahu**
- Shimon Peres
- Ariel Sharon
- Hosni Mubarak
- Hassan Rouhani

(9) Who is the current United States Secretary of Education?

- Stephen Bannon
- Rex Tillerson
- **Betsy Devos**
- Kellyanne Conway
- James Mattis

(10) Who was Hillary Clinton's running mate in the 2016 United States Presidential election?

- Martin O'Malley
- Debbie Wasserman Shultz
- Joe Biden
- Elizabeth Warren
- **Tim Kaine**

Latent cognitive resources. We estimated a confirmatory factor analysis for the overarching cognitive resources variable using a 7-item CRT battery, a 18 item NfC inventory and 10 item Political Knowledge. First, we estimated a confirmatory factor analysis whereby all items load on the latent cognitive resources variable. Table B18 provides the factor loadings showing that the items generally have an acceptable loading on the latent dimension. Figure B13, plots the distribution of the latent cognitive resources variable, showing a relatively normal distribution. The cognitive resources variable has the following psychometric properties: (m=.50, sd=.14, skewness=.20, kurtosis=3.63, α=.85, ω=.88)

Figure B13. Study 2 Farm Policy Experiment: Histogram Cognitive Resources



Table B18

Study 2 Farm Policy Experiment: Standardized Factor Loadings for Cognitive Resources (NfC+CRT+Knowledge)

	Standardized Factor Loading	p-value	battery
1	0.62	0.00	NfC
2	0.77	0.00	NfC
3	0.62	0.00	NfC
4	0.59	0.00	NfC
5	0.52	0.00	NfC
6	0.60	0.00	NfC
7	0.55	0.00	NfC
8	0.29	0.00	NfC
9	0.50	0.00	NfC
10	0.67	0.00	NfC
11	0.70	0.00	NfC
12	0.55	0.00	NfC
13	0.63	0.00	NfC
14	0.61	0.00	NfC
15	0.61	0.00	NfC
16	0.27	0.00	NfC
17	0.40	0.00	NfC
18	0.35	0.00	NfC
19	0.41	0.00	CRT
20	0.40	0.00	CRT
21	0.66	0.00	CRT
22	0.45	0.00	CRT
23	0.62	0.00	CRT
24	0.12	0.00	CRT
25	0.39	0.00	CRT
26	0.38	0.00	Political Knowledge
27	0.32	0.00	Political Knowledge
28	0.48	0.00	Political Knowledge
29	0.19	0.00	Political Knowledge
30	0.32	0.00	Political Knowledge
31	0.38	0.00	Political Knowledge
32	0.36	0.00	Political Knowledge
33	0.37	0.00	Political Knowledge
34	0.43	0.00	Political Knowledge
35	0.44	0.00	Political Knowledge

B.5 Randomization checks

We checked whether CRT, NfC, Political Knowledge (Pol Know), the latent cognitive resources variable and partisan social identity strength were equally distributed across the different conditions in our experiment. As can be seen in Table B19 there is no systematic difference in CRT, NfC, Political Knowledge, latent cognitive resources or partisan social identity strength across out treatments.

Table B19
Study 2 Farm Policy Experiment: Balance check of moderators

	Dependent variable:				
	CRT	NfC	Pol Know	Cog resources	Partisan Identity Strength
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Democrats support	−0.01	−0.02	0.02	−0.01	−0.004
	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Repbulicans support	0.004	−0.01	0.03	−0.004	−0.01
	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Constant	0.19*	0.55*	0.58*	0.50*	0.64*
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Observations	1,302	1,302	1,302	1,302	1,261
R^2	0.0004	0.002	0.002	0.001	0.0002

Note: *p<0.05

In our analyses we use a recoded version of the treatment indicator capturing whether the party the respondents supports is endorsing the policy (1) or not (0). In Table B20 we present the results whereby we regress our moderators on the In-party cue and the Out-party cue. The results show that CRT (column 1), political knowledge (column 3), latent cognitive resources (column 4) and partisan social identity strength (column 4) are balanced across the conditions as indicated by the lack of significant effects of the treatment indicator on the dependent variables. We only see that in the out-party cue condition people score a bit lower on the NfC (b=-.02, se=.01).

We also test whether the covariates don't differ per condition. In Table B21 we show that age, education, race and partisanship (Democrat=0; Republican=1) were equally distributed across the conditions (see non-significant coefficients).

Finally, we test whether the assignment to the In-party and Out-party cues does not systematically vary based upon some of the covariates (gender, age, education, race and partisanship). In Table B22 we show that age, education, race and partisanship (Democrat=0; Republican=1) were equally distributed across the In-party and Out-party cue conditions (see non-significant coefficients). In the Out-party cue condition, there seem to be a bit more woman (b=.27, se=.14, p=.049). The effect is weak and we control for sex, as well as the other covariates, in our models.

Table B20
Study 2 Farm Policy Experiment: Balance checks moderators per treatment condition

	Dependent variable:				
	CRT	NfC	Pol Know	Cog resources	Party Identity Strength
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
In-party cue	−0.0004	−0.01	0.03	−0.001	−0.01
	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Out-party cue	−0.003	−0.02*	0.01	−0.02	−0.001
	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Constant	0.19*	0.55*	0.58*	0.50*	0.64*
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Observations	1,302	1,302	1,302	1,302	1,261
R^2	0.0000	0.004	0.002	0.003	0.001

Note: *p<0.05

Table B21
Study 2 Farm Policy Experiment: Balance Checks Demographics

	Dependent variable:				
	Sex	Age	Education	Non-white	Partisanship
	logistic	*OLS*	*ordered logistic*	*logistic*	*logistic*
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Democrats support	0.25	0.11	−0.03	−0.16	0.02
	(0.14)	(0.11)	(0.13)	(0.18)	(0.14)
Repbulicans support	0.06	0.19	−0.03	−0.16	0.08
	(0.14)	(0.12)	(0.13)	(0.18)	(0.14)
Constant	−0.11	3.77*		−1.45*	−0.02
	(0.10)	(0.08)		(0.13)	(0.10)
Observations	1,302	1,302	1,296	1,302	1,302
R^2		0.002			
Akaike Inf. Crit.	1,807.17			1,203.58	1,810.52

Note: *p<0.05

Table B22
Study 2 Farm Policy Experiment: In-party vs. Out-party balance checks demographics

	Dependent variable:				
	Sex	Age	Education	Non-white	Partisanship
	logistic	*OLS*	*ordered logistic*	*logistic*	*logistic*
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
In-party cue	0.04	0.15	0.07	−0.32	−0.06
	(0.14)	(0.11)	(0.13)	(0.18)	(0.14)
Out-party cue	0.28*	0.14	−0.13	−0.02	0.15
	(0.14)	(0.11)	(0.13)	(0.18)	(0.14)
Constant	−0.11	3.77*		−1.45*	−0.02
	(0.10)	(0.08)		(0.13)	(0.10)
Observations	1,302	1,302	1,296	1,302	1,302
R^2		0.002			
Akaike Inf. Crit.	1,805.93			1,200.90	1,808.19
Note:					*p<0.05

B.6 Main effects

In this section we report results of analyses that involve comparisons between each of the party cue conditions and the control (no cues) condition to assess the main effects of the treatments. We start with a model regressing farm subsidy support on in-party support and out-party support dummy variables (with no cues as the reference category), partisan identity strength, and CRT score (Column 1, Table B23). We find that, compared to the control condition, there was a negative effect of out-party support (b=-.07, se=.02, p<.01), but no effect of in-party support (b=.02, se=.02, p=ns). These findings suggest that partisans did not increase their support of a popular status quo policy (maintaining farm subsidies) when told that their party supports (and the opposing party opposes) this policy, but did decrease their support of this status quo policy when told that the opposing party supports (and their party opposes) this policy. The asymmetric finding of party cues might be interpreted as a reflection of status quo bias: one favors existing subsidy policy as the default, and to the same extent that one would favor that policy had one received reinforcing partisan cues. Only when this status quo policy is supported by the opposition and opposed by one's own party does support decline. However, we did not predict this asymmetry and the interpretation we offer here is post-hoc. Note the the results do not change if we substitute CRT for NfC (model 2) or Political Knowledge (model 3).

When it comes to the covariates, we observe that partisan social identity strength is associated with more support for the policy, while CRT (model 1 Table B23, b=-.14, se=.03), and political knowledge (model 3 Table B23, b=-.15, se=.03) are associated with less supportive for the policy. NfC (model 2) and the latent cognitive resources are not associated with policy support.

Table B23
Study 2 Farm Policy Experiment: Main Effect of Party Cues on Policy Support

	Policy support			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
In-Party cue	0.02	0.02	0.02	0.02
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Out-Party cue	−0.07*	−0.07*	−0.07*	−0.07*
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
PID Strength	0.18*	0.20*	0.18*	0.20*
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
CRT	−0.14*			
	(0.03)			
NfC		0.01		
		(0.04)		
Political Knowledge			−0.15*	
			(0.03)	
Cognitive resources				−0.07
				(0.05)
Age	−0.02*	−0.02*	−0.01	−0.02*
	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)
Female	0.02	0.03	0.02	0.02
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Race: non-white	−0.04*	−0.03	−0.05*	−0.03
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Education: Some college	−0.03	−0.04*	−0.02	−0.04
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Education: College	−0.07*	−0.08*	−0.05*	−0.08*
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Party: Republican	0.0003	0.001	−0.003	0.0005
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Constant	0.73*	0.69*	0.76*	0.73*
	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.04)
Observations	1,258	1,258	1,258	1,258
R^2	0.11	0.09	0.11	0.09
Note:				*p<0.05

B.7 Inspection of non-linearity

Again, we tested whether our results hold once we do not assume that partisan social identity strength has a linear effect. We grouped partisan social identity strength in each of the three studies in a categorical variable capturing the lowest tertile, the middle tertile and upper tertile of partisan social identity strength. We reran our models using this categorical variable. In Figure B14 we plot the results of the analyses of the categorical partisan social identity strength measure. The results do not show many signs of non-linearity. Across the four measures the party cues tends to become stronger among those with a strong partisan identity and a high level of cognitive resources. The results thereby mirror those presented in Figure 2 of the paper.

Figure B14. **Farm Subsidy Experiment**: Inspection of non-linearity



B.8 Results using the 3-item CRT battery

The seven-item cognitive reflection task consisted of the three items that make-up the 3-item cognitive reflection task (Toplak et al., 2014). To examine whether we arrive at similar results using the 3-item Cognitive Reflection Task, we created the 3-item battery. The 3-item battery has similar descriptive statistics (M=0.13, SD=0.26, Min=0, Max=1) compared to the 3-item battery used in the Food Irradiation Experiment. Not surprisingly, the 3-item battery correlates highly with the 7-item battery (r=.85). To examine whether the combination of strong partisan identity strength and high cognitive resources leads to the greatest amount of cue-taking, we regressed policy support on the two cue condition dummies, the 3-item CRT, partisan identity strength, all two-way interactions (excluding between the two dummies), and three-way interactions between CRT, partisan identity strength, and each of the two cue condition dummies. Contrary to the results reported in Figure 2, the three-way interaction involving the out-party cue was negative but not significant (b=-.14, se = .11, ns) whereas that involving in-party cue was not significant (b=.03, se=.11).

To further examine this interaction, we plot the marginal effects of the condition dummies on policy support as a function of party identity strength for those that score low (i.e., -1SD below the mean), modest (i.e., mean) and high (i.e., +1SD above the mean) on the 3-item cognitive reflection test (Figure B15). In line with the results obtained using the 7-item CRT (Figure 3 of the main text), there is no effect of the party-cues among those low on CRT as well as those that score at the mean on CRT.

In line with the results using the 7-item CRT, the strength of party identification does not condition the effect of the in-party cue on policy support (b=.04, se=.12, ns) among the more reflective respondents (i.e., those that score 1 standard deviation above the mean). Yet, we see in the most right-hand panel that using the 3-item CRT battery, the effect of the out-party cue is not moderated by partisan identity strength (b=-.21, se=.12, p=.076). The effect is in the same direction as the results reported in Figure 2 but it is not statistically significant at conventional levels. So using the 3-item CRT we would conclude that cognitive reflection *does not* moderate the reliance upon party-cues in interaction with party identity strength. Yet, in the main text we show that we do reach the conclusion that among these reflective participants, strong partisans are more likely to oppose a policy when faced with an out-party cue compared to weak partisans (b=-.27, se=.12, p=.019).

The results in this appendix show that using the brief 3-item CRT would lead us to disregard CRT as a moderator of party cues, while a larger measure – which leads to less measurement error and removes floor effects – leads us to conclude that the CRT is a meaningful moderator of the reliance upon party cues in line with our argument.

Figure B15. Farm Subsidy Experiment: Marginal Effect of Party Cues on Policy Support across Levels of Party Identity by Cognitive Reflection Score measured with the **3-item battery**



C. Study 3: Replication of Food and Farm Policy Experiments

C.1 Replication of Food Irradiation Experiment

Sample. Study 3 was conducted among 1,911 panelists from *Bovitz's* online panel. In total 2522 participants started the study but 611 dropped out of the study before they reached the Food Irradiation Experiment. We collected measures of partisan social identity strength (see Appendix C.8), CRT, NfC and cognitive resources (all Appendix C.9) followed by the food irradiation experiment, a filler task, and, finally, the farm subsidy experiment. See Appendix C.6 for sample description and analysis of drop-out between the two experiments; treatment wording Appendix C.7 and randomization checks Appendix C.10.

Results Food Irradiation Experiment. In line with Study 1, support for the ban of food irradiation decreased by about .05 points when the out-party supported the policy (Appendix C.11), but, in contrast to Study 1, the in-party cue *increased* support by .05 points. In line with Study 1, partisan social identity strength was not associated with policy support, while those higher on CRT, NFC, and cognitive resources were somewhat less supportive of the policy.

Turning to the test of the bounded rationality model, we found that in-party cue (relative to control condition) had a greater influence on policy support to the degree that the individual was high in cognitive resources based on CRT (b=.14, se=.05; model 1, Table **??**), NfC (b=.14, se=.05; model 3 Table **??** model 3), and the latent cognitive resources variable (b=.14, se=.05; model 5 Table **??**). This pattern did not replicate for the effect of the out-party cue. Again, we did not find support for the bounded rationality view that cues are primarily followed by individuals with low cognitive resources; and we found some support for the opposite. In line with the Study 1 Food Irradiation experiment, receptivity to the in-party cue was especially strong among people high in partisan social identity in the NFC (b=.17, se=.06, model 3) and Cognitive resources (b=.19, se=.09, model 5) models but not in the CRT model (b=.02, se=.05, model 1).

Next, we turn to the test of the expressive utility model. In the analysis with CRT, neither of the three-way interactions was significant. Figure C16 shows that those low on the CRT (upper left panel), in-party cue (b=.04, se=.07) and out-party cue (b=.01, se=.08) had no effect on policy support relative to control at any level of partisan social identity. Contrary to the results in Study 1 Food Irradiation experiment, the in-party cue lead to more support for the policy among respondents with a strong partisan social identity and high CRT score (b=.24, se=.08, p=.001; see also top-right panel of Figure C16). At the mean of CRT – middle panel – we see also a positive but somewhat weaker marginal effect of the In-party cue on policy support when partisan social identity is strong (b=.14, se=.05, p<.01). In line with Study 1, the effect of the out-party cue on policy support was not conditioned by partisan social identity strength (b=.10, se=.08) among those high on CRT.

The model with NFC closely mirrors the results with the CRT in this study and those with NFC in the Study 1. Again, the three-way interactions are not significant. The almost horizontal slopes of the marginal effects of the in-party and out-party cue over the range of partisan social identity among those low on NfC (see Figure C16) indicates that partisan social identity did not condition the reliance upon cues among those low on NfC. Among those high in NfC, the marginal effect of the in-party cue – compared to the control condition – on policy support becomes stronger as partisan social identity increases (b=.21, se=.08, p<.01). While the effect of the out-party cue is not moderated by partisan social identity strength among those high in NFC.

The results for the cognitive resources variable closely mirror the findings in the original Food Irradiation experiment (bottom panel of C16): only among those with high (to modest)

levels of cognitive resources we see that the effect of the In-party cue becomes stronger as partisan social identity increases (b=.24, se=.08, p=.002).

To summarize, we replicated the findings from the Food Irradiation Experiment reported in Study 1 and failed to find support for the bounded rationality perspective on partisan cue receptivity. We find mixed support for the expressive utility perspective on partisan cue receptivity.

Table C24

Farm Subsidy Experiment: Policy support, party cues, reflection and social identity strength

	Policy support							
	CRT		NFC		Knowledge		Cog resources	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
In-party cue	0.02	0.04	−0.05	0.08	0.01	0.23^{+}	0.02	0.16
	(0.06)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.16)	(0.06)	(0.13)	(0.06)	(0.17)
Out-party cue	0.003	−0.08	0.01	−0.14	0.12^{+}	−0.13	0.003	−0.19
	(0.06)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.15)	(0.07)	(0.12)	(0.06)	(0.17)
Partisan Identity Strength (PSID)	0.27*	0.24*	0.40*	0.38*	0.40*	0.37*	0.27*	0.40*
	(0.06)	(0.07)	(0.11)	(0.17)	(0.09)	(0.13)	(0.06)	(0.19)
Cognitive resource	0.11	−0.02	0.16	0.15	0.10	0.07	0.11	0.13
	(0.10)	(0.16)	(0.13)	(0.18)	(0.09)	(0.14)	(0.10)	(0.23)
In-party * PSID	−0.01	−0.05	−0.01	−0.22	−0.01	−0.34^{+}	−0.01	−0.34
	(0.08)	(0.09)	(0.08)	(0.25)	(0.08)	(0.18)	(0.08)	(0.27)
Out-party * PSID	−0.08	0.06	−0.08	0.16	−0.12	0.24	−0.08	0.31
	(0.08)	(0.10)	(0.08)	(0.25)	(0.08)	(0.17)	(0.08)	(0.27)
In-party * Cognitive	0.02	−0.16	0.13	−0.10	0.03	−0.32^{+}	0.02	−0.28
	(0.07)	(0.23)	(0.10)	(0.28)	(0.06)	(0.19)	(0.07)	(0.33)
Out-party * Cognitive	−0.09	0.37^{+}	−0.05	0.23	−0.18*	0.26	−0.09	0.36
	(0.07)	(0.22)	(0.10)	(0.28)	(0.06)	(0.19)	(0.07)	(0.34)
PSID * Cognitive	−0.37*	−0.15	−0.30^{+}	−0.28	−0.30*	−0.25	−0.37*	−0.33
	(0.15)	(0.26)	(0.18)	(0.30)	(0.11)	(0.20)	(0.15)	(0.36)
In-party * PSID * Cognitive		0.29		0.37		0.54^{+}		0.65
		(0.37)		(0.44)		(0.28)		(0.52)
Out-party * PSID * Cognitive		−0.78*		−0.47		−0.68*		−0.80
		(0.34)		(0.44)		(0.28)		(0.53)
Age	−0.02*	−0.02*	−0.02*	−0.02*	−0.01^{+}	−0.01*	−0.02*	−0.02*
	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)
Female	0.02	0.02^{+}	0.03^{+}	0.03*	0.03^{+}	0.03^{+}	0.02	0.03*
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Race: non-white	−0.04*	−0.04*	−0.03^{+}	−0.03^{+}	−0.06*	−0.06*	−0.04*	−0.04^{+}
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Education: Some college	−0.03^{+}	−0.03^{+}	−0.04*	−0.04*	−0.02	−0.02	−0.03^{+}	−0.04*
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Education: College	−0.07*	−0.07*	−0.09*	−0.09*	−0.05*	−0.05*	−0.07*	−0.08*
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Party: Republican	−0.002	−0.002	−0.001	−0.001	−0.01	−0.005	−0.002	−0.001
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Constant	0.66*	0.69*	0.59*	0.60*	0.58*	0.60*	0.66*	0.61*
	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.08)	(0.10)	(0.07)	(0.10)	(0.05)	(0.12)
Observations	1,258	1,258	1,258	1,258	1,258	1,258	1,258	1,258
R^2	0.11	0.12	0.10	0.10	0.13	0.14	0.11	0.10

Note: +p<.1; *p<0.05

Figure C16. Replication Food Irradiation: Marginal Effect of Party Cues on Policy Support across Levels of Partisan Social Identity Strength and Cognitive Resources



See Table **??**, *model 2 (CRT), model 4 (NfC) and model 6 (Cognitive resources) for the regression output.*

C.2 Replication of the Farm Policy Experiment

In line with Study 2, we find that support for farm subsidies decreased by about .09 points when the out-party supported the policy (see Appendix C.11). But contrary to Study 2, the in-party cue *increased* support by .03 points. In line with Study 2, partisan social identity strength was positively associated with policy support, while those higher on CRT, NFC and cognitive resources are somewhat less supportive of the policy.

Turning to the bounded rationality model, we found no evidence that cue-taking effects were stronger for those low in cognitive resources (see Table C25): the interactions between CRT and in-party cue and out-party cue were not significant (Table C25 model 1), and similar results were obtained using NfC as well as the latent cognitive resource variable (see model 3 and 5 of Table C25). Like the original study, cue receptivity did not differ across level of partisan social identification, as no significant interaction effects between partisan social identity and either experimental condition dummy emerged in any of the analyses (see Table C25).

Next, we tested the expressive utility model: among respondents that score low on CRT (left panel of Figure C17), both in-party cues (b=.11, se=.09) and out-party cues (b=-.01, se=.09) have no effect on policy support relative to control at any level of partisan social identity. Among respondents high on the CRT (right panel), we see that out-party cue had its strongest effect among those most strongly identified with the party. Here, highly socially identified

partisans are more likely to oppose a policy when faced with an out-party cue compared to low social identification partisans (b=-.16, se=.09, p=.08). However, partisan social identity did not condition the effect of the in-party cue on policy support (b=.07, se=.10).

For the analyses with NfC (see model 4 in Table C25), the three-way interactions were not significant. However, the negative slope of the out-party cue in the middle panel of Figure C17 among those high in the NfC (right-hand panel) is in line with expectations and the results with NfC from the prior two experiments (b=-0.19, se=.09, p=0.04). Finally, the cognitive resources model in the bottom panel of Figure C25 shows a similar pattern, whereby among those with high cognitive resources the negative effect of the out-party cue on policy support becomes stronger as partisan social identity increases.

