

Supplementary Material for:

Professed Democracy Support and Openness to Politically Congenial Authoritarian Actions within the American Public

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<u>Table of Contents:</u>	Pages
A. Demographic composition, descriptive statistics, and correlations among the main measures	2-4
Table A-1: Comparing survey respondents' demographic characteristics to U.S. adult population	2
Table A-2: Descriptive statistics for the primary measures	3
Table A-3: Correlations among the primary measures	4
B. Question wording	5-13
C. Attention check and tests of comparability of findings with those of a probability sample	14
D. Factor analysis of democracy attitude items	15
E. Revealed anti-democratic preference	16-23
Section E-1: Description of measure, distribution of responses, and self-reported reasons for making the undemocratic choice.	16-18
Table E-1: Percentages selecting each reason for anti-democratic choice	19
Section E-2: Results of analyses with revealed anti-democratic preference measure	20-21
Figure E-1: Predicted probabilities of revealed anti-democratic preference	22
Figure E-2: Predicted probabilities of stringent revealed anti-democracy preference	23
F. Additional tests of predictors of democracy attitudes	24-26
Table F-1: Effects of individually entered predictors on democracy attitudes	24
Table F-2: Predictors of democracy attitudes only among respondents who passed the attention check	25-26
G. Predictors of democracy attitudes across partisan groups	27-30
Table G-1: Predictors of democracy attitudes across Republicans and Democrats	27-28
Table G-2: Predictors of democracy attitudes across Republicans and Democrats who passed the attention check	29-30
H. Additional tests of involved-but-ignorant hypothesis	31-40
Table H-1: Tests including quadratic terms for political engagement and knowledge	31-32
Table H-2: Separate tests across Republicans and Democrats	33-34
Table H-3: Tests only among respondents who passed the attention check	35-36
Table H-4: Separate tests across Republicans and Democrats who passed the attention check	37-38
Figure H-1: Predicted values of democracy attitudes for political knowledge/ involvement subgroups among Republicans	39
Figure H-2: Predicted values of democracy attitudes for political knowledge/ involvement subgroups among Democrats	40
I. References	41

Part A**Demographic composition, descriptive statistics, and correlations among the main measures**

Table A1. *Comparing Survey Respondents' Demographic Characteristics to U.S. Adult Population.*


	% of Survey Respondents	% of U.S. Adult Population
Gender		
Male	51.43	51.70
Female	48.57	48.30
Race and Ethnicity		
White	73.66	77.53
Black	12.06	12.74
Asian	5.79	6.69
Other	8.49	3.04
Hispanic ethnicity	10.65	16.69
Age		
18 – 29	23.09	20.49
30 – 39	18.47	17.29
40 – 49	19.68	15.78
50 – 59	15.49	16.57
60 – 69	14.18	15.33
70 – 79	7.82	9.66
80 and over	1.26	4.88
Education		
Less than high school	4.24	9.85
High school diploma or GED	25.02	27.75
Some college, no degree	25.44	27.78
College degree or more	45.29	34.62
Region		
Northeast	21.03	17.45
Midwest	19.18	20.69
South	38.75	37.76
West	21.03	23.82

Note. Population estimates are from the Current Population Survey March 2020 Annual Social and Economic Supplement.

Table A-2. Descriptive Statistics for the Primary Measures.

Variable	Mean	Standard Deviation	Skewness	Kurtosis	Number of Items	Standardized Alpha
Professed Democracy Support	.74	.25	-.84	.14	3	.84
Openness to Authoritarian Actions	.46	.32	-.004	-1.06	3	.88
Anti- Democratic Sentiment Composite	.36	.22	-.06	-.68	6	.75
Authoritarian Election Preference	.60	.36	-.45	-1.10	1	
Cultural Conservatism	.50	.27	.02	-.94	3	.63
Economic Conservatism	.49	.27	.03	-.78	3	.89
Political Engagement	.62	.27	-.25	-.65	2	.61
Political Knowledge	.54	.34	-.05	-1.33	5	.75

Table A-3: Correlations Among the Primary Measures



Part B

Question Wording

Questions are listed in the order in which they appeared in the survey, but questions from the survey that are not included in the present study are omitted here. Wording of all survey questions is presented in the pre-analysis plan pre-registered on OSF:

https://osf.io/c68py/?view_only=7d9aae3f4d7f469984b7d6a69ca8cb45

Political Engagement (agree-disagree scale condition; random half of respondents in this condition were presented with response options in the reverse order):

I am interested in politics.

Agree strongly

Agree

Neither agree nor disagree

Disagree

Disagree strongly

I pay little attention to what is going on in government and politics.

Agree strongly

Agree

Neither agree nor disagree

Disagree

Disagree