To summarize, we directly replicated the results from the Farm Subsidy Experiment using a novel sample.

Table C25

Replication Farm Policy study: party cues, reflection and social identity strength

	Policy support					
	CRT		NFC		Cog resoucres	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
In-party cue	−0.0001	−0.01	−0.03	0.04	−0.02	0.11
	(0.04)	(0.05)	(0.06)	(0.12)	(0.07)	(0.14)
Out-party cue	−0.05	−0.09	0.02	−0.17	−0.001	−0.15
	(0.04)	(0.05)	(0.06)	(0.13)	(0.07)	(0.14)
Partisan Identity Strength (PSID)	0.11*	0.09	0.21*	0.16	0.15	0.15
	(0.05)	(0.06)	(0.09)	(0.14)	(0.10)	(0.16)
Cognitive resource	−0.18*	−0.25*	−0.05	−0.10	−0.18	−0.18
	(0.07)	(0.11)	(0.09)	(0.13)	(0.12)	(0.18)
In-party * PSID	−0.09+	−0.07	0.02	−0.10	−0.01	−0.25
	(0.06)	(0.16)	(0.08)	(0.19)	(0.10)	(0.25)
Out-party * PSID	0.01	0.17	−0.11	0.20	−0.10	0.18
	(0.05)	(0.15)	(0.08)	(0.20)	(0.10)	(0.26)
In-party * Cognitive	0.10	0.11	0.10	−0.03	0.11	−0.12
	(0.07)	(0.09)	(0.07)	(0.20)	(0.07)	(0.23)
Out-party * Cognitive	−0.09	−0.02	−0.08	0.26	−0.07	0.19
	(0.07)	(0.09)	(0.07)	(0.21)	(0.07)	(0.24)
PSID * Cognitive	0.14	0.27	−0.06	0.03	0.02	0.01
	(0.10)	(0.18)	(0.13)	(0.22)	(0.18)	(0.31)
In-party * PSID * Cognitive		−0.04		0.21		0.44
		(0.27)		(0.31)		(0.42)
Out-party * PSID * Cognitive		−0.30		−0.56+		−0.49
		(0.24)		(0.33)		(0.44)
Age	−0.001*	−0.001*	−0.001+	−0.001+	−0.001+	−0.001*
	(0.0004)	(0.0004)	(0.0004)	(0.0004)	(0.0004)	(0.0004)
Female	0.05*	0.05*	0.06*	0.06*	0.06*	0.06*
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Race: non-white	−0.01	−0.01	−0.01	−0.01	−0.01	−0.01
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Education: Some college	0.01	0.01	0.002	0.001	0.01	0.01
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Education: College	−0.03	−0.03	−0.04*	−0.05*	−0.03+	−0.03+
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Party: Republican	0.05*	0.05*	0.04*	0.04*	0.04*	0.04*
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Constant	0.67*	0.69*	0.64*	0.67*	0.71*	0.71*
	(0.04)	(0.05)	(0.07)	(0.09)	(0.07)	(0.10)
Observations	1,741	1,741	1,768	1,768	1,741	1,741
R^2	0.11	0.11	0.10	0.10	0.10	0.11

Note: +p<.1; *p<0.05

Figure C17. Replication Farm Subsidy: Marginal Effect of Party Cues on Policy Support across Levels of Partisan Social Identity Strength and Cognitive Resources



See Table C25, model 2 (CRT), model 4 (NfC) and model 6 (Cognitive resources) for the regression output.

C.3 Inspection of the Mechanism: Reading time

We measured the time participants spend reading the prompts. In Table C26 we present the summary statistics of the reading time in seconds. As can be gleaned from the Table C26, it seems that people spend less time reading the treatments when they are in the In-party or Out-party condition compared to the No-cues (or control) condition. Following the descriptive statistics, we tested whether respondents read longer based upon the cue-condition, their partisan social identity strength and their cognitive resources. Do note that this model was not pre-registered. We do this by regressing the log-transformed time that respondents took to read the treatment on the party cues, partisan social identity strength and the cognitive resource variable plus the standard controls. In the Food Irradiation Experiment we find that respondents in the In-party and Out-party cue conditions spend less time reading the article (model 1, 4 and 7 of Table C28).

Table C26
Study 3 Food Irradiation Experiment: Reading Time

	Cue	Mean	SD	Min	Max
1	No cues	106.47	353.69	2.28	7616.21
2	In-party cue	78.14	114.59	1.97	1443.82
3	Out-party cue	73.26	100.39	2.06	1407.65

Interestingly, the pattern reverses in the Farm Subsidy Experiment. Table C27 shows that people in the No cues condition spend less time reading the article compared to people in the In-party and Out-party condition. This is confirmed by our regression analyses in model 1 and 4 of Table C29. Here, participants in the Out-party cue (and in-party cue but non-significant) condition spend *more* time reading the treatment. This difference could be explained by the characteristics of the issue, the length of the treatment (the Food Irradiation Experiment was a lot longer compared to the Farm Policy Experiment, see Appendix A.2 and B.2 for item wording) or other unknown differences.

Table C27
Study 3 Farm Subsidy Experiment: Reading Time

	Cue	Mean	SD	Min	Max
1	No cues	39.99	53.08	1.34	497.84
2	In-party cue	59.17	195.02	1.36	2928.48
3	Out-party cue	71.52	436.93	1.15	9849.39

Across the two experiments we find that respondents with a stronger partisan social identity strength spend less time reading the treatments in both the Food Irradiation and Farm Policy experiments. At the same time, respondents that score higher on cognitive resources (CRT, NFC and latent cognitive resources) spend more time reading the treatments in the Food Irradiation and Farm Subsidy Experiments.

To assess whether reading time of the treatment differs when people receive party cues as a function of partisan social identity and cognitive resources, we regressed the log-transformed reading time on in-party cue, out-party cue, a cognitive resource variable (CRT, NFC and latent cognitive resources), partisan social identity, the two-way interactions between each of the condition dummies and the cognitive resource variable, the two-way interactions between each of the condition dummies and partisan social identity, and the two-way interaction between the cognitive resource variable and partisan social identity. Across the tests for CRT (model 2), NFC (model 5) and latent cognitive reosurces (model 8) in the Food Irradiation (Table C28)

and Farm Policy (Table C29) Experiments we find now evidence that people in the party cues conditions spend more or less time reading conditional upon their cognitive resources or partisan social identity strength. This is singaled by the non-significant interaction effects between the party cues and cognitive resources and the party cues and partisan social identity strength (PSID). This is an important null finding as the bounded rationality model might expect that respondents with low cognitive resources will spend *less* time reading the treatment when they receive a party cue. Importantly, this test was not pre-registered.

Finally, we run our pre-registered test of the expectation that those with a strong partisan social identity and high in cognitive resources spend more time reading the policy when they receive a party cue. To test this, we regressed support for the time people spend reading the treatment on the two cue condition dummies, a cognitive resource variable, partisan social identity, all two-way interactions (excluding between the two dummies), and the three-way interactions between the cognitive resource variable, partisan social identity, and each of the two cue condition dummies. Contrary to our expectations, we find no significant interaction effects. As such, this test does not provide evidence that participants with high cognitive resources and stronger partisan social identity strength spend more time reading about the policies.

To further interpret the three-way interaction effects we also created the plots of the marginal effects of the in-party and out-party cue on policy support over the range of partisan social identity strength at different levels of the three cognitive resources variables. The plots also show that partisan social identity strength and cognitive resources are not conditioning the reading time in the in-party and out-party cue conditions as can be seen by the almost horizontal lines of the marginal effects of the in-party and out-party cue on reading time in Figure C18 for the Food Irradiation Experiment and Figure C19 for the Farm Subsidy Experiment. Note that none of the simple slopes of the in-party or out-party cue on reading time is significant at conventional levels.

Table C28

Study 3: Reading Time in the Food Irradiation Experiment: Party Cues, Reflection and Partisan Social Identity Strength

	Reading time								
	CRT			NFC			Cognitive resources		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)
In-party cue	−0.13*	0.15	−0.09	−0.12*	−0.003	0.21	−0.12*	−0.003	0.19
	(0.06)	(0.17)	(0.21)	(0.06)	(0.25)	(0.50)	(0.06)	(0.25)	(0.55)
Out-party cue	−0.12*	−0.02	−0.15	−0.11+	0.17	0.44	−0.12*	0.17	0.38
	(0.06)	(0.17)	(0.22)	(0.06)	(0.25)	(0.51)	(0.06)	(0.25)	(0.57)
PSID	−0.51*	−0.51*	−0.72*	−0.54*	−1.03*	−0.74	−0.58*	−1.03*	−1.13
	(0.11)	(0.20)	(0.24)	(0.11)	(0.38)	(0.60)	(0.11)	(0.38)	(0.69)
Cognitive resource	0.57*	0.13	−0.43	1.06*	0.42	0.68	1.51*	0.42	0.77
	(0.10)	(0.28)	(0.44)	(0.13)	(0.37)	(0.55)	(0.17)	(0.37)	(0.75)
In-party * PSID		−0.21	0.85		0.18	−0.16		0.18	−0.22
		(0.22)	(0.60)		(0.31)	(0.77)		(0.31)	(1.00)
Out-party * PSID		0.06	0.63		−0.22	−0.66		−0.22	−0.69
		(0.23)	(0.63)		(0.32)	(0.80)		(0.32)	(1.07)
In-party * Cognitive		−0.42	0.01		−0.41	−0.79		−0.41	−0.57
		(0.27)	(0.35)		(0.26)	(0.83)		(0.26)	(0.93)
Out-party * Cognitive		−0.21	0.01		−0.27	−0.75		−0.27	−0.72
		(0.27)	(0.35)		(0.26)	(0.84)		(0.26)	(0.96)
PSID * Cognitive		0.91*	1.92*		1.16*	0.69		1.16*	1.43
		(0.43)	(0.74)		(0.53)	(0.92)		(0.53)	(1.27)
In-party * PSID * Cognitive			−2.00+			0.63			0.43
			(1.05)			(1.28)			(1.71)
Out-party * PSID * Cognitive			−1.03			0.78			0.90
			(1.03)			(1.31)			(1.76)
Age	0.01*	0.01*	0.02*	0.02*	0.02*	0.02*	0.02*	0.02*	0.01*
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
Female	0.10+	0.09+	0.08+	0.07	0.08	0.07	0.10*	0.08	0.10*
	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)
Race: non-white	0.02	0.03	0.03	−0.01	−0.02	−0.02	0.01	−0.02	0.01
	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)
Education: Some college	0.01	0.01	0.02	−0.01	−0.01	−0.01	−0.04	−0.01	−0.03
	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)
Education: College	−0.09	−0.09	−0.09	−0.07	−0.06	−0.06	−0.13+	−0.06	−0.12+
	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)
Party: Republican	−0.10*	−0.10+	−0.10+	−0.08	−0.07	−0.07	−0.08+	−0.07	−0.07
	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)
Constant	3.41*	3.40*	3.52*	2.85*	3.13*	2.97*	2.79*	3.13*	3.08*
	(0.12)	(0.16)	(0.18)	(0.14)	(0.28)	(0.38)	(0.15)	(0.28)	(0.42)
Observations	1,868	1,868	1,868	1,896	1,896	1,896	1,868	1,896	1,868
R^2	0.09	0.10	0.10	0.11	0.11	0.11	0.11	0.11	0.12

Note: +p<.1; *p<0.05

Table C29

Study 3: Reading time in the Farm Subsidy Experiment: Party Cues, Reflection and Partisan Social Identity Strength

	Reading time								
	CRT			NFC			Cognitive resources		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)
In-party cue	0.09	0.26	0.26	0.07	−0.01	0.32	0.09	0.15	0.51
	(0.06)	(0.17)	(0.21)	(0.06)	(0.24)	(0.46)	(0.06)	(0.26)	(0.52)
Out-party cue	0.11*	0.24	0.20	0.12*	0.48*	0.12	0.12*	0.60*	0.02
	(0.06)	(0.17)	(0.21)	(0.06)	(0.24)	(0.49)	(0.06)	(0.25)	(0.54)
PSID	−0.54*	−0.43*	−0.45+	−0.55*	−1.08*	−1.06*	−0.57*	−1.25*	−1.33*
	(0.11)	(0.20)	(0.24)	(0.11)	(0.35)	(0.53)	(0.11)	(0.39)	(0.62)
Cognitive resource	0.21*	0.26	0.20	0.71*	0.15	0.17	0.93*	0.23	0.14
	(0.09)	(0.28)	(0.42)	(0.13)	(0.35)	(0.51)	(0.17)	(0.46)	(0.69)
In-party * PSID		0.09	0.06		0.35	−0.19		0.28	−0.42
		(0.21)	(0.62)		(0.30)	(0.72)		(0.39)	(0.97)
Out-party * PSID		−0.34	−0.19		−0.46	0.11		−0.83*	0.26
		(0.21)	(0.56)		(0.30)	(0.76)		(0.39)	(1.00)
In-party * Cognitive		−0.33	−0.34		−0.25	−0.84		−0.37	−1.03
		(0.26)	(0.34)		(0.26)	(0.77)		(0.26)	(0.87)
Out-party * Cognitive		−0.07	−0.01		−0.12	0.52		−0.08	0.98
		(0.26)	(0.34)		(0.26)	(0.81)		(0.26)	(0.91)
PSID * Cognitive		0.07	0.16		1.08*	1.04		1.58*	1.74
		(0.40)	(0.68)		(0.51)	(0.85)		(0.67)	(1.17)
In-party * PSID * Cognitive			0.05			0.96			1.25
			(1.03)			(1.20)			(1.61)
Out-party * PSID * Cognitive			−0.29			−1.01			−1.98
			(0.95)			(1.26)			(1.68)
Age	0.02*	0.02*	0.02*	0.02*	0.02*	0.02*	0.02*	0.02*	0.02*
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
Female	0.10*	0.09*	0.10*	0.09*	0.09*	0.09*	0.11*	0.11*	0.11*
	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)
Race: non-white	0.12+	0.12+	0.12+	0.10+	0.11+	0.11+	0.12+	0.12*	0.12*
	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)
Education: Some college	0.09	0.09	0.09	0.06	0.06	0.06	0.05	0.05	0.05
	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)
Education: College	−0.02	−0.02	−0.02	−0.04	−0.04	−0.04	−0.07	−0.07	−0.08
	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)
Party: Republican	−0.04	−0.04	−0.04	−0.02	−0.02	−0.01	−0.03	−0.02	−0.02
	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)
Constant	2.60*	2.52*	2.53*	2.18*	2.46*	2.45*	2.19*	2.48*	2.52*
	(0.12)	(0.16)	(0.18)	(0.14)	(0.25)	(0.34)	(0.14)	(0.28)	(0.38)
Observations	1,742	1,742	1,742	1,769	1,769	1,769	1,742	1,742	1,742
R^2	0.11	0.11	0.11	0.12	0.13	0.13	0.12	0.13	0.13

Note: +p<.1; *p<0.05

Figure C18. Food Irradiation Reading Time: Marginal Effect of Party Cues on Reading Time across Levels of Partisan Social Identity Strength and Cognitive Resources



See Table C28, model 3 (CRT), model 6 (NfC) and model 9 (Cognitive resources) for the regression output.

Figure C19. Farm Subsidy Reading Time: Marginal Effect of Party Cues on Reading Time across Levels of Partisan Social Identity Strength and Cognitive Resources



See Table C29, model 3 (CRT), model 6 (NfC) and model 9 (Cognitive resources) for the regression output.

C.4 Inspection of the Mechanism: Thoughts

We only collected the thoughts in the Food Irradiation Experiment: (M=14.75, SD=15.98, min=0, max=172). First, we tested whether respondents formulated thoughts that consisted of more words based upon the cue-condition, their partisan social identity strength and their cognitive resources – do note that this model was not pre-registered. We do this by regressing the log-transformed number of words on the party cue dummies, partisan social identity strength and the cognitive resource variable plus the standard controls. We find no evidence that respondents in the party cues conditions report more or less words (see model 1, 4 and 7 of Table C30). In line with the analyses of the reading time results, we do find that respondents that have a stronger partisan social identity strength formulate thoughts that consist of a lower number of *less* words, while respondents that have higher cognitive resources formulate *more* words.

Next, we assess whether the number of formulated words differed when people received party cues as a function of partisan social identity and cognitive resources. Therefore, we regressed the number of words (log-transformed) on in-party cue, out-party cue, a cognitive resource variable (CRT, NfC or latent cognitive resources), partisan social identity, the two-way interactions between each of the condition dummies and the cognitive resource variable, the two-way interactions between each of the condition dummies and partisan social identity, and the two-way interaction between the cognitive resource variable and partisan social identity. Across the tests for CRT (model 2), NFC (model 5) and latent cognitive resources (model 7; Table C30), we find no indications that the formulated number of words is conditional upon an interaction between the party cues and cognitive resources nor partisan social identity strength.

Finally, we preregistered the expectation that those with a strong partisan social identity and high in cognitive resources will formulate thoughts that contain more words when they receive a party cue. To test this, we regressed the formulated number of words (log-transformed) on the two cue condition dummies, a cognitive resource variable, partisan social identity, all two-way interactions (excluding between the two dummies), and the three-way interactions between the cognitive resource variable, partisan social identity, and each of the two cue condition dummies. Contrary to our expectations, we find no significant interaction effects in any of the models in the CRT (model 3) or NFC (model 6 of Table C30).

To further interpret the three-way interaction effects we also created the plots of the marginal effects of the in-party and out-party cue on thoughts over the range of partisan social identity strength at different levels of the three cognitive resources variables. The plots also show that partisan social identity strength and cognitive resources are not conditioning the number of thoughts (words) in the in-party and out-party cue conditions as can be seen by the almost horizontal lines of the marginal effects of the in-party and out-party cue on reading time in Figure C18 for the Food Irradiation Experiment and Figure C19 for the Farm Subsidy Experiment. Note that none of the simple slopes of the in-party or out-party cue on reading time is significant at conventional levels.

Table C30

Study 3: Words Formulated in the Food Irradiation Experiment: Party Cues, Reflection and Partisan Social Identity Strength

	Thoughts (number of words)								
	CRT			NFC			Cognitive resources		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)
In-party cue	−0.08	−0.09	−0.10	−0.07	0.13	−0.37	−0.07	0.06	−0.54
	(0.05)	(0.14)	(0.18)	(0.05)	(0.21)	(0.41)	(0.05)	(0.22)	(0.45)
Out-party cue	−0.05	−0.02	−0.004	−0.04	0.20	−0.41	−0.05	0.12	−0.63
	(0.05)	(0.14)	(0.18)	(0.05)	(0.20)	(0.42)	(0.05)	(0.22)	(0.47)
PSID	−0.26*	−0.04	−0.03	−0.32*	−0.20	−0.87+	−0.33*	−0.12	−0.98+
	(0.09)	(0.17)	(0.20)	(0.09)	(0.31)	(0.49)	(0.09)	(0.34)	(0.57)
Cognitive resource	0.60*	0.94*	0.95*	0.91*	1.07*	0.49	1.35*	1.56*	0.69
	(0.08)	(0.24)	(0.37)	(0.11)	(0.30)	(0.45)	(0.14)	(0.40)	(0.61)
In-party * PSID		0.14	0.16		−0.22	0.57		−0.16	0.98
		(0.18)	(0.50)		(0.26)	(0.63)		(0.34)	(0.83)
Out-party * PSID		0.16	0.08		−0.19	0.80		−0.06	1.39
		(0.19)	(0.52)		(0.26)	(0.65)		(0.35)	(0.88)
In-party * Cog		−0.03	−0.02		−0.10	0.81		−0.08	1.04
		(0.22)	(0.29)		(0.22)	(0.68)		(0.22)	(0.77)
Out-party * Cog		−0.12	−0.15		−0.22	0.87		−0.24	1.14
		(0.22)	(0.29)		(0.22)	(0.69)		(0.22)	(0.79)
PSID * Cog		−0.79*	−0.82		−0.03	1.04		−0.21	1.42
		(0.35)	(0.62)		(0.44)	(0.75)		(0.58)	(1.04)
In-party * PSID * Cog			−0.05			−1.46			−2.13
			(0.87)			(1.05)			(1.41)
Out-party * PSID * Cog			0.14			−1.78+			−2.64+
			(0.85)			(1.07)			(1.45)
Age	0.003*	0.003*	0.003*	0.003*	0.003*	0.003*	0.003*	0.003*	0.003*
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
Female	0.13*	0.14*	0.14*	0.12*	0.11*	0.12*	0.13*	0.13*	0.13*
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)
Race: non-white	−0.08	−0.09+	−0.09+	−0.12*	−0.12*	−0.13*	−0.10+	−0.10+	−0.10+
	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)
Education: Some college	0.10+	0.10+	0.10+	0.09	0.09	0.09	0.07	0.07	0.07
	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)
Education: College	0.09	0.09	0.09	0.12*	0.12*	0.12*	0.08	0.07	0.08
	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)
Party: Republican	−0.07	−0.08+	−0.08+	−0.05	−0.05	−0.05	−0.05	−0.05	−0.05
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)
Constant	2.20*	2.09*	2.09*	1.80*	1.64*	2.00*	1.67*	1.50*	1.96*
	(0.10)	(0.13)	(0.14)	(0.12)	(0.23)	(0.31)	(0.12)	(0.25)	(0.35)
Observations	1,882	1,882	1,882	1,910	1,910	1,910	1,882	1,882	1,882
R^2	0.05	0.05	0.05	0.06	0.06	0.06	0.07	0.07	0.07

Note: +p<.1; *p<0.05

Figure C20. Food Irradiation Thoughts: Marginal Effect of Party Cues on Formulated Thoughts (Words) across Levels of Partisan Social Identity Strength and Cognitive Resources



See Table C30, model 3 (CRT), model 6 (NfC) and model 9 (Cognitive resources) for the regression output.

C.5 Inspection of the Mechanism: Quiz results

Quiz questions asked. In the Food Irradiation we measured the knowledge people have about food irradiation using four questions (see below correct answer in italics). Note that the order of the answer categories will be randomized. We create a scale ranging from 0 correct answers on the quiz to 4 correct answers on the quiz (M=2.31, SD=1.34, Min=0, Max=4).

- 1. "What is the goal of food irradiation?" [*To kill deadly bacteria in food* (Correct answer); To remove harmful radiation from food; To make food production more environmentally friendly; To help farmers produce more food at lower cost; To help farmers produce better tasting food]
- 2. "People who support banning food irradiation have said:" [*Food irradiation could lead to accidents in moving nuclear material* (Correct answer); Food irradiation could increase obesity in the United States; Food irradiation could lead to trade disputes with other countries; Food irradiation could lead to a loss of jobs in various food production industries; Food irradiation could produce more food allergies in the United States]
- 3. "People who oppose banning food irradiation have said:" [*Irradiated food has been consumed by burn victims* (Correct answer); Irradiated food tastes better; Irradiated food is cheaper to produce; Food irradiation reduces the environmental problems associated with food production; Food irradiation could provide more jobs in various food production industries]
- 4. "Why do supporters of banning food irradiation believe that food irradiation could cause careless food handling?" [*Because workers will believe that poor hygiene can be covered up by irradiation* (Correct answer); Because workers would be afraid of exposure to radiation; Because the increase in jobs would bring in lower skill workers; Because workers jobs would become more complicated, leading to more mistakes; Because workers jobs would become more boring, leading to more carelessness]

In the Farm Subsidy Experiment respondents completed two quiz questions (see below). Again, we created an index of the number of correct answers ranging from 0 to 2 (M=1.36, SD=0.75, Min=0, Max=2).

- "What is NOT a reason that supporters of the farm policy mention?" [The farm policy protects American farmers from losing their jobs, The farm policy keeps the cost of food low for Americans or "*It lessens the need to source food from outside borders*" (Correct answer)].
- 'What is NOT a reason that opponents of the farm policy mention?" [The farm policies prevents poor agricultural countries from growing economically, The money saved by Americans in food costs is taken from them in taxes anyway or "*The money saved by the farm policy can be used to reduce the budget deficit of the federal government* (Correct answer)].

Results from the answers on the quiz. First, we tested whether respondents answer more questions correct on the quiz based upon the cue-condition, their partisan social identity strength and their cognitive resources – do note that this model was not pre-registered. We do this by regressing (using OLS regression) the correct answers on the quiz (recoded to range from 0-1) on the party cues, partisan social identity strength and the cognitive resource variable plus the standard controls. Across the two experiments, we find suggestive evidence that people in the cues conditions answer less questions correct – as is signalled by the negative and most often significant coefficients for the In-party and Out-party cues (see model 1, 4 and 7 of Table C31 for the Food Irradiation Experiment and the same models of Table C32 for the Farm Subsidy Experiment). Note that these results do not change if we use a negative binomial regression model. Results can be derived from the replication file.

To assess whether answers on the quiz differed when people received party cues as a function of partisan social identity and cognitive resources, we regressed the correct answers on the quiz on in-party cue, out-party cue, a cognitive resource variable (CRT, NfC or cognitive resources), partisan social identity, the two-way interactions between each of the condition dummies and the cognitive resource variable, the two-way interactions between each of the condition dummies and partisan social identity, and the two-way interaction between the cognitive resource variable and partisan social identity. Across the tests for CRT (model 2), NFC (model 5) and latent cognitive resources (model 7) in the Food Irradiation (Table C31) and Farm Subsidy (Table C32) Experiments the results are mixed. In the Food Irradiation Experiment it seems that people in the Out-party condition answer less questions correct when the stronger their partisan social identity is (as is signaled by the negative and significant interaction effects for Out-party Cue X Cognitive Resource). However, in the Farm Subsidy Experiment the signs for this interaction effect are flipped and not significant. Moreover, we find no suggestions for a moderation effect of the In-party cue.

Finally, we preregistered the expectation that those with a strong partisan social identity and high in cognitive resources will know more about the policy when they receive a party cue. To test this, we regressed the correct answers on the quiz on the two cue condition dummies, a cognitive resource variable, partisan social identity, all two-way interactions (excluding between the two dummies), and the three-way interactions between the cognitive resource variable, partisan social identity, and each of the two cue condition dummies. Contrary to our expectations, we find no significant interaction effects in any of the models in the Food Irradiation (model 3, 6 and 9 of Table C31) or Farm Policy Experiment (model 3, 6 and 9 of Table C32).

To further interpret the three-way interaction effects we also created the plots of the marginal effects of the in-party and out-party cue on policy support over the range of partisan social identity strength at different levels of the three cognitive resources variables. The plots also show that partisan social identity strength and cognitive resources are not conditioning the quiz results in the in-party and out-party cue conditions as can be seen by the almost horizontal lines of the marginal effects of the in-party and out-party cue on reading time in Figure C21 for the Food Irradiation Experiment and Figure C22 for the Farm Subsidy Experiment. The only notable thing we find that is in the Food Irradiation Experiment for the NfC and cognitive resources, people with a weak partisan social identity and high cognitive resources had more questions correct, see C21. This pattern was not what we expected but importantly is not replicated in the Farm Subsidy experiment (see Figure C22. Aside from that that none of the simple slopes of the in-party or out-party cue on quiz results are significant at conventional levels. We don't want to put too much weight on this occasional finding for NfC and cognitive resources as it did not show up in the Farm Subsidy Experiment. Nor do we find a pattern suggestive for this interpretation in the reading time and/or formulated thoughts. Therefore, the finding for NfC and cognitive resources might as well be consequence of running many

models.

Table C31

Study 3: Number of Correct Quiz Items in the Food Irradiation Experiment: Party Cues, Reflection and Partisan Social Identity Strength

	Quiz result							
	CRT				NFC		Cog resources	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
In-party cue	−0.04*	−0.01	−0.01	−0.03+	0.05	−0.09	0.04	−0.10
	(0.02)	(0.05)	(0.07)	(0.02)	(0.08)	(0.15)	(0.08)	(0.17)
Out-party cue	−0.04*	0.04	0.03	−0.03+	0.21*	0.11	0.17*	0.04
	(0.02)	(0.05)	(0.07)	(0.02)	(0.08)	(0.16)	(0.08)	(0.18)
PSID	−0.12*	−0.09	−0.10	−0.16*	0.02	−0.14	−0.03	−0.21
	(0.03)	(0.06)	(0.07)	(0.03)	(0.12)	(0.19)	(0.13)	(0.21)
Cognitive resource	0.36*	0.24*	0.22	0.41*	0.57*	0.43*	0.81*	0.63*
	(0.03)	(0.09)	(0.14)	(0.04)	(0.11)	(0.17)	(0.15)	(0.23)
In-party * PSID		0.06	0.04		−0.05	0.19	−0.07	0.21
		(0.07)	(0.18)		(0.10)	(0.24)	(0.12)	(0.31)
Out-party * PSID		0.01	0.08		−0.21*	−0.04	−0.20	0.04
		(0.07)	(0.19)		(0.10)	(0.25)	(0.13)	(0.33)
In-party * Cog		−0.08	−0.09		−0.10	0.17	−0.07	0.20
		(0.08)	(0.11)		(0.08)	(0.26)	(0.08)	(0.29)
Out-party * Cog		−0.15+	−0.12		−0.19*	−0.01	−0.17*	0.06
		(0.08)	(0.11)		(0.08)	(0.26)	(0.08)	(0.30)
PSID * Cog		0.18	0.21		−0.13	0.12	−0.10	0.24
		(0.13)	(0.23)		(0.16)	(0.29)	(0.22)	(0.39)
In-party * PSID * Cog			0.04			−0.44		−0.52
			(0.32)			(0.40)		(0.53)
Out-party * PSID * Cog			−0.12			−0.30		−0.44
			(0.31)			(0.40)		(0.54)
Age	0.003*	0.003*	0.003*	0.003*	0.003*	0.003*	0.003*	0.003*
	(0.0004)	(0.0004)	(0.0004)	(0.0004)	(0.0004)	(0.0004)	(0.0004)	(0.0004)
Female	0.05*	0.05*	0.05*	0.04*	0.03*	0.03*	0.04*	0.05*
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Race: non-white	−0.08*	−0.08*	−0.08*	−0.10*	−0.10*	−0.10*	−0.09*	−0.09*
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Education: Some college	0.05*	0.05*	0.05*	0.05*	0.05*	0.05*	0.04+	0.04+
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Education: College	0.02	0.02	0.02	0.06*	0.06*	0.06*	0.03	0.03
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Party: Republican	−0.04*	−0.04*	−0.04*	−0.02	−0.03	−0.03+	−0.03+	−0.03+
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Constant	0.41*	0.40*	0.40*	0.25*	0.10	0.18	0.05	0.14
	(0.04)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.09)	(0.12)	(0.09)	(0.13)
Observations	1,823	1,823	1,823	1,850	1,850	1,850	1,823	1,823
R^2	0.14	0.14	0.14	0.12	0.12	0.12	0.14	0.14

Note: +p<.1; *p<0.05

Table C32

Study 3: Number of Correct Quiz Items in the Farm Subsidy Experiment: party cues, reflection and social identity strength

	Quiz result								
	CRT			NFC			Cognitive resources		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)
In-party cue	-0.04^{+}	-0.11^{+}	0.26	-0.04^{*}	-0.19^{*}	0.32	-0.04^{*}	-0.22^{*}	0.51
	(0.02)	(0.06)	(0.21)	(0.02)	(0.09)	(0.46)	(0.02)	(0.10)	(0.52)
Out-party cue	−0.004	-0.11^{+}	0.20	−0.005	−0.06	0.12	−0.005	−0.07	0.02
	(0.02)	(0.06)	(0.21)	(0.02)	(0.09)	(0.49)	(0.02)	(0.10)	(0.54)
PSID	-0.13^{*}	-0.28^{*}	-0.45^{+}	-0.15^{*}	-0.31^{*}	-1.06^{*}	-0.16^{*}	-0.39^{*}	-1.33^{*}
	(0.04)	(0.08)	(0.24)	(0.04)	(0.13)	(0.53)	(0.04)	(0.15)	(0.62)
Cognitive resource	0.26^{*}	0.02	0.20	0.33^{*}	0.17	0.17	0.50^{*}	0.22	0.14
	(0.04)	(0.10)	(0.42)	(0.05)	(0.13)	(0.51)	(0.06)	(0.17)	(0.69)
In-party * PSID		0.18^{*}	0.06		0.21^{+}	−0.19		0.32^{*}	−0.42
		(0.08)	(0.62)		(0.11)	(0.72)		(0.15)	(0.97)
Out-party * PSID		0.04	−0.19		−0.05	0.11		−0.03	0.26
		(0.08)	(0.56)		(0.11)	(0.76)		(0.15)	(1.00)
In-party * Cog		0.05	−0.34		0.01	−0.84		0.01	−1.03
		(0.10)	(0.34)		(0.10)	(0.77)		(0.10)	(0.87)
Out-party * Cog		0.18^{+}	−0.01		0.14	0.52		0.15	0.98
		(0.10)	(0.34)		(0.10)	(0.81)		(0.10)	(0.91)
PSID * Cog		0.31^{*}	0.16		0.18	1.04		0.33	1.74
		(0.15)	(0.68)		(0.19)	(0.85)		(0.26)	(1.17)
In-party * PSID * Cog			0.05			0.96			1.25
			(1.03)			(1.20)			(1.61)
Out-party * PSID * Cog			−0.29			−1.01			−1.98
			(0.95)			(1.26)			(1.68)
Age	0.002^{*}	0.002^{*}	0.02^{*}	0.002^{*}	0.002^{*}	0.02^{*}	0.002^{*}	0.002^{*}	0.02^{*}
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
Female	0.03^{+}	0.03^{+}	0.10^{*}	0.02	0.02	0.09^{*}	0.03^{+}	0.03^{+}	0.11^{*}
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.05)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.05)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.05)
Race: non-white	−0.01	−0.01	0.12^{+}	−0.03	−0.03	0.11^{+}	−0.02	−0.02	0.12^{*}
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.06)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.06)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.06)
Education: Some college	0.04^{+}	0.04^{+}	0.09	0.04^{+}	0.04^{+}	0.06	0.03	0.03	0.05
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.06)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.06)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.06)
Education: College	0.02	0.02	−0.02	0.05^{*}	0.05^{*}	−0.04	0.03	0.03	−0.08
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.07)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.07)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.07)
Party: Republican	0.01	0.01	−0.04	0.02	0.02	−0.01	0.02	0.02	−0.02
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.05)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.05)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.05)
Constant	0.58^{*}	0.68^{*}	2.53^{*}	0.44^{*}	0.57^{*}	2.45^{*}	0.40^{*}	0.58^{*}	2.52^{*}
	(0.04)	(0.06)	(0.18)	(0.05)	(0.10)	(0.34)	(0.05)	(0.10)	(0.38)
Observations	1,738	1,738	1,742	1,765	1,765	1,769	1,738	1,738	1,742
R^2	0.05	0.06	0.11	0.05	0.06	0.13	0.06	0.06	0.13

Note: $^{+}$p<.1; *p<0.05

Figure C21. Food Irradiation Quiz Results: Marginal Effect of Party Cues on Quiz Results across Levels of Partisan Social Identity Strength and Cognitive Resources



See Table C31, model 3 (CRT), model 6 (NfC) and model 9 (Cognitive resources) for the regression output.

Figure C22. Farm Subsidy Quiz Results: Marginal Effect of Party Cues on Quiz Results across Levels of Partisan Social Identity Strength and Cognitive Resources



See Table C32, model 3 (CRT), model 6 (NfC) and model 9 (Cognitive resources) for the regression output.

C.6 Sample Characteristics

In exchange for participation, *Bovitz's* panelists receive points which they can exchange for various rewards. The sample was 52 percent female, 81 percent white and 19 percent non-white. The median age was 50 (M=49.16, SD=17.28, Min=18, Max=93) and 41 percent of participants had at least finished some college and 39 percent had a least a college degree.

Drop-out between the two experiments. We test whether the drop-out between the Food Irradiation and Farm Policy Experiment is systematic. In a logistic regression, we regress a dummy variable indicating whether participants completed the Farm Policy Experiment (0) or not (1) on the cue condition that participants received in the Food Irradiation Experiment, partisan social identity strength, a cognitive resource varible (CRT, NFC or latent cognitive resource dimension) as well as gender, age, race, education and preferred party. The results are provided in Table C33. The analyses show that those with higher levels of CRT are less likely to drop-out. Moreover, those that received the in-party treatment in the Food Irradiation experiment were somewhat more likely to drop-out. The effects are modest and there is still enough variance in our moderators to test our expectations. Finally, older people were somewhat more likely to drop-out between the two experiments.

Table C33
Study 3: Drop-out between Food Irradiation and Farm Subsidy Experiment

	Drop-out		
	CRT	NFC	Cognitive resources
	(1)	(2)	(3)
In-party cue	0.61*	0.61*	0.60*
	(0.21)	(0.21)	(0.21)
Out-party cue	0.09	0.09	0.08
	(0.24)	(0.24)	(0.24)
Partisan Identity Strength (PSID)	−0.13	−0.01	−0.003
	(0.41)	(0.40)	(0.40)
CRT	−1.32*		
	(0.46)		
NFC		−0.16	
		(0.49)	
Cognitive resources			−0.58
			(0.66)
Age	0.01*	0.01*	0.01*
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Female	0.17	0.25	0.24
	(0.19)	(0.18)	(0.18)
Race: non-white	0.14	0.22	0.21
	(0.24)	(0.24)	(0.24)
Education: Some college	0.24	0.17	0.19
	(0.23)	(0.23)	(0.23)
Education: College	−0.27	−0.46+	−0.42
	(0.26)	(0.26)	(0.27)
Party: Republican	0.28	0.27	0.27
	(0.19)	(0.19)	(0.19)
Constant	−3.45*	−3.67*	−3.47*
	(0.47)	(0.55)	(0.57)
Observations	1,910	1,910	1,910
Akaike Inf. Crit.	988.66	997.75	997.09

Note: Unstandardized coefficients from logistic regression; +p<.1; *p<0.05

C.7 Treatments

The item wording of the Farm Subsidy Experiment is exactly the same as in the original Farm Subsidy Experiment (see Appendix B.2). The Food Irradiation Experiment was a little bit shorter compared to the original Food Irradiation Experiment in this study (see Appendix A.2) and Kam (2005). But the text we did include, was one-on-one the same compared to the original study. Here is the item wording.

- "Lawmakers consider ban on food irradiation". **Washington – The House of Representatives is considering a ban on the irradiation of beef, pork, and lamb as a possible means of attacking the problem of severe food poisoning.**

  Irradiation involves exposing food to brief doses of gamma rays or electron rays. These rays kill micro-organisms, including potentially deadly bacteria like E. coli, salmonella, and listeria. Yet irradiation is proving to be a controversial solution to the food poisoning problem. The House of Representatives is considering a five-year ban on the sale and production of irradiated food.

  *[**Proponents of the ban / Democrats support ban / Republican support ban**]*

  [*Proponents of the ban / Democrats / Republicans*] claim that irradiation changes the taste, odor, color, and texture of food. They also believe irradiation could encourage careless food handling in the food industry, since workers will know that poor hygiene could be disguised by eventual irradiation.

  [*Proponents / Democrats / Republicans*] also point to the environmental concerns. Irradiation increases the risk of radioactive leaks, increased worker contamination and possible accidents involved in moving nuclear material.

  *[**Opponents of the ban / Republicans oppose ban / Democrats oppose ban**]*

  [*Opponents of the ban / Republicans / Democrats*] believe the House should allow food irradiation to occur immediately, and they strongly oppose the five-year ban. They say that proponents are trying to scare the public with wild myths about irradiation, and that enough research has been done to prove the technique is safe.

  [*Opponents / Republicans / Democrats*] note that irradiation has been used for decades on a number of medical and consumer goods, including contact lenses, medical supplies, cosmetics and milk cartons. Hospitals serve irradiated food to burn victims and chemotherapy patients. And astronauts have been eating irradiated food since the 1960s.

C.8 Partisan social identity strength

At the start of the study, participants were asked to indicate whether they "usually think of themselves as a Republican, a Democrat, an Independent, or something else." Those in the latter two categories will then be asked if they think of themselves "as closer" to one party or the other. Participants who identify as leaning towards a party are then administered the eight-item partisan identity strength measure, worded appropriately for their in-party (Bankert et al., 2017; Huddy, Mason, & Aarøe, 2015). such as: "When I speak about the [Democratic/Republican] party, I usually say "we" instead of "they"." For this measure, respondents rated items such as the following on a four-point scale (coded: strongly disagree=0; somewhat disagree=.33; somewhat agree=.67; strongly agree=1). Note that the 8-item strength of party identity battery developed by Bankert et al. (2017) and employed in the other experiments. The item wording of the 8-items are provided in Appendix A.3. Table C34 provides the factor loadings showing that the items generally have an acceptable loading on the latent dimension. Figure C23, plots the distribution of the Partisan Social Identity Strength measure showing a relatively normal distribution. The Partisan Social Identity Strength measure has the following psychometric properties: m=.56, sd=.22, skewness=-.04, kurtosis=2.72, α=.88, ω=.90).

Table C34
Study 3 Partisan Social Identity Strength: Standardized Factor Loadings

	Standardized Factor Loading	p-value
1	0.84	0.00
2	0.57	0.00
3	0.74	0.00
4	0.75	0.00
5	0.67	0.00
6	0.81	0.00
7	0.84	0.00
8	0.80	0.00

Figure C23. Study 3: Histogram for Partisan Social Identity Strength



C.9 Cognitive resources

Need for Cognition. We employ a 10-item Need for Cognition battery. The 10 items were randomly drawn from the 18-item Need for Cognition battery developed by Cacioppo et al. (1984). Bakker and Lelkes (2018) showed that the criterion validity of a randomly drawn 10-item NfC battery does not affect the criterion validity compared to the full 18-item battery. The item wording of the 10-items is provided below. The ten items were scored on a 5-point Likert-type scale coded to range from 0 ("extremely uncharacteristic of me") to 1 ("extremely characteristic of me"). After reverse scoring the appropriate items, we conducted a confirmatory factor analysis. Table C35 provides the factor loadings showing that the items generally have an acceptable loading on the latent dimension. Figure C24, plots the distribution of the Need for Cognition showing a relatively normal distribution. The NfC has the following psychometric properties: m=.63, sd=.19, skewness=-.22, kurtosis=2.90, α=.83, ω=.87)

- 1. I would prefer complex to simple problems.
- 2. I like to have the responsibility of handling a situation that requires a lot of thinking.
- 3. Thinking is not my idea of fun. (Reverse coded)
- 4. I would rather do something that requires little thought than something that is sure to challenge my thinking abilities. (Reverse coded)
- 5. I try to anticipate and avoid situations where there is likely a chance I will have to think in depth about something. (Reverse coded)
- 6. I only think as hard as I have to.
- 7. The idea of relying on thought to make my way to the top appeals to me.
- 8. I really enjoy a task that involves coming up with new solutions to problems.
- 9. Learning new ways to think doesn't excite me very much. (Reverse coded)
- 10. I prefer my life to be filled with puzzles that I must solve

Table C35
Need for Cognition: Standardized Factor Loadings

	Standardized Factor Loading	p-value
1	0.60	0.00
2	0.74	0.00
3	0.69	0.00
4	0.64	0.00
5	0.60	0.00
6	0.57	0.00
7	0.66	0.00
8	0.72	0.00
9	0.61	0.00
10	0.60	0.00

Figure C24. Need for Cognition



Cognitive Reflection Test. We employ the 7-item cognitive reflection test introduced by Toplak et al. (2014) and used in the Farm Subsidy Experiment. The correct answer as well as the intuitive but incorrect answer are provided in Appendix B.4. In Table C36, we show the tetrachoric correlations between the seven CRT items. In line with Toplak et al. (2014), we observe that all items are positive and modestly to strongly correlated with each other. Figure C25 provides a histogram of the distribution of the CRT. Note that the CRT has the following psychometric properties: m=.23, sd=.26, skewness=1.19, kurtosis=3.56, α=.76, ω=.81).

Table C36

Study 3: Tetrachoric Correlations for Cognitive Reflection Test

	CRT1	CRT2	CRT3	CRT4	CRT5	CRT6	CRT7
CRT1	1.00	0.59	0.70	0.58	0.65	0.37	0.53
CRT2		1.00	0.69	0.59	0.61	0.30	0.47
CRT3			1.00	0.65	0.71	0.30	0.63
CRT4				1.00	0.65	0.24	0.49
CRT5					1.00	0.41	0.56
CRT6						1.00	0.23
CRT7							1.00

Figure C25. Study 3 Histogram Cognitive Reflection Test



Latent cognitive resources. We create a latent Cognitive Resources variable that consists of the items that make up the CRT (#7) and NFC (#10). First, we estimated a confirmatory factor analysis whereby all items load on the latent cognitive resources variable. Table C35 provides the factor loadings showing that the items generally have an acceptable loading on the latent dimension. Figure C26, plots the distribution of the Cognitive Resources variable, showing a relatively normal distribution. The cognitive resources variable has the following psychometric properties: m=.53, sd=.14, skewness=.16, kurtosis=3.17, α=.81, ω=.86)

Figure C26. Study 3 Histogram of Cognitive Resources



Table C37

Study 3 Cognitive Resources: Standardized Factor Loadings

	Standardized Factor Loading	p-value
CRT 1	0.48	0.00
CRT 2	0.47	0.00
CRT 3	0.62	0.00
CRT 4	0.46	0.00
CRT 5	0.56	0.00
CRT 6	0.16	0.00
CRT 7	0.42	0.00
NFC 1	0.59	0.00
NFC 2	0.72	0.00
NFC 3	0.67	0.00
NFC 4	0.62	0.00
NFC 5	0.59	0.00
NFC 6	0.55	0.00
NFC 7	0.65	0.00
NFC 8	0.70	0.00
NFC 9	0.59	0.00
NFC 10	0.58	0.00

C.10 Randomization checks

Randomization in Food Irradiation Experiment. We checked whether CRT, NfC, Cognitive resources and Partisan Social Identity Strength were equally distributed across the different conditions in our experiment. CRT (column 1, Table C38), NfC (column 2, Table C38) and cognitive resources (column 3, Table C38) are balanced across the conditions as indicated by the lack of significant effects of the treatment indicator on the dependent variables. The participants in the Republicans support condition score a little bit higher on partisan social identity strength. But the effect is small.

Table C38
Study 3 Food Irradiation Experiment: balance checks of moderators

	Dependent variable:			
	CRT	NFC	Cognitive resources	Party Identity Strength
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Democrats support	−0.0003	−0.01	−0.01	−0.001
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Republicans support	−0.0001	−0.01	−0.01	0.02*
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Constant	0.23*	0.63*	0.53*	0.55*
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Observations	1,911	1,911	1,911	1,911
R^2	0.0000	0.001	0.001	0.003

Note: *p<0.05

In our analyses we use a recoded version of the treatment indicator capturing whether the party the respondents support is endorsing the policy (1) or not (0). In Table C39 we present the results whereby we regress our moderators on the In-party cue and Out-party cue. As can be seen in Table C39 all four moderators are balanced across the two conditions as non of the In-party or Out-party cues is statistically significant associated with the moderators.

Our study also contained a set of covariates. We also assessed whether the covariates were balanced across conditions. We show in Table C40 that sex, age, education and party affiliation (Democratic party=0; Republican party=1) were equally distributed in the Democrats and Republican supports conditions. Those who are non-white are little bit underrepresented in the Republican support condition. But the effect is small and we control for this covariate in all our models.

We show in Table C41 that sex, age, education and party affiliation (Democratic party=0; Republican party=1) were equally distributed across the In-party and Out-party cue conditions. In the Out-party cue there are a little bit less people who are non-white. But the effect is small and we control for this covariate in all our models.

Randomization in Farm Subsidy Experiment. We checked whether CRT, NFC, Cognitive resources and Partisan Social Identity Strength were equally distributed across the different conditions in the Farm Subsidy Experiment. CRT (column 1, Table C42), NFC (column 2, Table C42), cognitive resources (column 3, Table C42) and partisan social identity strength (column 4, Table C42) are balanced across the conditions as indicated by the lack of significant effects of the treatment indicator on the dependent variables.

In Table C43 we present the results whereby we regress our moderators on the In-party

Table C39
Study 3 Food Irradiation Experiment: balance checks of moderators per cue condition

	Dependent variable:			
	CRT	NFC	Cognitive resources	Party Identity Strength
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
In-party cue	−0.001	−0.01	−0.01	0.01
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Out-party cue	0.001	−0.01	−0.01	0.02
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Constant	0.23*	0.63*	0.53*	0.55*
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Observations	1,911	1,911	1,911	1,911
R^2	0.0000	0.001	0.001	0.001
Note:				*p<0.05

Table C40
Study 3 Food Irradiation Experiment: Balance Checks Demographics

	Dependent variable:				
	Sex	Age	Education	Non-white	Republican Party
	logistic	*OLS*	*ordered logistic*	*logistic*	*logistic*
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Democrats support	0.07	−0.23	−0.08	−0.14	−0.16
	(0.11)	(0.96)	(0.10)	(0.14)	(0.11)
Republicans support	0.01	0.16	0.01	−0.32*	−0.03
	(0.11)	(0.98)	(0.11)	(0.15)	(0.11)
Constant	0.05	49.20*		−1.33*	−0.24*
	(0.08)	(0.68)		(0.10)	(0.08)
Observations	1,910	1,910	1,910	1,910	1,911
R^2		0.0001			
Akaike Inf. Crit.	2,650.15			1,841.39	2,610.32
Note:					*p<0.05

Table C41
Study 3 Food Irradiation Experiment: Balance Checks Demographics

	Dependent variable:				
	Sex	Age	Education	Non-white	Republican Party
	logistic	*OLS*	*ordered logistic*	*logistic*	*logistic*
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
In-party cue	0.09	0.16	−0.03	−0.13	−0.16
	(0.11)	(0.96)	(0.10)	(0.14)	(0.11)
Out-party cue	−0.01	−0.27	−0.05	−0.33*	−0.02
	(0.11)	(0.98)	(0.11)	(0.15)	(0.11)
Constant	0.05	49.20*		−1.33*	−0.24*
	(0.08)	(0.68)		(0.10)	(0.08)
Observations	1,910	1,910	1,910	1,910	1,911
R^2		0.0001			
Akaike Inf. Crit.	2,649.68			1,841.00	2,610.17

Note: *p<0.05

Table C42
Study 3 Farm Subsidy Experiment: balance checks of moderators

	Dependent variable:			
	CRT	NFC	Cognitive resources	Party Identity Strength
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Democrats support	−0.02	−0.003	−0.003	−0.01
	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Republicans support	−0.01	−0.01	−0.01	−0.02
	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Constant	0.25*	0.63*	0.53*	0.57*
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Observations	1,778	1,778	1,778	1,778
R^2	0.001	0.0001	0.001	0.001

Note: *p<0.05

cue and the Out-party cue. As can be seen in Table C43 all four moderators are balanced across the In-party cue and Out-party cue.

Table C43
Study 3 Farm Subsidy Experiment: balance checks of moderators per cue condition

	Dependent variable:			
	CRT	NFC	Cognitive resources	Party Identity Strength
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
In-party cue	−0.01	0.002	−0.002	−0.01
	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Out-party cue	−0.02	−0.01	−0.01	−0.02
	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Constant	0.25*	0.63*	0.53*	0.57*
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Observations	1,778	1,778	1,778	1,778
R^2	0.001	0.001	0.001	0.001
Note:				*p<0.05

We also assessed whether the covariates were balanced across conditions. We show in Table C44 that sex, age, education and were equally distributed across the Democrats and Republicans support-party and Out-party cue conditions. We only see that in the Democrats support condition there are somewhat more Republican partisans (b=.24, se=12, p=.04). Yet, we show in Table C45 that sex, age, education, race and party affiliation were equally distributed across the In-party and Out-party cue conditions. In the recoded cue conditions, there are no systematic differences in partisans across the conditions.

Table C44
Study 3 Farm Subsidy Experiment: Balance Checks Demographics

	Dependent variable:				
	Sex	Age	Education	Non-white	Republican Party
	logistic	*OLS*	*ordered logistic*	*logistic*	*logistic*
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Democrats support	−0.02	0.50	0.07	−0.07	0.24*
	(0.12)	(1.00)	(0.11)	(0.15)	(0.12)
Republicans support	0.07	0.84	−0.04	−0.10	0.20
	(0.12)	(1.00)	(0.11)	(0.15)	(0.12)
Constant	0.04	48.41*		−1.41*	−0.47*
	(0.08)	(0.70)		(0.10)	(0.08)
Observations	1,777	1,777	1,777	1,777	1,778
R^2		0.0004			
Akaike Inf. Crit.	2,467.37			1,722.97	2,420.45
Note:					*p<0.05

Table C45
Study 3 Farm Subsidy Experiment: Balance Checks Demographics

	Dependent variable:				
	Sex	Age	Education	Non-white	Republican Party
	logistic	*OLS*	*ordered logistic*	*logistic*	*logistic*
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
In-party cue	0.06	0.89	0.01	−0.06	0.22
	(0.12)	(1.00)	(0.11)	(0.15)	(0.12)
Out-party cue	−0.01	0.45	0.02	−0.11	0.22
	(0.12)	(0.99)	(0.11)	(0.15)	(0.12)
Constant	0.04	48.41*		−1.41*	−0.47*
	(0.08)	(0.70)		(0.10)	(0.08)
Observations	1,777	1,777	1,777	1,777	1,778
R^2		0.0004			
Akaike Inf. Crit.	2,467.51			1,722.87	2,420.61

Note: *p<0.05

C.11 Main effects of Food and Farm Policy Experiments

Food Irradiation Main Effects. In this section we report results of analyses that involve comparisons between each of the party cue conditions and the control (no cues) condition to assess the main effects of the treatments. We find that, compared to the control condition, there was a positive effect of the in-party cue on policy support (b=.05, se=.01; Table C46, model 1), while there is a negative effect of the out-party cue on policy support (b=-.05, se=.01). These findings suggest that partisans increase their support for the policy when their preferred party supports the policy, while they oppose the policy when the other (out-party) supports the policy. The results do not change in model 2 (NFC) and 3 (cognitive resources) when we substitute CRT for NFC or cognitive resources. Finally, we note that all three indicators of cognitive resources: CRT (model 1), NFC (model 2) and cognitive resources (model 3) are negatively associated with policy support. The strength of this association is modest.

Table C46

Study 3 Food Irradiation Experiment: Main Effect of Party Cues on Support for Food Irradiation

	Policy support		
	(1)	(2)	(3)
In-Party cue	0.05*	0.05*	0.05*
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Out-Party cue	−0.05*	−0.05*	−0.05*
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
PID Strength	0.03	0.04*	0.05*
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
CRT	−0.16*		
	(0.02)		
NfC		−0.09*	
		(0.03)	
Cognitive resources			−0.18*
			(0.04)
Age	−0.001*	−0.001*	−0.001*
	(0.0003)	(0.0003)	(0.0003)
Female	0.02	0.03*	0.02*
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Race: non-white	0.01	0.02	0.01
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Education: Some college	−0.03*	−0.03*	−0.03*
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Education: College	−0.03*	−0.05*	−0.04*
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Party: Republican	0.005	0.005	0.003
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Constant	0.60*	0.61*	0.65*
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Observations	1,861	1,889	1,861
R^2	0.09	0.06	0.07
Note:			*p<0.05

Farm Subsidy Main Effects. In this section we report results of analyses that involve comparisons between each of the party cue conditions and the control (no cues) condition to assess the main effects of the treatments. We start with a model regressing farm subsidy support on the in-party cue and out-party cue (with no cues as the reference category), partisan identity strength, and CRT score and the covariates gender, age, education, race and party that the person supports (Column 1, Table C47). We find that, compared to the control condition, there was a positive effect of the in-party cue on policy support (b=.03, se=.01), while there is a negative effect of the out-party cue on policy support (b=-.09, se=.01). These findings indicate that partisans increase their support for the policy when their preferred party supports the policy, while they oppose the policy when the other (out-party) supports the policy. The results do not change in model 2 (NFC) and 3 (cognitive resources) when we substitute CRT for NFC or cognitive resources. Finally, we note that all three indicators of cognitive resources: CRT (model 1), NFC (model 2) and cognitive resources (model 3) are negatively associated with policy support. The strength of this association is modest.

Table C47
Study 3 Farm Subsidy Experiment: Main Effect of Party Cues on Support for Farm Subsidies

	Policy support		
	(1)	(2)	(3)
In-Party cue	0.03*	0.04*	0.03*
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Out-Party cue	−0.09*	−0.09*	−0.09*
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
PID Strength	0.15*	0.18*	0.17*
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
CRT	−0.13*		
	(0.02)		
NfC		−0.12*	
		(0.03)	
Cognitive resources			−0.21*
			(0.04)
Age	−0.001*	−0.001	−0.001*
	(0.0004)	(0.0004)	(0.0004)
Female	0.05*	0.06*	0.06*
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Race: non-white	−0.01	−0.01	−0.01
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Education: Some college	0.01	0.004	0.01
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Education: College	−0.03	−0.04*	−0.03
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Party: Republican	0.04*	0.04*	0.04*
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Constant	0.66*	0.68*	0.72*
	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.04)
Observations	1,741	1,768	1,741
R^2	0.10	0.10	0.10
Note:			*p<0.05

C.12 Direct replication results Kam (2005)

Like in Appendix A.7, we present a series of models directly replicating the analyses by Kam. First, in Model 1 of Table C48, we estimate a direct replication of the results acquired by Kam (2005) using the original one-item that was used in that study (i.e, "Do you support or oppose a ban on food irradiation?"), recoded to range from strongly oppose [0] to strongly support [1]; M=.49, SD=.29) and the continuous indicator whether participants received the party-cue which ranged from -1 (strong or weak partisan exposed to out-partisan endorsement) to 0 (no party cues) to 1 (strong or weak partisan exposed to in-partisan endorsement). Contrary to the first replication of the Food Irradiation Experiment (see Appendix A.7), we find a positive – but not statistically significant – interaction effect between the party cue and the NfC (b=.04, se=.05, p=.38). In model 2, we apply the three-item dependent variable, and here we find a positive interaction effect between the Party Cue and the NfC (b=.06, se=.04, p=.107). This model provides some evidence (p=.107) that there is more reliance upon the party cue among those that score higher on the NfC.

Table C48
Study 3 Food Irradiation: Moderation of Party Cues Following Kam (2005)

	Policy support	
	(1)	(2)
Party Cue	0.04	0.02
	(0.03)	(0.02)
NfC	−0.07*	−0.12*
	(0.04)	(0.03)
Party Cue * NfC	0.04	0.06
	(0.05)	(0.04)
Constant	0.55*	0.59*
	(0.02)	(0.02)
Observations	1,890	1,890
R^2	0.03	0.05
Note:	OLS Regession models; *p<0.05	

C.13 Food Irradiation Experiment: item-by-item analysis

The dependent variable in this experiment consists of three items: The first – *Support* – asked to rate support for the ban on food irradiation on a five point scale ranging from 1 ("strongly support the ban on food irradiation") to 5 ("strongly oppose the ban on food irradiation"). This was the original dependent variable used by Kam (2005). The second – *Cost-benefit* asked about agreement with the statement "The costs of food irradiation outweigh the benefits" on a scale from 1 ("strongly agree") to 5 ("strongly disagree"). The third item – *Good vs. Bad* asked "All things considered, food irradiation is a good thing" on a scale ranging from 1 ("food irradiation is bad") to 5 ("food irradiation is good"). One might wonder if the results are similar for each individual item. To test this, we rerun the two-way and three-way interaction models for each of the three different dependent variables.

The results for the two-way interactions do not differ from the results that we arrive using the composite scale in the main text.

Similarly, the result of our three-way interaction effects do not change substantially across the three items that make-up the dependent variable in the main text. For CRT the results mirror each other closely across the three items that make-up the dependent variable. If anything, the increasing positive effect of the in-party cue over the range of partisan social identity strength among those with higher levels of NfC is a bit stronger for the second item (see Table C50) compared to the first (see Table C49) and third item (see Table C51). To interpret the three-way interaction effects, we also plotted the figures of the marginal effect of the in-party and out-party cue across levels of partisan social identity strength and different levels of cognitive resources. As can be seen in the Figures for item 1 (see Figure C27), 2 (see Figure C28) and 3 (see Figure C29): the effect of the in-party cue on policy support (measured with the 3 different items) becomes stronger when people score higher on cognitive resources (CRT, NFC and cognitive resources) and their partisan social identity increases. To conclude, the result of the Food Irradiation Experiment do not seem to be dependent on one of the three specific items of the dependent variable.

Table C49

Study 3: Food Irradiation item 1 "Support": Policy support, party cues, cognitive resources and social identity strength

	Policy support					
	CRT		NFC		Cog resources	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
In-party cue	−0.07	−0.06	−0.19*	−0.11	−0.17*	−0.03
	(0.05)	(0.06)	(0.07)	(0.14)	(0.08)	(0.16)
Out-party cue	−0.15*	−0.18*	−0.21*	−0.18	−0.23*	−0.18
	(0.05)	(0.06)	(0.07)	(0.14)	(0.08)	(0.16)
Partisan Identity Strength (PSID)	−0.12*	−0.13+	0.02	0.09	0.05	0.18
	(0.06)	(0.07)	(0.11)	(0.17)	(0.12)	(0.20)
Cognitive resource	−0.11	−0.14	−0.05	0.01	−0.07	0.06
	(0.08)	(0.12)	(0.10)	(0.16)	(0.14)	(0.21)
In-party * PSID	0.02	−0.02	0.20*	0.08	0.20+	−0.07
	(0.06)	(0.17)	(0.09)	(0.22)	(0.12)	(0.29)
Out-party * PSID	0.08	0.20	0.14	0.09	0.19	0.10
	(0.06)	(0.18)	(0.09)	(0.22)	(0.12)	(0.30)
In-party * Cognitive	0.20*	0.18+	0.19*	0.06	0.20*	−0.06
	(0.07)	(0.10)	(0.07)	(0.23)	(0.07)	(0.26)
Out-party * Cognitive	0.12	0.17+	0.10	0.04	0.11	0.02
	(0.08)	(0.10)	(0.07)	(0.24)	(0.08)	(0.27)
PSID * Cognitive	−0.07	−0.02	−0.22	−0.32	−0.33+	−0.58
	(0.12)	(0.21)	(0.15)	(0.26)	(0.20)	(0.36)
In-party * PSID * Cognitive		0.07		0.21		0.50
		(0.30)		(0.36)		(0.49)
Out-party * PSID * Cognitive		−0.22		0.09		0.18
		(0.29)		(0.37)		(0.50)
Age	−0.0001	−0.0001	0.0002	0.0002	0.0001	0.0001
	(0.0004)	(0.0004)	(0.0004)	(0.0004)	(0.0004)	(0.0004)
Female	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Race: non-white	0.01	0.01	0.02	0.02	0.01	0.01
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Education: Some college	−0.03	−0.03	−0.03+	−0.03+	−0.03+	−0.03+
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Education: College	−0.03	−0.03	−0.05*	−0.05*	−0.04*	−0.04*
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Party: Republican	−0.01	−0.01	−0.01	−0.01	−0.02	−0.01
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Constant	0.64*	0.65*	0.63*	0.59*	0.65*	0.58*
	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.08)	(0.11)	(0.09)	(0.12)
Observations	1,861	1,861	1,889	1,889	1,861	1,861
R^2	0.05	0.05	0.04	0.04	0.04	0.04

Note: +p<.1; *p<0.05

Table C50

Study 3: Food Irradiation item 2 "Cost-benefit": Policy support, party cues, cognitive resources and social identity strength

	Policy support					
	CRT		NFC		Cog resources	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
In-party cue	−0.02	0.04	−0.10	0.06	−0.09	0.14
	(0.05)	(0.06)	(0.07)	(0.13)	(0.07)	(0.15)
Out-party cue	−0.12*	−0.12*	−0.11	−0.15	−0.11	−0.17
	(0.05)	(0.06)	(0.07)	(0.14)	(0.07)	(0.15)
Partisan Identity Strength (PSID)	0.01	0.04	−0.07	0.01	−0.05	0.07
	(0.05)	(0.06)	(0.10)	(0.16)	(0.11)	(0.19)
Cognitive resource	−0.11	−0.02	−0.20*	−0.13	−0.32*	−0.19
	(0.08)	(0.12)	(0.10)	(0.15)	(0.13)	(0.20)
In-party * PSID	0.003	−0.25	0.12	−0.14	0.12	−0.31
	(0.06)	(0.16)	(0.08)	(0.21)	(0.11)	(0.27)
Out-party * PSID	0.11+	0.09	0.01	0.08	0.02	0.14
	(0.06)	(0.17)	(0.09)	(0.21)	(0.11)	(0.29)
In-party * Cognitive	0.16*	0.06	0.17*	−0.13	0.17*	−0.25
	(0.07)	(0.09)	(0.07)	(0.22)	(0.07)	(0.25)
Out-party * Cognitive	0.08	0.07	0.08	0.14	0.08	0.18
	(0.07)	(0.09)	(0.07)	(0.23)	(0.07)	(0.26)
PSID * Cognitive	−0.23*	−0.39*	0.07	−0.06	0.07	−0.16
	(0.11)	(0.20)	(0.14)	(0.25)	(0.19)	(0.34)
In-party * PSID * Cognitive		0.47+		0.49		0.80+
		(0.28)		(0.34)		(0.46)
Out-party * PSID * Cognitive		0.05		−0.11		−0.18
		(0.27)		(0.35)		(0.47)
Age	−0.001*	−0.001*	−0.001*	−0.001*	−0.001*	−0.001*
	(0.0004)	(0.0004)	(0.0004)	(0.0004)	(0.0004)	(0.0004)
Female	0.03*	0.03*	0.04*	0.04*	0.04*	0.04*
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Race: non-white	0.01	0.01	0.03	0.03	0.02	0.02
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Education: Some college	−0.04*	−0.04*	−0.04*	−0.04*	−0.04*	−0.04*
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Education: College	−0.03+	−0.03+	−0.06*	−0.06*	−0.05*	−0.05*
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Party: Republican	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Constant	0.64*	0.63*	0.73*	0.68*	0.77*	0.71*
	(0.04)	(0.05)	(0.07)	(0.10)	(0.08)	(0.11)
Observations	1,861	1,861	1,889	1,889	1,861	1,861
R^2	0.09	0.09	0.06	0.06	0.07	0.07

Note: +p<.1; *p<0.05

Table C51

Study 3: Food Irradiation item 2 "Good vs. Bad": Policy support, party cues, cognitive resources and social identity strength

	Policy support					
	CRT		NFC		Cog resources	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
In-party cue	−0.02	0.03	−0.13*	0.02	−0.13+	0.09
	(0.04)	(0.05)	(0.06)	(0.13)	(0.07)	(0.14)
Out-party cue	−0.04	−0.01	−0.05	0.18	−0.07	0.22
	(0.04)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.13)	(0.07)	(0.15)
Partisan Identity Strength (PSID)	0.13*	0.18*	0.17+	0.41*	0.21*	0.54*
	(0.05)	(0.06)	(0.10)	(0.15)	(0.11)	(0.18)
Cognitive resource	−0.001	0.12	−0.12	0.08	−0.17	0.16
	(0.07)	(0.11)	(0.09)	(0.14)	(0.13)	(0.19)
In-party * PSID	0.05	−0.17	0.20*	−0.04	0.24*	−0.19
	(0.06)	(0.15)	(0.08)	(0.20)	(0.10)	(0.26)
Out-party * PSID	0.06	−0.08	0.05	−0.33	0.08	−0.47+
	(0.06)	(0.16)	(0.08)	(0.20)	(0.11)	(0.28)
In-party * Cognitive	0.05	−0.03	0.05	−0.22	0.04	−0.37
	(0.07)	(0.09)	(0.07)	(0.21)	(0.07)	(0.24)
Out-party * Cognitive	−0.02	−0.07	−0.02	−0.45*	−0.02	−0.53*
	(0.07)	(0.09)	(0.07)	(0.21)	(0.07)	(0.25)
PSID * Cognitive	−0.32*	−0.53*	−0.14	−0.52*	−0.24	−0.86*
	(0.11)	(0.19)	(0.14)	(0.23)	(0.18)	(0.33)
In-party * PSID * Cognitive		0.40		0.43		0.80+
		(0.27)		(0.33)		(0.44)
Out-party * PSID * Cognitive		0.24		0.70*		0.99*
		(0.26)		(0.33)		(0.45)
Age	−0.001*	−0.001*	−0.001*	−0.001*	−0.001*	−0.001*
	(0.0004)	(0.0004)	(0.0004)	(0.0004)	(0.0004)	(0.0004)
Female	0.02+	0.02+	0.03*	0.03*	0.02+	0.02+
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Race: non-white	−0.004	−0.004	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Education: Some college	−0.03+	−0.03+	−0.03*	−0.03+	−0.03+	−0.03+
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Education: College	−0.03+	−0.03+	−0.05*	−0.05*	−0.04*	−0.04*
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Party: Republican	0.01	0.01	0.004	0.004	0.005	0.01
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Constant	0.57*	0.54*	0.63*	0.50*	0.65*	0.47*
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.07)	(0.10)	(0.08)	(0.11)
Observations	1,861	1,861	1,889	1,889	1,861	1,861
R^2	0.05	0.05	0.04	0.04	0.04	0.05

Note: +p<.1; *p<0.05

Figure C27. Food Irradiation –**item 1 "Support"**: Marginal Effect of In-party and Out-party Cues on Policy Support across Levels of Partisan Social Identity by Cognitive Resources



See model 2 (CRT), model 4 (NfC) and model 6 (Cognitive resources) of Table C49 for the output of the regression analysis.

Figure C28. Food Irradiation –**item 2 "Cost-benefit"**: Marginal Effect of In-party and Out-party Cues on Policy Support across Levels of Partisan Social Identity by Cognitive Resources



See model 2 (CRT) and model 4 (NfC) and model 6 (Cognitive resources) of Table C50 for the output of the regression analysis.

Figure C29. Food Irradiation –**item 3 "Good vs. Bad"**: Marginal Effect of In-party and Out-party Cues on Policy Support across Levels of Partisan Social Identity by Cognitive Resources



See model 2 (CRT) and model 4 (NfC) of Table C51 for the output of the regression analysis.

C.14 Inspection of non-linearity

Linearity in the Food Irradiation Experiment. Again, we tested whether our results hold once we do not assume that partisan social identity strength has a linear effect (for a discussion, see Hainmueller, Mummolo, & Xu, 2017). To do this, we grouped partisan social identity strength into a categorical variable capturing the lowest tertile, the middle tertile and upper tertile of partisan social identity strength. We reran our models using this categorical variable.

In Figure C30 we plot the results of the analyses of the categorical partisan social identity strength measure. The results do not show any signs of non-linearity. The effect of the party cues tends to become stronger among those with a strong partisan identity and a high level of cognitive resources. The results also clearly mirror those presented in the main text of the paper.

Figure C30. **Food Irradiation Experiment**: Inspection of non-linearity



Linearity in the Farm Subsidy Experiment. We repeat the same test for the Farm Subsidy Experiment. In Figure C31 we plot the results of the analyses of the categorical partisan social identity strength measure. The results do not show any signs of non-linearity. The effect of the party cues tends to become stronger among those with a strong partisan identity and a high level of cognitive resources. The results also clearly mirror those presented in the main text of the paper. If anything, there is a small non-linear effect whereby the effect of the out-party cue on policy support becomes somewhat stronger when comparing those with high cognitive resources and modest to strong partisan social identity strength. However, generally, the effects seem linear.

Figure C31. **Farm Subsidy Experiment**: Inspection of non-linearity



C.15 Results using the 3-item CRT battery

This analysis was not pre-registered. The seven-item cognitive reflection task consisted of the 3 items that make-up the 3-item cognitive reflection task (Toplak et al., 2014). To examine whether we arrive at similar results using the 3-item Cognitive Reflection Task, we created the 3-item battery. In this sample, the 3-item battery has similar descriptive statistics (M=0.18, SD=0.29, Min=0, Max=1) compared to the 3-item battery used in the the Food Irradiation Experiment and the Farm Subsidy Experiment. Again, the 3-item battery correlates highly with the 7-item battery (r=.87).

First, we test whether the use of the 3-item CRT conditions the results in the Food Irradiation Experiment. To examine whether the combination of strong partisan identity strength and high cognitive resources leads to the greatest amount of cue-taking, we regressed policy support on the two cue condition dummies, the 3-item CRT, partisan identity strength, all two-way interactions (excluding between the two dummies), and three-way interactions between CRT, partisan identity strength, and each of the two cue condition dummies. To examine this interaction, we plot the marginal effects of the condition dummies on policy support as a function of party identity strength for those that score low (i.e., -1SD below the mean), modest (i.e., mean) and high (i.e., +1SD above the mean) on the 3-item cognitive reflection test. We present the results in the upper panel of Figure C32. In line with the results obtained using the 7-item CRT (Figure 2 of the main text), there is no effect of the party-cues among those low on CRT. Among respondents with high cognitive resources (i.e., 1SD above the mean on the CRT) we see – in line with the results using the 7-item CRT – that the effect of the out-party cue on policy support was not conditioned by partisan social identity strength.

However, with regard to in-party cue, we replicate the findings from the Food Irradiation experiment when we use the 3-item CRT instead of the 7-item CRT measure. Specifically, in-party cue leads to more support for the policy compared to the control condition among those respondents with a strong partisan social identity (b=.16, se=.08, p=.04). This effect is weaker compared to the results that we acquired with the 7-item CRT in the main text. At the mean of CRT – middle panel – we see also a positive but somewhat weaker marginal effect of the In-party cue on policy support when partisan social identity is strong (b=.13, se=.05, p=.016). Again, this effect is weaker than the effect reported in the main text when use the 7-item CRT.

In the bottom panel of Figure C32 we present the results for the *Farm Subsidy Experiment*. In line with the results obtained using the 7-item CRT (main text), there is no effect of the party-cues among those low on CRT. In line with the results using the 7-item CRT, the strength of party identification does not condition the effect of the in-party cue on policy support (b=.12, se=.10) among the more reflective respondents (i.e., those that score 1 standard deviation above the mean). Yet, we see in the most right-hand panel that using the 3-item CRT battery, the effect of the out-party cue is moderated by partisan identity strength (b=-.16, se=.09, p=.09). The effect is in the same direction as the results reported in main text.

The results in this appendix show that using a brief measure of Cognitive Reflection underestimates the importance of the CRT as a moderator of cue-taking effects. The use of a larger measure – which leads to less measurement error and removes floor effects – leads us to conclude that the CRT is a stronger moderator of the reliance upon party cues in line with our argument.

Figure C32. Food and Farm Policy Experiments: Marginal Effect of Party Cues on Policy Support across Levels of Party Identity by Cognitive Reflection Score measured with the **3-item battery**



C.16 Exclusion of those who had seen CRT before

We pre-registered to also run our models without the participants who indicated that they had seen one or more of the CRT items before (those that answer "yes" or "maybe"). In total 24% indicated that they had seen CRT before so below we present the models that excluded these respondents. As can be seen in Table C52 (Food Irradiation) and Table C53 (Farm Policy) the results are highly similar compared to the models presented in the main text. This is further illustrated by Figure C33 where in the top panel the three-way interactions in the Food Irradiation Experiment are plotted in the bottom panel the result for the Farm Policy Experiment.

Table C52
Study 3 Food Irradiation Experiment: CRT results for those who had never seen CRT

	Policy support		
	Food Irradiation		
	(1)	(2)	(3)
In-party cue	0.05*	−0.02	0.02
	(0.01)	(0.04)	(0.05)
Out-party cue	−0.05*	−0.11*	−0.08+
	(0.01)	(0.04)	(0.05)
Partisan Identity Strength (PSID)	0.01	−0.02	0.02
	(0.03)	(0.05)	(0.05)
Cognitive resource	−0.14*	−0.15*	−0.02
	(0.02)	(0.07)	(0.11)
In-party * PSID		0.07	−0.16
		(0.06)	(0.15)
Out-party * PSID		0.15*	0.0004
		(0.06)	(0.15)
In-party * Cognitive		0.11+	0.03
		(0.06)	(0.08)
Out-party * Cognitive		0.05	−0.004
		(0.06)	(0.08)
PSID * Cognitive		−0.12	−0.34+
		(0.10)	(0.17)
In-party * PSID * Cognitive			0.42
			(0.26)
Out-party * PSID * Cognitive			0.27
			(0.24)
Age	−0.001*	−0.001*	−0.001*
	(0.0003)	(0.0003)	(0.0003)
Female	0.02	0.02	0.02
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Race: non-white	−0.002	−0.005	−0.004
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Education: Some college	−0.03*	−0.03*	−0.03*
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Education: College	−0.04*	−0.04*	−0.04*
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Party: Republican	0.004	0.002	0.002
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Constant	0.60*	0.63*	0.61*
	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.04)
Observations	1,413	1,413	1,413
R^2	0.08	0.09	0.09
Note:			+p<.1; *p<0.05

Table C53

Study 3 Farm Policy Experiment: CRT results for those who had never seen CRT

	Policy support		
	Food Irradiation		
	(1)	(2)	(3)
In-party cue	0.04*	−0.02	−0.002
	(0.02)	(0.05)	(0.06)
Out-party cue	−0.10*	−0.10*	−0.08
	(0.02)	(0.05)	(0.06)
Partisan Identity Strength (PSID)	0.13*	0.04	0.06
	(0.03)	(0.06)	(0.07)
Cognitive resource	−0.12*	−0.23*	−0.17
	(0.03)	(0.09)	(0.13)
In-party * PSID		−0.10	−0.20
		(0.07)	(0.19)
Out-party * PSID		0.01	−0.06
		(0.07)	(0.18)
In-party * Cognitive		0.14+	0.11
		(0.08)	(0.10)
Out-party * Cognitive		−0.02	−0.04
		(0.08)	(0.10)
PSID * Cognitive		0.24+	0.15
		(0.12)	(0.21)
In-party * PSID * Cognitive			0.18
			(0.31)
Out-party * PSID * Cognitive			0.12
			(0.29)
Age	−0.001*	−0.001*	−0.001*
	(0.0004)	(0.0004)	(0.0004)
Female	0.06*	0.06*	0.06*
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Race: non-white	−0.02	−0.02	−0.02
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Education: Some college	0.03+	0.03+	0.03+
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Education: College	−0.02	−0.01	−0.01
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Party: Republican	0.04*	0.04*	0.04*
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Constant	0.67*	0.71*	0.70*
	(0.04)	(0.05)	(0.05)
Observations	1,322	1,322	1,322
R^2	0.11	0.12	0.12
Note:			+p<.1; *p<0.05

Figure C33. Food and Farm Policy Experiments: Marginal Effect of Party Cues on Policy Support across Levels of Party Identity among respondents that had not seen the CRT before



C.17 Models without Covariates

In our pre-analysis plan we did not clearly specify whether we would or would not include a set of control variables. In the main text we did present our models with the covariates age, sex, race, education and partisanship. Here we show that the results do not change when we exclude these covariates. The results do not change in the Food Irradiation Experiment (see Table C54 and Figure C34) and the Farm Subsidy Experiment (see Table C55 and Figure C35).

Table C54
Study 3: Food irradiation support, party cues, reflection and social identity strength

	Policy support					
	CRT		NFC		Cog resources	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
In-party cue	−0.03	−0.001	−0.13*	−0.01	−0.12*	0.06
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.05)	(0.10)	(0.06)	(0.12)
Out-party cue	−0.09*	−0.09*	−0.11*	−0.03	−0.13*	−0.02
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.05)	(0.11)	(0.06)	(0.12)
Partisan Identity Strength (PSID)	0.01	0.03	0.05	0.18	0.08	0.27+
	(0.04)	(0.05)	(0.08)	(0.12)	(0.09)	(0.14)
Cognitive resource	−0.09	−0.04	−0.14+	−0.03	−0.21*	−0.02
	(0.06)	(0.09)	(0.08)	(0.11)	(0.10)	(0.16)
In-party * PSID	0.02	−0.11	0.17*	−0.03	0.18*	−0.17
	(0.05)	(0.12)	(0.06)	(0.16)	(0.08)	(0.21)
Out-party * PSID	0.08+	0.07	0.06	−0.07	0.10	−0.09
	(0.05)	(0.13)	(0.07)	(0.17)	(0.09)	(0.22)
In-party * Cognitive	0.14*	0.08	0.13*	−0.09	0.13*	−0.21
	(0.05)	(0.07)	(0.05)	(0.17)	(0.05)	(0.19)
Out-party * Cognitive	0.04	0.04	0.03	−0.12	0.04	−0.15
	(0.05)	(0.07)	(0.06)	(0.17)	(0.06)	(0.20)
PSID * Cognitive	−0.20*	−0.29+	−0.11	−0.31	−0.18	−0.54*
	(0.09)	(0.15)	(0.11)	(0.19)	(0.15)	(0.27)
In-party * PSID * Cognitive		0.26		0.36		0.66+
		(0.22)		(0.27)		(0.36)
Out-party * PSID * Cognitive		0.03		0.25		0.36
		(0.21)		(0.27)		(0.37)
Constant	0.56*	0.55*	0.62*	0.55*	0.64*	0.54*
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.05)	(0.07)	(0.06)	(0.08)
Observations	1,862	1,862	1,890	1,890	1,862	1,862
R^2	0.08	0.08	0.05	0.05	0.06	0.06
Note:						+p<.1; *p<0.05

Table C55
Replication Farm Policy study: party cues, reflection and social identity strength

	Policy support					
	CRT		NFC		Cog resoucres	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
In-party cue	0.01	0.01	−0.03	0.04	−0.02	0.10
	(0.04)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.12)	(0.07)	(0.14)
Out-party cue	−0.04	−0.07	0.02	−0.15	−0.01	−0.12
	(0.04)	(0.05)	(0.06)	(0.13)	(0.07)	(0.14)
Partisan Identity Strength (PSID)	0.11*	0.09	0.23*	0.18	0.17+	0.19
	(0.05)	(0.06)	(0.09)	(0.14)	(0.10)	(0.16)
Cognitive resource	−0.21*	−0.27*	−0.08	−0.12	−0.22+	−0.20
	(0.07)	(0.11)	(0.09)	(0.13)	(0.12)	(0.18)
In-party * PSID	−0.09	−0.08	0.04	−0.07	0.01	−0.22
	(0.06)	(0.16)	(0.08)	(0.19)	(0.10)	(0.26)
Out-party * PSID	0.01	0.14	−0.10	0.18	−0.07	0.14
	(0.06)	(0.15)	(0.08)	(0.20)	(0.10)	(0.26)
In-party * Cognitive	0.08	0.09	0.08	−0.03	0.09	−0.13
	(0.07)	(0.09)	(0.07)	(0.20)	(0.07)	(0.23)
Out-party * Cognitive	−0.09	−0.04	−0.09	0.22	−0.08	0.12
	(0.07)	(0.09)	(0.07)	(0.22)	(0.07)	(0.24)
PSID * Cognitive	0.14	0.23	−0.10	−0.02	−0.04	−0.07
	(0.10)	(0.18)	(0.13)	(0.22)	(0.18)	(0.31)
In-party * PSID * Cognitive		−0.01		0.18		0.42
		(0.27)		(0.32)		(0.43)
Out-party * PSID * Cognitive		−0.24		−0.50		−0.38
		(0.25)		(0.33)		(0.44)
Constant	0.68*	0.69*	0.66*	0.69*	0.74*	0.73*
	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.06)	(0.08)	(0.07)	(0.10)
Observations	1,742	1,742	1,769	1,769	1,742	1,742
R^2	0.09	0.09	0.07	0.08	0.08	0.08
Note:						+p<.1; *p<0.05

Figure C34. Food Irradiation Experiment: Marginal Effect of Party Cues on Policy Support across Levels of Party Identity without covariates



Figure C35. Farm Subsidy Experiment: Marginal Effect of Party Cues on Policy Support across Levels of Party Identity without covariates



C.18 Spillover effects from Food Irradiation on Farm Policy

To test whether the treatment assignment in the Food Irradiation Experiment influences the results in the Farm Policy Experiment, we repeat the models for the Farm Policy Experiment but include two dummy variables indicating whether respondents were exposed the In-party or Out-Party cue in the Food Irradiation Experiment. These models were pre-registered. In Table C56 and Figure C36 we show the results from the Farm Subsidy Experiment don't change.

Table C56

Replication Farm Policy study: party cues, reflection and social identity strength

	Policy support					
	CRT		NFC		Cog resoucres	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
In-party cue	0.0002	−0.01	−0.03	0.05	−0.02	0.11
	(0.04)	(0.05)	(0.06)	(0.12)	(0.07)	(0.14)
Out-party cue	−0.05	−0.09	0.02	−0.17	0.0001	−0.14
	(0.04)	(0.05)	(0.06)	(0.13)	(0.07)	(0.14)
Partisan Identity Strength (PSID)	0.11*	0.08	0.21*	0.16	0.15	0.16
	(0.05)	(0.06)	(0.09)	(0.14)	(0.10)	(0.16)
Cognitive resource	−0.18*	−0.26*	−0.04	−0.09	−0.17	−0.17
	(0.07)	(0.11)	(0.09)	(0.13)	(0.12)	(0.18)
In-party * PSID	−0.09+	−0.06	0.02	−0.11	−0.01	−0.26
	(0.06)	(0.16)	(0.08)	(0.19)	(0.10)	(0.25)
Out-party * PSID	0.01	0.17	−0.11	0.19	−0.10	0.17
	(0.05)	(0.15)	(0.08)	(0.20)	(0.10)	(0.26)
In-party * Cognitive	0.10	0.11	0.10	−0.04	0.11	−0.13
	(0.07)	(0.09)	(0.07)	(0.20)	(0.07)	(0.23)
Out-party * Cognitive	−0.08	−0.01	−0.08	0.26	−0.07	0.19
	(0.07)	(0.09)	(0.07)	(0.21)	(0.07)	(0.24)
PSID * Cognitive	0.14	0.27	−0.07	0.01	0.01	−0.003
	(0.10)	(0.18)	(0.13)	(0.22)	(0.18)	(0.31)
In-party * PSID * Cognitive		−0.05		0.23		0.45
		(0.27)		(0.31)		(0.42)
Out-party * PSID * Cognitive		−0.30		−0.55+		−0.49
		(0.24)		(0.33)		(0.44)
Age	−0.001*	−0.001*	−0.001+	−0.001+	−0.001+	−0.001+
	(0.0004)	(0.0004)	(0.0004)	(0.0004)	(0.0004)	(0.0004)
Female	0.05*	0.05*	0.06*	0.06*	0.06*	0.06*
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Race: non-white	−0.01	−0.01	−0.01	−0.01	−0.01	−0.01
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Education: Some college	0.01	0.01	0.003	0.003	0.01	0.01
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Education: College	−0.02	−0.03	−0.04*	−0.04*	−0.03+	−0.03+
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Party: Republican	0.05*	0.05*	0.04*	0.04*	0.04*	0.04*
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Food Irradiation: In-party cue	0.02	0.02	0.03+	0.03+	0.02	0.02
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Food Irradiation: Out-party cue	0.02	0.02	0.03*	0.03*	0.02	0.02
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Constant	0.66*	0.67*	0.62*	0.64*	0.70*	0.69*
	(0.04)	(0.05)	(0.07)	(0.09)	(0.07)	(0.10)
Observations	1,741	1,741	1,768	1,768	1,741	1,741
R^2	0.11	0.11	0.10	0.11	0.10	0.11

Note: +p<.1; *p<0.05

Figure C36. Farm Subsidy Experiment: Marginal Effect of Party Cues on Policy Support across Levels of Party Identity controlling for the party cue received in the Food Irradiation Experiment



D. MTurk sample

D.1 Sample characteristics

In total 3533 respondents recruited via – Amazon's MTurk – completed wave 1 of the study between October 9 and October 11, 2018. That is a little less than the 4000 we anticipated and pre-registered but our funding did not allow us to recruit more participants. The second wave was completed by 2509 (71% of the original sample) between October 12 and October 24, 2018. The sample was diverse in terms of key demographics: 58 percent female, 90 percent white. The median age was between 35 and 44, and was higher educated as 57 percent of participants had at least a college.

D.2 Design

The study took place over two-waves. In the first wave we measured the moderators, demographics, and identify those who are eligible (those who identify whether they are Republican or Democrat (including leaners). The second wave was used to conduct the cue-taking experiment. Only self-identified partisans (including leaners) were invited to participate in wave 2.

At the start of the survey we measured age (in age categories), gender, race and education. We measured these socio-economic background variables to broadly assess the extent to which the sample is representative of the U.S. population. The key moderator variables of partisan social identity and cognitive resources were measured prior to the manipulation.

Partisan Social Identity Strength. A Participants were asked to indicate whether they "usually think of themselves as a Republican, a Democrat, an Independent, or something else." Those in the latter two categories were then asked if they think of themselves "as closer" to one party or the other. Participants who identified with or leaned towards a party were then administered the eight-item partisan identity strength measure, worded appropriately for their in-party (Bankert et al., 2017; Huddy et al., 2015). Like in the other samples, the items load highly on the latent dimension (see Table D57). We created a scale ranging from the weakest observed partisan social identity (0) in the sample to the strongest (1) observed partisan social identity in the sample (M=.50, SD=.39, α=.88, =.90) – see Figure D37 for the distribution.

Table D57
Study 4 Partisan Social Identity Strength: Standardized Factor Loadings

	Standardized Factor Loading	p-value
1	0.87	0.00
2	0.54	0.00
3	0.76	0.00
4	0.72	0.00
5	0.65	0.00
6	0.81	0.00
7	0.89	0.00
8	0.82	0.00

Figure D37. Study 4 Histogram of Partisan Social Identity Strength



Cognitive Reflection Test. We measure cognitive resources with the Cognitive Reflection Test which is designed to assess the degree to which participants engage in intuitive or "gut" reasoning vs. effortful and systematic thinking (Frederick, 2005). We use an extended seven item CRT that was based upon four items (#1-4 below) that are part of the CRT-2 (Thomson & Oppenheimer, 2016) and an additional three items (#5-7 below) from the CRT-7 developed by Toplak et al. (2014), see items and the correct answer in brackets below.

In Table D58, we show the tetrachoric correlations between the seven CRT items. In line with Toplak et al. (2014) and the other studies part of this paper, we observe that all items are positive and modestly to strongly correlated with each other. We recoded the scale to range between 0 (lowest score in the sample) and 1 (highest score in the sample). Figure D38 provides a histogram of the distribution of the CRT. Note that the CRT has the following psychometric properties: m=.48, sd=.27, skewness=.16, kurtosis=2.33, α=.73, ω=.84).

- 1. A farmer had 15 sheep and all but 8 died. How many are left? [**Correct answers = 8**; intuitive answer = 7]
- 2. If you're running a race and you pass the person in second place, what place are you in? [**Correct answers = second**; intuitive answer = first]
- 3. Emily's father has three daughters. The first two are named April and May. What is the third daughter's name? [**Correct answer = Emily**; intuitive answer = June]
- 4. How many cubic feet of dirt are there in a hole that is 3' deep x 3' wide x 3' long? [**Correct answer = None**; intuitive answer = 27]
- 5. If John can drink one barrel of water in 6 days, and Mary can drink one barrel of water in 12 days, how long would it take them, in days, to drink one barrel of water together? [Correct answer = 4; intuitive answer = 9]
- 6. Jerry received both the 15th highest and the 15th lowest mark in the class. How many students are in the class? [Correct answer = 29; intuitive answer = 30]
- 7. A man buys a pig for $60, sells it for $70, buys it back for $80, and sells it finally for $90. How much has he made, in dollars? [Correct answer = $20; intuitive answer = 10]

Table D58
Study 4 Tetrachoric Correlations Cognitive Reflection Test

	CRT1	CRT2	CRT3	CRT4	CRT5	CRT6	CRT7
CRT1	1.00	0.56	0.40	0.47	0.37	0.39	0.16
CRT2		1.00	-0.42	0.14	-0.23	-0.14	-0.29
CRT3			1.00	0.46	0.33	0.39	0.20
CRT4				1.00	0.43	0.52	0.32
CRT5					1.00	0.62	0.40
CRT6						1.00	0.43
CRT7							1.00

Wave 2: Food Irradiation Experiment. In the second wave, we conducted the experiment. We only invited those respondents that identify with or lean toward a party. In the second wave, we replicate the study by Kam (2005) where participants were exposed to a short newspaper article about a proposed ban on food irradiation. Participants were randomly assigned to one of three conditions: Republicans Support (and Democrats oppose) banning

Figure D38. Cognitive Reflection Test



food irradiation, Democrats Support (and Republicans oppose) banning food irradiation, and Control (proponents and opponents of a ban). All other information in the experimental stimuli was identical across the treatment conditions and we used the same wording as in Study 3 (see Appendix C.7).

The dependent variable is the same as the one used in Studies 1 and 3 (M=.50, SD=.24, α=.78). Next, we measured the thoughts people have while reading the message about food irradiation. We ask them: "What thoughts came to mind while you were reading the article about food irradiation? Please try to list everything that came to mind" followed by a text box where people can write down their thoughts (M=29.36, SD=22.39, Min=0, Max=323). Finally, we measured the knowledge people have about food irradiation using four questions that were used in Study 3 (see Appendix C.5; M=2.92, SD=1.21, Min=0, Max=4).

D.3 Results

Throughout this study we use the α-value of 0.05 as the value for statistical significance. To test the main effects we regressed the policy support on the In-party and Out-party cue dummies, the partisan social identity strength measure, the CRT-score and the covariates age, gender, race (non-white), education and the party the person supports (see model 1 of Table D59). We find, in line with Study 3 (Appendix C.11) – but not Study 1 (Appendix A.6) – that people who receive the in-party cue are more supportive of the policy (b=.05, se=.01, model 1 of Table D59), while people who receive the out-party cue are less supportive of the policy (b=-.07, se=.01, model 1 of Table D59). Again, we also see that people who strongly identify with a party are more supportive of the policy, while those higher on CRT are less supportive of the policy.

To assess whether cue receptivity differs as a function of partisan social identity and cognitive resources, we regressed support for the ban on in-party cue, out-party cue, CRT, partisan social identity, the two-way interactions between each of the condition dummies and the cognitive resource variable, the two-way interactions between each of the condition dummies and partisan social identity, the two-way interaction between the cognitive resource variable and partisan social identity and the standard covariates. Table D59 (model 2) shows that neither

the interaction between CRT and in-party cue (b=-.01, se=.04) nor that between CRT and out-party cue (b=-.03, se=.04) was significant. This is inline with the results in Study 1 (see main text) and Study 3 (see main text). In this model, we find mixed findings whether cue-receptivity is conditional upon partisan social identity strength. Again, we find no significant two-way interactions were observed between partisan social identity and in-party cue (b=.07, se=.05, model 2 of Table D59). But we do find that the effect of the out-party cue on policy support becomes stronger as partisan social identity strength increases (b=-.12, se=.05).

Table D59
Study 4: Food irradiation support, party cues, reflection and social identity strength

	Policy support		
	CRT		
	(1)	(2)	(3)
In-party cue	0.05*	0.02	0.02
	(0.01)	(0.04)	(0.06)
Out-party cue	−0.07*	0.01	0.04
	(0.01)	(0.04)	(0.06)
Partisan Identity Strength (PSID)	0.08*	0.14*	0.15*
	(0.02)	(0.05)	(0.08)
CRT	−0.12*	−0.07	−0.05
	(0.02)	(0.05)	(0.08)
In-party * PSID		0.07	0.07
		(0.05)	(0.11)
Out-party * PSID		−0.12*	−0.18
		(0.05)	(0.11)
In-party * CRT		−0.005	0.0002
		(0.04)	(0.11)
Out-party * CRT		−0.03	−0.09
		(0.04)	(0.11)
PSID * CRT		−0.08	−0.12
		(0.08)	(0.14)
In-party * PSID * CRT			−0.01
			(0.20)
Out-party * PSID * CRT			0.12
			(0.20)
Age	−0.01+	−0.01	−0.01
	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)
Female	0.04*	0.04*	0.04*
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Race: non-white	0.001	−0.001	−0.001
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Education: Some college	−0.01	−0.01	−0.01
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Education: College	−0.03+	−0.03+	−0.03+
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Party: Republican	0.01	0.01	0.01
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Constant	0.53*	0.50*	0.49*
	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.05)
Observations	2,509	2,509	2,509
R^2	0.08	0.08	0.08
Note:			+p<.1; *p<0.05

To test the expressive utility model, we regressed support for the food irradiation ban on the two cue condition dummies, a cognitive resource variable, partisan social identity, all two-way interactions (excluding between the two dummies), and the three-way interactions between the cognitive resource variable, partisan social identity, and each of the two cue condition dummies as well as the standard covariates (see model 3 of Table D59).

In the analysis with CRT, neither of the three-way interactions was significant. To explore the three-way interaction effects from the analysis with CRT, we plot in Figure D39 the marginal effects of the in-party cue and out-party cue as a function of partisan social identity for those that score one standard deviation below the mean, at the mean, and one standard deviation above the mean on the CRT. Among those low on the CRT (left panel), in-party cue had no effect on policy support relative to control at any level of partisan social identity, as is signaled by the horizontal slope of the marginal effects. Contrary to our expectations, among those low on the CRT out-party cue tends to have a negative marginal effect on policy support among those higher in partisan social identity (b=-.15, se=.08, p=.045).

Turning to those scoring at the mean on the CRT, receiving an in-party cue did not influence policy support at any level of partisan social identity (b=.07, se=.05). However, and

unexpectedly, partisan social identity did condition the reliance upon the out-party cue among those average on the CRT (b=-.12, se=.05, p=.029). In the middle panel of Figure D39 this is signaled by the almost horizontal lines of the predicted marginal effect of the in-party cue, and the negative slope of the out-party cue compared to the control condition.

Finally, among respondents with high cognitive resources (i.e., 1SD above the mean on the CRT) we see that the effect of the in-party cue on policy support was not conditioned by partisan social identity strength (b=.06, se=.08). We also do not find evidence that the effect of the out-party cue is conditioned by partisan social identity strength (b=-.09, se=.08). This is also signalled by more or less horizontal slope of the predicted marginal effect of both the in-party and out-part cues compared to the control – see right-hand panel of Figure D39.

To conclude, these findings are different compared to the pre-registered expectations and the findings in Study 1, 2 and 3. We return to possible explanations in conclusion of this Appendix.

Figure D39. MTurk: Marginal Effect of In-party and Out-party Cues on Policy Support across Levels of Partisan Social Identity by Cognitive Reflection Score



See model 3 of Table D59 for the regression output.

Exploration of the possible mechanisms. We measured the time participants spend reading the prompts, the number of words they formulated when we asked them to think about the policy and the number of correct answers on a quiz.

We start with the reading time. In Table D60 we present the summary statistics of the reading time in seconds. As can be gleaned from the Table, it seems that people spend less time reading the treatments when they are in the In-party or Out-party condition compared to the No-cues (or control) condition. Contrary to Study 3 (Appendix C.3), we observe no meaningful differences between the reading time of the different conditions.

Table D60
Study 4 Food Irradiation Experiment: Reading Time

	Cue	Mean	SD	Min	Max
1	No cues	91.82	126.10	1.57	1484.85
2	In-party cue	87.10	122.73	1.44	1623.59
3	Out-party cue	89.01	120.30	1.05	1631.33

Following the descriptive statistics, we tested whether respondents read longer based upon the cue-condition, their partisan social identity strength and their cognitive resources. Do note that this model was not pre-registered. We do this by regressing the log-transformed time that respondents took to read the treatment on the party cues, partisan social identity strength and the cognitive resource variable plus the standard controls. Contrary to the results in Appendix C.3, we find that respondents in the In-party and Out-party cue do not differ in the time they spend reading the prompts as can be seen from the non-significant coefficients of the in-party and out-party cues (model 1 of Table D61). In line with Study 3 (see Appendix C.3), we find that respondents who score higher on CRT read longer (b=.58, se=.07), while those higher on partisan social identity strength read shorter (b=-.25, se=.09, model 1 of Table D61).

To assess whether reading time of the treatment differs when people receive party cues as a function of partisan social identity and cognitive resources, we regressed the log-transformed reading time on in-party cue, out-party cue, CRT, partisan social identity, the two-way interactions between each of the condition dummies and the cognitive resource variable, the two-way interactions between each of the condition dummies and partisan social identity, and the two-way interaction between the cognitive resource variable and partisan social identity. In model 2 of Table D61 we find no evidence that people in the party cues conditions spend more or less time reading conditional upon their cognitive resources or partisan social identity strength (see non-significant coefficients for CRT * in-party and CRT * out-party cues). This is an important null finding as the bounded rationality model might expect that respondents with low cognitive resources will spend *less* time reading the treatment when they receive a party cue. Importantly, this model was not pre-registered.

Finally, we run our pre-registered test of the expectation that those with a strong partisan social identity and high in cognitive resources spend more time reading the policy when they receive a party cue. To test this, we regressed support for the time people spend reading the treatment on the two cue condition dummies, a cognitive resource variable, partisan social identity, all two-way interactions (excluding between the two dummies), and the three-way interactions between the cognitive resource variable, partisan social identity, and each of the two cue condition dummies. Contrary to our expectations, we find no significant interaction effects. Inspection of the marginal effects of the party cues on reading time over the range of partisan social identity strength at different levels of CRT (see Figure D40, show almost horizontal lines of the marginal effects of party cue. As such, this test does not provide evidence that participants with high cognitive resources and stronger partisan social identity strength spend more time reading about the policies.

Table D61

Study 4 Reading, Words and Quiz: Food irradiation support, party cues, reflection and social identity strength

	Mechanism								
	Reading time			Words			Quiz correct		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)
In-party cue	−0.04	−0.06	−0.24	0.04	0.15	0.30	−0.06	0.29	0.39
	(0.05)	(0.15)	(0.25)	(0.04)	(0.12)	(0.20)	(0.06)	(0.18)	(0.30)
Out-party cue	0.03	−0.03	−0.38	0.04	−0.02	0.03	0.01	0.28	0.27
	(0.05)	(0.16)	(0.25)	(0.04)	(0.12)	(0.20)	(0.06)	(0.18)	(0.30)
Partisan Identity Strength (PSID)	−0.25*	−0.42+	−0.76*	−0.13+	−0.10	0.03	−0.56*	−0.46+	−0.40
	(0.09)	(0.23)	(0.32)	(0.07)	(0.18)	(0.25)	(0.11)	(0.26)	(0.37)
CRT	0.58*	0.46*	0.09	0.51*	0.56*	0.69*	1.26*	1.28*	1.35*
	(0.07)	(0.21)	(0.32)	(0.06)	(0.17)	(0.25)	(0.09)	(0.25)	(0.37)
In-party * PSID		−0.11	0.23		−0.21	−0.49		−0.49+	−0.69
		(0.23)	(0.45)		(0.18)	(0.36)		(0.27)	(0.53)
Out-party * PSID		0.28	0.97*		0.17	0.07		−0.27	−0.25
		(0.23)	(0.45)		(0.18)	(0.36)		(0.27)	(0.53)
In-party * CRT		0.16	0.53		−0.01	−0.31		−0.22	−0.44
		(0.17)	(0.45)		(0.14)	(0.36)		(0.20)	(0.53)
Out-party * CRT		−0.17	0.56		−0.05	−0.15		−0.28	−0.26
		(0.18)	(0.46)		(0.14)	(0.36)		(0.21)	(0.53)
PSID * CRT		0.24	0.96		−0.06	−0.33		0.30	0.18
		(0.34)	(0.59)		(0.27)	(0.47)		(0.40)	(0.69)
In-party * PSID * CRT			−0.74			0.60			0.43
			(0.83)			(0.66)			(0.98)
Out-party * PSID * CRT			−1.47+			0.21			−0.05
			(0.84)			(0.66)			(0.98)
Age	0.13*	0.12*	0.12*	0.05*	0.05*	0.05*	0.13*	0.13*	0.13*
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Female	0.17*	0.17*	0.17*	0.12*	0.12*	0.12*	0.14*	0.14*	0.14*
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)
Race: non-white	0.10*	0.10*	0.10*	−0.05	−0.05	−0.05	−0.11+	−0.11+	−0.10+
	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)
Education: Some college	0.07	0.07	0.08	0.12*	0.12*	0.12*	0.18*	0.18*	0.18*
	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.08)
Education: College	−0.08	−0.08	−0.08	0.13*	0.13*	0.13*	0.02	0.02	0.02
	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)
Party: Republican	−0.09*	−0.09*	−0.09*	−0.09*	−0.09*	−0.09*	−0.12*	−0.12*	−0.12*
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)
Constant	3.38*	3.47*	3.64*	2.64*	2.61*	2.55*	2.05*	1.92*	1.89*
	(0.11)	(0.16)	(0.20)	(0.09)	(0.13)	(0.16)	(0.13)	(0.19)	(0.23)
Observations	2,509	2,509	2,509	2,509	2,509	2,509	2,509	2,509	2,509
R^2	0.07	0.07	0.07	0.05	0.05	0.05	0.12	0.13	0.13

Note: +p<.1; *p<0.05

Exploration of the possible mechanism: Words. Again, we first tested whether respondents formulated thoughts that consisted of more words based upon the cue-condition, their partisan social identity strength and their cognitive resources – do note that this model was not pre-registered. We do this by regressing the log-transformed number of words on the party cue dummies, partisan social identity strength and the cognitive resource variable plus the standard controls. We find no evidence that respondents in the party cues conditions report more or less words (see model 4 of Table D61). In line with the analyses of the reading time, we do find that respondents that have a stronger partisan social identity strength formulate thoughts that consist of a lower number of *less* words (b=-.13, se=.07), while respondents that have higher cognitive resources formulate *more* words (b=.51, se=.06).

Next, we assess whether the number of formulated words differed when people received party cues as a function of partisan social identity and cognitive resources. Therefore, we regressed the number of words (log-transformed) on in-party cue, out-party cue, CRT, partisan social identity, the two-way interactions between each of the condition dummies and the cognitive resource variable, the two-way interactions between each of the condition dummies and partisan social identity, and the two-way interaction between the cognitive resource variable and partisan social identity. We find no indications that the formulated number of words is conditional upon an interaction between the party cues and cognitive resources nor partisan social identity strength (see model 5 of Table D61).

Finally, we preregistered the expectation that those with a strong partisan social identity and high in cognitive resources formulate thoughts that contain more words when they receive a

party cue. To test this, we regressed the formulated number of words (log-transformed) on the two cue condition dummies, a cognitive resource variable, partisan social identity, all two-way interactions (excluding between the two dummies), and the three-way interactions between the cognitive resource variable, partisan social identity, and each of the two cue condition dummies. Contrary to our expectations, we find no significant three-way interaction effects (model 6 of Table D61). Inspection of the marginal effects of the party cues on the used number of words over the range of partisan social identity strength at different levels of CRT (see middle panel of Figure D40), show almost horizontal lines.

Exploration of the possible mechanism: Quiz results. First, we tested whether respondents answer more questions correct on the quiz based upon the cue-condition, their partisan social identity strength and their cognitive resources – do note that this model was not pre-registered. We do this by regressing the correct answers on the quiz on the party cues, partisan social identity strength and the cognitive resource variable plus the standard controls. Contrary to the results in Study 3 (Appendix C.5), we find no evidence that people the party cues conditions answer more or less questions correct – as is signalled by the non-significant coefficients for the in-party and out-party cues (see model 7 of Table D61). We do find that people who score higher on CRT answer more questions correct on the quiz (b=1.26, se=.09, model 5 of Table D61). Moreover, we find that those higher on partisan social identity strength answer less questions correct on the quiz (b=-.56, se=.11, model 5 of Table D61).

To assess whether answers on the quiz differed when people received party cues as a function of partisan social identity and cognitive resources, we regressed the correct answers on the quiz on in-party cue, out-party cue, CRT, partisan social identity, the two-way interactions between each of the condition dummies and the cognitive resource variable, the two-way interactions between each of the condition dummies and partisan social identity, and the two-way interaction between the cognitive resource variable and partisan social identity. In line with the results in Study 3 (Appendix C.5), we find no evidence in Table D61 (model 8) that CRT or partisan social identity moderates the effect of the in-party or out-party cue on the number of correct answers on the quiz.

Finally, we preregistered the expectation that those with a strong partisan social identity and high in cognitive resources will know more about the policy when they receive a party cue (see model 9). To test this, we regressed the correct answers on the quiz on the two cue condition dummies, a cognitive resource variable, partisan social identity, all two-way interactions (excluding between the two dummies), and the three-way interactions between the cognitive resource variable, partisan social identity, and each of the two cue condition dummies. Contrary to our expectations, we find no significant interaction effects (model 6 of Table D61). Inspection of the marginal effects of the party cues on the number of correct answers on the quiz over the range of partisan social identity strength at different levels of CRT (see bottom-panel of Figure D40), show almost horizontal lines of the marginal effects of party cues. As such, this test does not provide evidence that participants with high cognitive resources and stronger partisan social identity strength spend more time reading about the policies.[1]

[1]The results using the quiz don't change once we use a negative binomial regression model: see replication materials.

Figure D40. MTurk Exploring the Mechanism: Marginal Effect of Cues across Levels of Party Identity by Cognitive Reflection Score on Reading Time, Words and Correct Quiz Responses



See Table D61, model 3 (reading time), model 6 (words) and model 9 (quiz results) for the regression output.

D.4 Pre-registered robustness checks

Randomization checks. We pre-registered to test test whether CRT, partisan social identity strength and the socio-economic background variables are balanced across the treatment. We do this by regression these variables on the indicators of the treatment (Democrat support and Republican support) and the party cues (see Table D62). We also find that the covariates are balanced across conditions – with the exception of some more Republicans in the Republicans support condition (see Table D63). While thera a bit more Republicans in the "in-party support condition" (see Table D64).

Table D62
Study 4 Food Irradiation Experiment: balance checks of moderators

	Dependent variable:	
	CRT	
	(1)	(2)
Democrats support	0.01	
	(0.01)	
Republicans support	−0.02	
	(0.01)	
In-party cue		0.002
		(0.01)
Out-party cue		−0.01
		(0.01)
Constant	0.48*	0.48*
	(0.01)	(0.01)
Observations	2,509	2,509
R^2	0.002	0.0003
Note:		*p<0.05

Table D63
Study 4 Food Irradiation Experiment: Balance Checks Demographics

	Dependent variable:				
	Sex	Age	Education	Non-white	Republican Party
	logistic	*OLS*	*ordered logistic*	*logistic*	*logistic*
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Democrats support	−0.0002	0.04	−0.01	−0.16	0.09
	(0.10)	(0.06)	(0.10)	(0.12)	(0.10)
Republicans support	0.18	0.07	−0.02	−0.07	0.23*
	(0.10)	(0.06)	(0.10)	(0.12)	(0.10)
Constant	0.26*	3.79*		−1.32*	−0.62*
	(0.07)	(0.04)		(0.09)	(0.07)
Observations	2,509	2,509	2,509	2,509	2,509
R^2		0.001			
Akaike Inf. Crit.	3,414.03			2,510.38	3,319.50

Note: *p<0.05

Table D64
Study 4 Food Irradiation Experiment: Balance Checks Demographics

	Dependent variable:				
	Sex	Age	Education	Non-white	Republican Party
	logistic	*OLS*	*ordered logistic*	*logistic*	*logistic*
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
In-party cue	0.01	0.04	−0.03	−0.21	0.23*
	(0.10)	(0.06)	(0.10)	(0.12)	(0.10)
Out-party cue	0.18	0.07	0.002	−0.01	0.08
	(0.10)	(0.06)	(0.10)	(0.12)	(0.10)
Constant	0.26*	3.79*		−1.32*	−0.62*
	(0.07)	(0.04)		(0.09)	(0.07)
Observations	2,509	2,509	2,509	2,509	2,509
R^2		0.0005			
Akaike Inf. Crit.	3,414.31			2,508.23	3,319.16

Note: *p<0.05

Decomposing the dependent variable. We analyze each of the three items that make-up the dependent variable separately. We expected that the results would not change. Figure D41 presents the results from the analyses per item. Figure D41 shows that we do not reach at different conclusions in this sample if we analyze each item separately because the marginal effects of the in-party and out-party cues do not differ substantially per item.

Figure D41. Food Irradiation Item-by-item analyses: Marginal Effect of In-party and Out-party Cues across Levels of Partisan Social Identity by Cognitive Reflection Score



See replication file for the output of the regression analysis.

Checking linearity. We assess the assumed linear effect of partisan social identity strength. We follow the same procedures as outlined the other studies (see for instance Appendix A.9). Figure D42 shows that the effect of the out-part cue on policy support at different levels of CRT is linear: as partisan social identity increases, the effect of the out-part cue on policy support becomes stronger. For the in-party cue the effect seems somewhat non-linear. Especially when CRT is at the mean (middle panel of Figure D42) and at 1 standard deviation above the mean (right-hand panel of Figure D42, we see that the effect of the in-party cue on policy support becomes a lot stronger when people have a strong partisan social identity strength compared to a modest or weak partisan social identity strength. In fact, the results for the in-party cue are than in line with the findings for the Food Irradiation Experiments reported in Study 1 and Study 3. We return to this in the conclusion.

Figure D42. Food Irradiation Inspection of non-linearity: Marginal Effect of In-party and Out-party Cues across Levels of Partisan Social Identity by Cognitive Reflection Score



See replication file for the output of the regression analysis.

D.5 Conclusion

The results from the MTurk study are mixed. First, we replicate the main effect that people receiving an out-party cue become less supportive of the policy. But we also find that people who receive an in-party cue become more supportive of the policy. In line with Study 1 and Study 3, we fail to find evidence for the bounded rationality perspective. Respondents that score low on CRT are not more likely to rely upon party cues. However, we also find limited support for the expressive utility perspective. In the pre-registered test of the argument, we fail to find evidence that cue-receptivity is the strongest among people with a strong partisan social identity and higher levels of cognitive reflection. Instead, we find that – irrespective of the level of cognitive reflection – the effect of the out-party cue becomes stronger as partisan social identity increases. That said, the pre-registered robustness test shows that when we group partisan social identity strength into three categories (low, modest and high), than we find that there is strong and positive effect of the in-party cue on policy support among those with high CRT and strong partisan social identity strength, while this effect is a lot weaker or absent among those with low to modest levels of partisan social identity strength. Inspection of the mechanism, failed to find any evidence in line with our pre-registered expectations. We return to this in the discussion of the main paper.

Explanation of the inconsistent results. First, the mean on the CRT was high compared to the other samples reported in this study (see Appendix A.4; Appendix B.4 and

Appendix C.9). Yet, the mean of the CRT-7 employed in this study cannot directly be compared to the CRT-7 employed in Studies 2 and 3. However, 3 of the seven items in the MTurk sample (number 5-7 above) were also used in the CRT-7 employed in Study 3. People in the MTurk sample scored a lot higher on these three CRT items (M=.37, SD=.35, min=0, max=1) compared to people in Study 3 (M=.27, SD=.30, min=0, max=1). This 10% higher score (on overage) could be explained by the fact that people on MTurk might be more familiar with the CRT tasks (Haigh, 2016; Stieger & Reips, 2016) or they might search the correct answer (Clifford & Jerit, 2016).

Second we also observe that people in the MTurk sample formulated almost two times as much words in the thought listing task (M=29, SD=22, min=0, max=323) compared to the people in Study 3 (M=14.75, SD=16, Min=0, Max=17) – note that people in the MTurk sample don't read longer compared to those in Study 3. The differences in CRT and words formulated between the MTurk sample and Study 3 suggest that the MTurk sample behave differently in the same experiment. While we can only speculate about the origins of these differences, they could be an explanation for the weaker pattern of evidence in the MTurk study. If people score much higher on CRT because they know the questions or found the answer online, than the moderation effect of CRT will be biased in unknown direction. Moreover, if people really want to do their best in the study and satisfy the researchers – they might formulate much more thoughts than they actually had – as such the though listing findings would be biased in unknown ways.

To conclude, the results of the MTurk sample are not completely in line with the findings presented in the main text. Obviously, the results of the MTurk sample will be included in the meta-analysis.

E. Individual data meta-analysis

E.1 Distribution of partisan social identity strength

In all studies the item-wording of the partisan social identity scale is the same. In Figure E43 we plot the distribution of partisan social identity strength. As can be seen, across the samples the distribution of the partisan social identity strength measures differs a bit bit. There could be multiple explanations for these differences: they have been collected at different time points (see Table 1 in the main text), in different online panels and using slightly different wording of the answer categories (see research design overview section in the main text of the paper). Yet, as can be gleaned from Figure E43 they to more or lesser extent approximate a relatively normal distribution. Most important: various studies have showed that as long as there is considerable heterogeneity in a moderator, this will lead to the expected moderation effect (Coppock, 2018; Druckman & Kam, 2011; Mullinix et al., 2016). As such, our moderation effects are most likely not affected by the slight differences in the distribution of partisan social identity strength as there are in each sample enough people with a weak, modest or strong partisan social identity strength.

Figure E43. Distribution of Partisan Social Identity Strength



E.2 Main effects of the meta-analysis

The main effects are provided in Table E65 on this page.

Table E65
Individual Data Meta-Analysis: Main effects

	Policy support		
	CRT	NFC	Cog resources
	(1)	(2)	(3)
In-party cue	0.04*	0.03*	0.03*
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Out-party cue	−0.07*	−0.07*	−0.07*
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Partisan Identity Strength (PSID)	0.10*	0.12*	0.12*
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
CRT	−0.13*		
	(0.01)		
NFC		−0.08*	
		(0.02)	
Cognitive resource			−0.14*
			(0.02)
Sample: Study 2	0.15*	0.13*	0.12*
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Sample: Study 3 Food Experiment	−0.01	−0.03*	−0.04*
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Sample: Study 3 Farm Experiment	0.16*	0.14*	0.13*
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Sample: MTurk	−0.01		
	(0.01)		
Age	−0.01*	−0.01*	−0.01*
	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)
Female	0.04*	0.04*	0.04*
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Race: non-white	−0.02*	−0.02*	−0.02*
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Education: Some college	−0.04*	−0.06*	−0.05*
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Education: College	−0.01	−0.001	−0.003
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Party: Republican	0.02*	0.02*	0.02*
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Constant	0.56*	0.59*	0.63*
	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Observations	8,116	5,607	5,607
Akaike Inf. Crit.	-912.02	-608.06	-628.35
Bayesian Inf. Crit.	-785.99	-495.32	-515.61

Note: +p<.1; *p<0.05

E.3 Meta-analysis In-party vs. Out-party cue

We also conducted a meta-analysis of individual data to also compare the effect of the in-party cue versus the out-party cue on policy support. To do this, we pooled the data across the experiments. We pool data from Study 1-4, the Trade Policy Experiment (Appendix H) and the Danish Experiment (Appendix I). Note that the sample sizes across the different measures of cognitive resources in the meta-analysis differ because CRT was included in all samples but NfC was not included the MTurk (Study 4) and Danish Study. We create a dummy variable capturing whether respondents received the in-party cue (1) or the out-party cue (0). Note that respondents that received no cue condition in Study 1-4 were excluded from these analyses.

To test the bounded rationality perspective, we regressed policy support on the in-party cue, partisan social identity, a cognitive resource variable (i.e., CRT, NfC or cognitive resources), and the two-way interactions between these variables (see Table E66) as well as the covariates. Contrary to the bounded rationality, the meta-analyses show that the effect of the in-party cue on policy support becomes stronger when CRT (b=.12, se=.03, model 1 of Table E66), NFC (b=.12, se=.03, model 3 of Table E66) and cognitive resources (b=.12, se=.03; model 5 of Table E66 increase. Contrary to the bounded rationality perspective we find no evidence that people with lower cognitive resources rely more upon party cues. Instead, those with more cognitive resources rely more upon party cues. Finally, the two-way interaction also shows that the effect of the in-party on policy support become stronger as partisan social identity strength increases in the NfC and Cognitive resources model but not in the CRT model. Finally, we meta-analytically examined whether the effect of the in-party relative to the out-party cue is strongest among those high in both partisan social identity and cognitive resources. The three-way interaction effects between the in-party cue (vs. out-party cue) X partisan social identity strength X CRT is positive but not significant (b=.11, se=.08, model 2 Table E66). We find similar positive and significant interaction effects when we substitute the CRT for the NfC in model 4 of Table E66 (b=.55, se=.16, p<.001) and for the latent cognitive resources variable in model 6 Table E66 (b=in the model using the CRT (b=.56, se=.17, p<.001).

To facilitate the interpretation, we plot the three-way interaction with panels for CRT (upper), NFC (middle) and cognitive resources (lower) – see Figure E44. The results across the three measures of cognitive resources are strikingly similar. The effects of the in-party cue are not conditioned by partisan social identity strength when cognitive resources are low – as can be seen by the horizontal slopes of the marginal effects for the in-party cue on policy support in the NFC (middle row) and Cognitive Resources. The notable exception is the CRT: also among people low on CRT, there is an increasingly strong effect of the in-party cue on policy support as partisan social identity strength increases.

When cognitive resources are high, the effect of the in-party cue becomes stronger as partisan social identity strength increases. This can be seen by the positive and statistically significant slope of the CRT (b=.18, se=.04, p<.001, upper right panel of Figure E44), NFC (b=.22, se=.04, p<.01, middle right panel of Figure E44), and cognitive resources models (b=.21, se=.05, p<.01, bottom right panel of Figure E44). The results of the meta-analysis show no evidence in favor of the bounded rationality model, while the results for the three-way interaction effects are consistent with the key hypothesis of the expressive utility model.

Table E66
Individual Data Meta-Analysis: In-party versus Out-party Cue

	Policy support					
	CRT		NFC		Cog resources	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
In-party cue	0.03^{+}	0.05^{*}	-0.06^{+}	0.12^{*}	-0.04	0.14^{*}
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.06)	(0.03)	(0.06)
Partisan Identity Strength (PSID)	0.09^{*}	0.11^{*}	0.19^{*}	0.36^{*}	0.15^{*}	0.31^{*}
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.05)	(0.07)	(0.05)	(0.07)
Cognitive resource	-0.05^{+}	-0.03	-0.09	0.07	-0.14^{*}	0.03
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.05)	(0.07)	(0.06)	(0.08)
In-party * PSID	0.12^{*}	0.09^{*}	0.12^{*}	-0.21^{*}	0.12^{*}	-0.19^{+}
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.10)	(0.03)	(0.10)
In-party * Cognitive	0.0002	-0.06	0.16^{*}	-0.14	0.13^{*}	-0.18^{+}
	(0.02)	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.10)	(0.04)	(0.10)
PSID * Cognitive	-0.10^{*}	-0.15^{*}	-0.13	-0.42^{*}	-0.07	-0.36^{*}
	(0.04)	(0.06)	(0.08)	(0.12)	(0.09)	(0.12)
In-party * PSID * Cognitive		0.11		0.55^{*}		0.56^{*}
		(0.08)		(0.16)		(0.17)
Sample: Study 2	0.14^{*}	0.14^{*}	0.12^{*}	0.12^{*}	0.11^{*}	0.11^{*}
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Sample: Study 3 Food Experiment	-0.02	-0.02	-0.03^{*}	-0.03^{*}	-0.05^{*}	-0.04^{*}
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Sample: Study 3 Farm Experiment	0.14^{*}	0.14^{*}	0.13^{*}	0.13^{*}	0.11^{*}	0.12^{*}
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Sample: MTurk	-0.01	-0.01				
	(0.01)	(0.01)				
Sample: TTIP study	0.16^{*}	0.16^{*}	0.14^{*}	0.14^{*}	0.15^{*}	0.15^{*}
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Sample: Danish TTIP experiment	-0.10^{*}	-0.10^{*}				
	(0.03)	(0.03)				
Sample: Danish Euthanasia experiment	-0.17^{*}	-0.17^{*}				
	(0.03)	(0.03)				
Age	-0.003^{*}	-0.003^{*}	-0.003^{*}	-0.003^{*}	-0.003^{*}	-0.003^{*}
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
Female	0.03^{*}	0.03^{*}	0.03^{*}	0.03^{*}	0.03^{*}	0.03^{*}
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Race: non-white	-0.03^{*}	-0.03^{*}	-0.03^{*}	-0.03^{*}	-0.03^{*}	-0.03^{*}
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Education: Some college	-0.04^{*}	-0.04^{*}	-0.05^{*}	-0.05^{*}	-0.04^{*}	-0.04^{*}
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Education: College	0.005	0.005	0.001	0.001	0.001	0.001
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Party: Republican	0.01	0.01	0.003	0.004	0.004	0.004
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Constant	0.49^{*}	0.48^{*}	0.53^{*}	0.43^{*}	0.56^{*}	0.46^{*}
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.04)	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.05)
Observations	7,368	7,368	4,510	4,510	4,510	4,510
Akaike Inf. Crit.	242.65	243.03	-301.54	-310.79	-298.64	-307.48
Bayesian Inf. Crit.	401.47	408.74	-173.26	-176.09	-170.35	-172.79

Note: $^{+}$p<.1; *p<0.05

Figure E44. Individual Data Meta-Analyses: In-party cue versus Out-party cue



See Table E66 for the regression output.

F. Traditional party identity strength measure

The correlation between partisan social identity strength and party identity is modest in Study 1 (r=.45, p<.01), Study 2 (r=.43, p<.01), Study 3 (r=.45, p<.01) and Study 4 (r=.47, p<.01). We arrive at substantively similar conclusions in all experiments.

Figure F45. **Study 1 Food Irradiation Experiment**: Using Party Identity Strength



Figure F46. **Study 2 Farm Policy Experiment**: Using Party Identity Strength



Figure F47. **Study 3 Food Irradiation Replication**: Using Party Identity Strength



Figure F48. **Study 3 Farm Subsidy Replication**: Using Party Identity Strength



Figure F49. **Study 4 Food Irradiation Replication**: Using Party Identity Strength



G. Partisanship and policy preferences

One might wonder whether the ideological signals of the issues provide an explanation for the heterogeneity in the reliance on the in-party versus the out-party cue. Perhaps, in situations where the parties' positions aren't very clear for a voter, a food irradiation bill is something Democrats like more than Republicans, or vice versa. To test this explanation, we turn to the association between partisanship and policy preferences in the baseline condition where respondents did not receive a party cue. If the issue at stake provides an ideological signal, then we should see an association between partisanship and the policy support. We don't formulate any directional expectations as we don't know if Democrats or Republicans would per se be more supportive of food irradiation or farm policies. Remember that we chose these issues as they were not directly tied to a party.

Using the data from the three studies reported in this study, we created two measures of partisanship. First, a scale ranging from "strong Democrat" (1) "weak Democrat" (2), "leaning Democrat" (3), "leaning Republican" (4), "weak Republican" (5) to "strong Republican" (6). Note that we excluded the "Independent" category – because we don't analyze independents in our sample. Second, we create a dummy variable capturing whether respondents identified as a Democrat (0) or Republican (1). For all experiments that we conducted, we run two models whereby we regress the policy support on each of the independent variables. Note that we strict our sample to the participants in the control condition.

Starting with the Food Irradiation, reported in study 1, we show in Table G67 that partisanship is not associated with policy support (b=-.00, se=.01, model 1 of Table G67. We reach as similar conclusion when we regress policy support on a dummy variable capturing partisanship. Republicans don't show more or less support for the policy compared to Democrats (b=-.01, se=.03, model 2 of Table G67.

Table G67
Study 1 Food Irradiation: Partisanship and policy preferences in the Control Condition (no-Cues

	Policy support	
	(1)	(2)
Partisanship (6-point)	−0.001	
	(0.01)	
Republican (Ref. Democrat)		−0.01
		(0.03)
Constant	0.55*	0.55*
	(0.03)	(0.02)
Observations	249	249
R^2	0.0002	0.0004
Note:		*p<0.05

Next, we turn to the Farm Policy Experiment, reported in study 2. We run the same models. In Table G68 we find, again, that partisanship is not associated with policy support (b=-.01, se=.01, model 1 of Table G68. When we regress policy support on a dummy variable capturing partisanship – and set supporters of the Democrat party as the reference category –, there is no evidence that Republicans are more or less supportive of the policy then Democrats (b=.03, se=.2, model 2 of Table G68).

Next, we turn to the replication of the Food and Farm Policy Experiments in Study 3. We present the results of the same models in Table G69. Again, we find no evidence

Table G68
Study 2 Farm Policy: Partisanship and policy preferences in the Control Condition (no-Cues

	Policy support	
	(1)	(2)
Partisanship (6-point)	−0.01	
	(0.01)	
Republican (Ref. Democrat)		0.03
		(0.02)
Constant	0.75*	0.72*
	(0.02)	(0.02)
Observations	392	396
R^2	0.004	0.003
Note:		*p<0.05

that partisanship is associated with policy support in the Food Irradiation and Farm Subsidy Experiments as is signalled by the non-significant coefficients for the dummy variable capturing party support (model 2 and 4 of Table G69. In the Food Irradiation experiment we also find no evidence that the six point partisanship variable is associated with policy support (model 1 of Table G69). Only in the Farm Policy Experiment we find some very suggestive evidence that those who are more Republican are more supportive of farm subsidies (b=.01, se=.01, p=.05).

Table G69
Study 3 Partisanship and policy preferences in the Control Conditions of Food and Farm Policy Experiments

	Policy support			
	Food Irradiation		Farm Subsidy	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Partisanship (6-point)	−0.0000		0.01*	
	(0.005)		(0.01)	
Republican (Ref. Democrat)		−0.01		0.04
		(0.02)		(0.02)
Constant	0.52*	0.52*	0.63*	0.65*
	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.01)
Observations	643	643	611	611
R^2	0.00	0.0002	0.01	0.004
Note:				+p<.1; *p<0.05

Finally, we turn to the MTurk sample (Study 4). Here we repeat the same analyses. Again, we find no evidence that partisanship is associated with policy support as is signalled by the non-significant coefficient for the dummy variable capturing party support (model 1 of Table G70). We do find some suggestive evidence that in Study 4, those who are more Republican are more supportive of the ban on food irradiation.

To summarize, the results of the analyses across four Studies, suggest that food irradiation and farm subsidies are not providing ideological – or partisan – signals to respondents. Specifically, across six tests for the Food Irradiation experiment, we only find one statistically significant association (p<.05). Similarly, across four tests for the Farm Subsidy experiment we

Table G70
Study 4: Partisanship and policy preferences in the Control Conditions of the Food Irradiation Experiment

	Policy support	
	(1)	(2)
Partisanship (6-point)	0.01*	
	(0.004)	
Republican (Ref. Democrat)		0.02
		(0.02)
Constant	0.47*	0.49*
	(0.02)	(0.01)
Observations	824	824
R^2	0.01	0.002
Note:		*p<0.05

only find one statistically significant association (p=.05). When we look across the ten tests, we only find two significant associations between partisanship and policy support in opposite directions. We don't think this provides compelling evidence that the policies are providing ideological cues. Instead, it is shows that across a series of tests at different points in time, the policies generally don't provide ideological cues. We discuss the implications in the discussion of the main text of the paper.

H. Trade Policy Experiment

H.1 Design

In the Trade Policy Experiment, participants received information about a political policy and were informed – based on random assignment – that the policy was supported by either the party with which they identify or the other major US party. After reading this information, participants were asked to rate their level of support for the policy. Thus the Trade Policy Experiment allowed us to compare the effect of in-party vs. out-party cue on policy support among different kinds of people. However, it did not allow us to test how partisan cues impact policy support relative to an absence of cues.

The Trade Policy Experiment was embedded in the same July 2016 survey as the Food Irradiation Experiment, and was completed by a random subset of 888 of these respondents (588 of which also completed the Trade Policy Experiment) – See Appendix A.1 for a discussion of the sample characteristics. Pure independents were excluded from the sample (N=126) following Kam (2005). The 762 individuals who identified with or leaned toward a party (456 Democrats and 306 Republicans) were included in analyses. The order of the Trade Experiment and the Food Irradiation Experiment was randomized. We used the same measures for partisan social identity (m=.43, sd=.25, α=.91, min=0, max=1), CRT (m=.15, sd=.27, α=.67, min=0, max=1), NfC (m=.59, sd=.14, α=.82 min=0, max=1) and cognitive resources (m=.62, sd=.18, α=.80, min=0, max=1). CRT correlates positive with NfC (r=.19, p<.01) and the latent cognitive resources (r=.19, p<.01), while NfC also correlated positively with the latent cognitive resources (r=.76, p<.01). Party identity strength is weakly correlated with CRT (r=-.11, p<.01) and latent cognitive resources (r=.10, p<.01) but not associated with NfC (r=.00, *ns*). Detailed information about the psychometric properties of all moderators can be derived from the replication files.

After completing these measures, participants received information about a political policy and were informed – based on random assignment – that the policy was supported by either the party with which they identify or the other major US party. We chose the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) issue because, at the time of the experiment, this was an issue that was not clearly supported by one party and opposed by the other.[2] Thus, by using the TTIP we were able to maintain verisimilitude of the partisan cued issue stances and avoid strong pre-treatment effects. Randomization checks were performed and showed no anomelies: results can be derived from the replication file.

Aside from manipulating party cues, we also randomly varied the framing of the TTIP policy in simple or complex terms. Issues can vary in the degree of complexity with which they are discussed (Tetlock, 1983), and including this manipulation allowed us to assess whether cue receptivity is conditional on complexity of issue wording. In the "simple" frame condition, participants read a policy description and question framed around valence terms and ends rather than means. In contrast, respondents in the "complex" frame condition received wording that required them to understand the logic of technical economic impacts of the trade deal and that included a good deal of jargon. Participants then responded to the question, "How much do you agree or disagree with the statement, "We should support the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership" with a rating on a scale ranging from "Strongly agree" (1) to "strongly disagree" (5). Responses were recoded to range from 0 (strongly disagree) to 1 (strongly agree), so that high score signifies greater policy support (m=.57, sd=.27).

[2] At the time of the survey, President Obama and many Republicans supported the TTIP whereas factions within both parties opposed the TTIP. Furthermore, a YouGov survey from April 2016 indicated that 73 percent of respondent either "don't know" or "hadn't heard enough" to make a decision when asked about the TTIP.

Participants read the following text with randomization of *party cue* and *complexity* in parentheses:

> Some [PARTY CUE: *Republicans/Democrats*] believe that we should support the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP), a proposed trade agreement between the United States and the European Union [SIMPLE: *which is designed to promote trade and benefit the economy* / COMPLEX: *that will benefit the economy by increasing foreign direct investment and reducing custom duties and tariffs*]; while some [PARTY CUE: *Democrats/Republicans*] believe the proposal will harm American workers and small businesses.

H.2 Results

Treatment condition was represented with a dummy variable – referred to as in-party cue – in which a score of 1 means the respondent was told their party supports TTIP and a score of 0 means the respondent was told their party opposes TTIP. Party Identity Strength, CRT, and NfC – as well as a set of covariates – were equally distributed across the different conditions (see replication file).

First, we discuss the main effect of party cues on the policy support. We do so by using an OLS model and regressing support for the TTIP on cue condition, partisan identity strength, cognitive reflection score, and simple versus complex framing condition (Column 1, Table H71). Participants increased their own support of the TTIP by about .08 points (on a 0 to 1 scale) when the party they identified with supported the TTIP relative to when the opposing party supported the policy (see also, Kam, 2005). CRT (b=-.00, se=.03, model 1 of Table H71), NFC (b=-.12, se=.07, model 2 of Table H71) and cognitive resources (b=-.04, se=.05, model 3 of Table H71) were not associated with policy support. Additionally, strong identifiers were more likely to support the policy, although we had no prior hypothesis about this effect.

Next, we tested whether cue receptivity differed as a function of issue complexity, cognitive resources, and strength of partisan social identification. To do this, we regressed TTIP support on in-party cue, complexity condition, a cognitive resource variable (CRT, NfC or cognitive resources), partisan social identity strength, an interaction term between in-party cue and partisan social identity strength, an interaction term between in-party cue and the cognitive resource variable, an interaction term between partisan social identity strength and the cognitive resource variable, an interaction term between the in-party cue and the complexity dummy and the covariates age, sex, race, education and party preference (see Table H72).

The effect of in-party cue was not conditioned by the complexity of the issue, as the interaction effect between in-party cue and complexity condition was not significant in the CRT model (b=0.03, se=.04, see model 1 of Table H72), the NfC model (b=.03, se=.04, see model 3 of Table H72) and the cognitive resources model (b=.03, se=.04, see model 5 of Table H72). The cue receptivity effects were not stronger among those with low cognitive resources, as the interaction between in-party cue and cognitive resources was not significant when using CRT (b=-0.01, se=.07, see model 1 of Table H72), NfC (b=.23, se=.13, see model 3 of Table H72) or cognitive resources (b=.10, se=.10, see model 5 of Table H72). Thus we did not find support for the contention that partisan cue-taking serves to compensate for low cognitive resources, using two distinct measures of the latter.

The above models also tested whether the cue receptivity effect is enhanced among those who strongly socially identified with their party. Indeed, the interaction between in-party cue and partisan social identity strength was positive and statistically significant in the CRT model (b=.15, se=.07, p<.05, model 1), the NFC model (b=.15, se=.07, p<.05, model 3) and the cognitive resources model (b=.15, se=.07, p<.05, model 5) of Table H72). In-party cue had no

Table H71
Trade Policy Experiment: Main Effect of Party Cues on TTIP Support

	Policy support		
	(1)	(2)	(3)
In-Party cue	0.08*	0.08*	0.08*
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Complex frame	0.03	0.03	0.03
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
CRT	−0.004		
	(0.03)		
NfC		−0.12	
		(0.07)	
Cognitive resources			−0.04
			(0.05)
PSID Strength	0.29*	0.29*	0.29*
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)
Age	−0.002*	−0.002*	−0.002*
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
Female	−0.02	−0.02	−0.02
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Race: non-white	−0.02	−0.02	−0.02
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Education: Some college	−0.03	−0.02	−0.03
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Education: College	0.01	0.02	0.02
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Party: Republican	−0.05*	−0.05*	−0.05*
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Constant	0.50*	0.56*	0.52*
	(0.05)	(0.06)	(0.06)
Observations	762	762	762
R^2	0.15	0.15	0.15
Note:			*p<0.05

significant effect on support for the TTIP among those at the lowest levels of partisan social identity, but it increased support by about .15 percentage points among those at the highest level of partisan social identity.

Table H72

Trade Policy Experiment: Policy support, party cues, cognitive resources and social identity strength

	Policy support					
	CRT		NFC		Cog resources	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
In-party cue	0.002	0.01	−0.14	0.05	−0.06	0.03
	(0.04)	(0.05)	(0.09)	(0.15)	(0.07)	(0.13)
Complexity	0.04	0.04	0.07	0.08	0.09	0.09
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.09)	(0.09)	(0.07)	(0.07)
Partisan Social Identity Strength (PID)	0.23*	0.24*	0.53*	0.74*	0.37*	0.45*
	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.17)	(0.22)	(0.13)	(0.17)
Cognitive resources	−0.04	−0.01	−0.02	0.13	0.06	0.14
	(0.08)	(0.10)	(0.16)	(0.19)	(0.13)	(0.16)
In-party * Cog	−0.01	−0.07	0.23	−0.09	0.10	−0.05
	(0.07)	(0.14)	(0.13)	(0.25)	(0.10)	(0.21)
In-party * PSID	0.15*	0.14	0.15*	−0.32	0.15*	−0.03
	(0.07)	(0.08)	(0.07)	(0.32)	(0.07)	(0.22)
PSID * Cog	0.11	0.04	−0.49	−0.85*	−0.19	−0.33
	(0.16)	(0.22)	(0.28)	(0.37)	(0.17)	(0.24)
In-party * Complexity	0.03	0.03	0.03	0.03	0.03	0.03
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)
PSID * Complexity	−0.05	−0.05	−0.05	−0.05	−0.04	−0.04
	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)
Cog * Complexity	−0.01	−0.005	−0.07	−0.07	−0.10	−0.10
	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.13)	(0.13)	(0.10)	(0.10)
In-party * PSID * Cog		0.14		0.82		0.29
		(0.31)		(0.54)		(0.35)
Age	−0.002*	−0.002*	−0.002*	−0.002*	−0.002*	−0.002*
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
Female	−0.02	−0.02	−0.01	−0.01	−0.01	−0.01
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Race: non-white	−0.01	−0.01	−0.02	−0.02	−0.02	−0.02
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Education: Some college	−0.04	−0.04	−0.03	−0.03	−0.03	−0.03
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Education: College	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.02	0.01	0.01
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Party: Republican	−0.04*	−0.04*	−0.05*	−0.05*	−0.05*	−0.05*
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Constant	0.53*	0.53*	0.52*	0.43*	0.48*	0.43*
	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.11)	(0.12)	(0.10)	(0.11)
Observations	762	762	762	762	762	762
R^2	0.15	0.15	0.16	0.17	0.16	0.16

Note: *p<0.05

Next, we tested the hypothesis derived from the expressive utility model that the combination of a strong partisan social identity and high cognitive resources would yield especially strong levels of cue receptivity. To do this we estimated models in which TTIP support was regressed on in-party cue, complexity condition, cognitive resources (CRT, NfC or cognitive resources), partisan social identity strength, all two-way interaction effects and the three-way interaction between in-party cue, the cognitive resource variable, and partisan social identity strength.

In the model with CRT, we did not find that strong partisan social identifiers who were cognitively reflective were most moved by cues, as the three-way interaction between in-party cue, partisan social identity, and CRT was not statistically significant (b=.14, se=.31, model 2 of Table H72). This is further illustrated in the upper panel of Figure H50 where we plot the marginal effect of the in-party cue over the range of partisan social identity strength among respondents who score one standard deviation below the mean, the mean, and one standard deviation above the mean on the CRT, respectively. The results in the three panels show that in-party cue has a modest positive marginal effect on support for the policy among respondents who strongly socially identify with the party, regardless of whether they were low (b=.14, se=.08, p=.08), average (b=.16, se=.07, p=.03), or high on the CRT (b=.19, se=.12, p=.11).

In the model with NfC (see model 4 of Table H72), we found a non-significant three-way interaction that was directionally consistent with our expectations (b=.82, se=.54). In

the middle panel of Figure H50 we plot the marginal effect of the in-party cue on support for TTIP over the range of partisan social identity among respondents who score one standard deviation below the mean, at the mean, or one standard deviation above the mean on NfC. At low levels of NfC, we see that irrespective of the level of partisan social identity there is no effect of in-party cue on the expressed support for the policy (b=.04, se=.10). At the mean of NfC we see that there is a positive marginal effect of in-party cue on policy support over the range of party identity strength (b=.17, se=.07, p=.02). Finally, turning to those high in NfC (i.e, 1 SD above the mean), we see that the effect of the in-party cue becomes stronger as party identification increases (b=.29, se=.11, p=.008). While the effect of receiving an in-party cue was roughly zero among those high NfC respondents with the weakest partisan social identity, policy support among those with the strongest partisan social identity was .30 points greater when receiving the in-party cue versus the out-party cue. These results are not conditional upon the complexity of the treatment (see, Appendix H.3 below).

Finally, the results for the cognitive resources variable closely mirror the results for the NFC. As cognitive resources increase, the effect of the in-party cue on policy support becomes stronger as partisan social identity increases.

To summarize, contrary to the bounded rationality perspective, we did not find evidence that those with low cognitive resources relied more on party cues. We did, however, find that those who strongly socially identify with their party rely more on party cues. However, we obtained some support for the key prediction of the expressive utility model, that those with a combination of strong partisan social identification and high cognitive resources would follow party cues the most.

Figure H50. Trade Policy: Marginal Effect of In-party Cue across Levels of Party Identity by Cognitive Reflection Score and by Need for Cognition



See Table H72 model 2 (CRT), model 4 (NfC) and model 6 (Cognitive resources) for the regression output.

H.3 Results conditional upon simple and complex cues

One might wonder if the results are conditional upon the complexity of the cue. Therefore, we ran the analyses used to create Figure 1 in the main text among those respondents in the simple cue conditions (N=460) and the complex condition (N=428). We provide plots of the three-way interaction effect between in-party cue, party identity strength and cognitive resources. As can be seen, the results in the simple cue condition (see Figure H51 are strikingly similar to the results in the complex cue condition (see Figure H52). These analyses illustrate that our results are not conditional upon the complexity of the cue. Table H72 provides the full regression output.

Figure H51. Trade Policy Experiment - **Simple Cue**: Marginal Effect of In-party cue across Levels of Party Identity by Cognitive Reflection Score and by Need for Cognition



Figure H52. Trade Policy Experiment - **Complex Cue**: Marginal Effect of In-party cue across Levels of Party Identity by Cognitive Reflection Score and by Need for Cognition



H.4 Analysis of Frame Complexity

We have focused mostly upon the party cues. But there are also a set of important questions that could be tested using the frame complexity manipulation. Using the complexity manipulation we tried to gain experimental control over the cognitive resources that were needed to take a policy position. So far we have analyzed the complexity manipulation in the same models as the in-party versus out-party cues. One could argue that it might be cleaner to analyze the complexity manipulation in absence of the party cue manipulation. Here we will do this. First, we test whether partisan social identity strength moderates the reliance upon complexity manipulation by rerunning the previous model with an interaction term between complexity and partisan social identity strength. Finally, we test whether cognitive resources moderate the reliance upon the complexity cue as it allows us to test whether the frame complexity effect varies between people who came into the experiment with high and low resources across their levels of partisan social identity strength. To test this latter expectation, we regressed policy support on the complexity manipulation, partisan social identity strength and the indicator of cognitive resources (i.e., CRT or NfC), the two-way interactions between these variables and the three-way interaction between complexity, partisan social identity strength and cognitive resources.

First, we estimate a model where partisan social identity strength moderates the frame complexity treatment. We find no evidence that the effect of the complexity manipulation is conditional upon a persons' partisan social identification strength as the interaction effect between partisan social identity strength and the complexity dummy is negative and non-significant (b=-.05, se=.07, model 1 in Table H73). Turning to our second expectation, we tested ford the CRT (model 2, Table H73), NfC (model 3 in Table H73) and latent cognitive resources (model 4, Table H73) whether the frame complexity effect varies between people who came into the experiment with high and low resources across their levels of partisan social identity strength. The three-way interaction between partisan social identity strength, CRT and complexity is positive but non-significant (b=.36, se=.31). We find, in model 3 and 4, similar positive but non-significant three-way interaction effects when we use the NfC (model 3) and latent cognitive resources (model 4) as our measure of cognitive resources. To facilitate the interpretation of the three-way interaction effect, we plot the marginal effect of the complex versus the simple condition over the range of partisan social identity strength when people have low, modest and high cognitive resources. As can be seen by the almost horizontal slope – and confidence intervals that overlap with zero – in Figure H53 the effect of the complex versus the simple condition on policy support is not conditional upon the level of cognitive resources and the level of partisan social identity strength.

Table H73
Trade Policy Experiment: Analysis of Complexity Manipulation

	Policy support			
	PID	CRT	NfC	Cognitive resources
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Partisan Social Identity Strength (PID)	0.35*	0.35*	0.82*	0.59*
	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.25)	(0.17)
Complex (vs. simple)	0.06	0.07	0.19	0.16
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.15)	(0.13)
Cognitive resources		0.02	0.24	0.23
		(0.10)	(0.19)	(0.15)
PID*Complexity	−0.05	−0.09	−0.31	−0.16
	(0.07)	(0.08)	(0.33)	(0.23)
Complexity*Cog resources		−0.13	−0.22	−0.18
		(0.14)	(0.25)	(0.21)
PID*Cog resources		−0.001	−0.81	−0.39
		(0.22)	(0.42)	(0.26)
PID*Cog resources*Complexity		0.36	0.45	0.19
		(0.31)	(0.56)	(0.35)
Constant	0.40*	0.40*	0.27*	0.26*
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.11)	(0.10)
Observations	762	762	762	762
R^2	0.10	0.10	0.11	0.10

Note: *p<0.05

Figure H53. Trade Policy: Marginal Effect of the Complexity condition across Levels of Partisan Social Identity by Cognitive Reflection Score and by Need for Cognition



See model 2 (CRT) and model 3 (NfC) of Table H73 for the output of the regression analysis.

H.5 Inspection of non-linearity

We tested whether our results hold once we do not assume that partisan social identity strength has a linear effect (for a discussion, see Hainmueller et al., 2017). To do this, we grouped partisan social identity strength in each of the three studies in a categorical variable capturing the lowest tertile, the middle tertile and upper tertile of partisan social identity strength. We reran our models using this categorical variable.

In Figure H54 we plot the results of the analyses of the categorical partisan social identity strength measure. The results do not show any signs of non-linearity. The effect of the party cues tends to become stronger among those with a strong partisan identity and a high level of cognitive resources.

Figure H54. **Trade Policy Experiment**: Inspection of non-linearity



I. Danish Experiment

Are the findings that we present our paper limited to one political context, namely the United States? In this appendix we provide some evidence that the expressive utility model generalizes outside the United States. We leave this section out of the main text, as we utilize a different political identity (ideological identity), context, and the measurement of identity and reflection is subpar. Nonetheless, the results are consistent with our other studies.

Data and Methods

We recruited 1828 respondents in Denmark from the YouGov online panel. The sample was recruited to be representative of the Danish population.

The Danish multiparty system poses a challenge with regard to party cue manipulations in terms of the choice of a relevant out party. Instead we measured respondents' ideological identity and examined receptivity to ideological cues.[3] Thus instead of measuring partisan social identity we opted to measure ideological social identity. As discussed by Malka and Lelkes (2010), and Mason (2015), an ideology often functions as an identity that is important for cue-based influence (see also, Flynn, Nyhan, & Reifler, 2017). Additionally, partisan dealignment in Europe seems to indicate that conceptions of party identity as a social identity is on less firm footing in Europe than in the United States – but see Slothuus and de Vreese (2010), Slothuus (2015) and Petersen et al. (2013) for studies that manipulate party cues in Denmark.

In measuring ideological identity and strength of ideological social identification, we first asked respondents to indicate on an 11-point scale their ideological identification.[4] Respondents who did not say they were moderates (a score of 6 on the scale), were then asked to indicate how well two items taken from the longer 8-item identity strength scale applied to them. These items were chosen as they were the highest loading items in a factor analysis of the full 8-item scale Bankert2016.

These questions were:

- When I meet someone who supports the [left/right], I feel connected with this person.
- When people praise the [left/right], it makes me feel good.

We also included the same 3-item cognitive reflection test from Study 1, although resource limitations prevented us from including the NfC or political sophistication measures.

For the hard issue we again went with the issue of the TTIP – which is also a relatively complex and obscure economic issue in Europe – using the following wording (with left supporting versus right supporting randomized):

> Some on the [left/right] believe that we should support the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP), a proposed trade agreement between the United States and the European Union, because it will to promote trade by increasing market access; while some on the [right/left] believe we should not support the TTIP, because it will open the borders to currently banned chemicals, crops, and other products.
>
> How much do you agree or disagree with the statement, "We should support the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership."

[3] Petersen, Skov, Serritzlew, and Ramsoy (2013), for instance, chose to include party cues from the left-wing Socialist People's Party and the right-wing Danish People's Party. Yet, since the 2015 parliamentary elections the Danish parliament consists of *nine* political parties. Therefore, we refrain from choosing two parties or including *all possible* political parties.

[4] The exact wording was: In politics people sometimes talk of "left" and "right." Where would you place yourself?

For an easy issue, we chose euthanasia. Many other progressive cultural or moral positions, such as support for abortion, receive almost universal support in Denmark (Kriesi et al., 2008). Euthanasia is not uniformly supported (Moestrup, 2016), however, but is still an easy issue (Carmines & Stimson, 1980) that would likely be tied to "gut-level" intuitive responding. Those who saw the euthanasia question saw the following (with either left supporting or right supporting):

> Some on the [left/right] believe that we should support the manufacturing and availability of a suicide pill for people over the age of 75, who live alone and would like to end their lives in a humane manner, because every person has a right to choose when to die; while some on the [right/left] believe that such a pill would give doctors too much power to decide when a patient's life is not worth living.
>
> How much do you agree or disagree with the statement, "we should support the manufacturing and availability of a suicide pill for people over the age of 75, who live alone and would like to end their lives in a humane manner."

Results

We examined whether cue receptivity was stronger among with those with stronger ideological social identifications following a similar model that we used to derive that the results for Figure 1. Indeed, cue receptivity was stronger among those with stronger ideological social identifications, with the in-group cue X social identity strength interaction of b=.22 (se=.10, p<.05). Figure I55 plots the marginal effects from a model regressing support for the policy on a variable indicating that their own side supported the issue, the strength of their ideological identity, and the interaction between the two. The effect of in-party support was positive and different from zero among those in the upper third of ideological identity strength, but not in the middle and lower thirds.

We next tested whether cue receptivity differs as a function of inclination toward systematic processing, using a models similar to those used in Trade Policy Experiment. The in-group cue X CRT interaction was b=.03 (se=.02, p<.10), suggested that cues had a stronger effect among those who were more likely to engage in systematic processing.

We examined the interaction of social identity strength, cognitive reflection, and own party cue as a predictor of issue support. The three-way interaction between identity strength and cognitive reflection was not significant (b=.03, se=.09). Figure I56 plots the marginal effects of identity strength on support of the policy cued to be ideologically consistent among those who scored 1 standard deviation below the mean on CRT, at the mean or one standard deviation above the mean on CRT. As can be seen in the far left, identity strength was positively but not significantly related to support for the policy among those lowest in cognitive reflection (b=.24, se=.13). Among those who scored at the mean on the cognitive reflection test, we find that high identity strength increased cue receptivity–the interaction between the two was b=.21, se=.10, p<.05. We find a similarly positive - but not significant - effect among those who scored one standard deviation above the mean on the cognitive reflection test (b=.17, se=.13).

Figure I55. Danish Study: Marginal Effect of Cues across Levels of Party Identity



Figure I56. Denmark: Marginal Effect of Cues across Levels of Party Identity and CRT



Conclusion

Thus,our Danish study offers some preliminary evidence that the findings reported in the main text of the paper are not limited to the United States per se. But the effects are weak and we welcome future research that more systematically assesses the extent to which our finding are robust across political contexts.

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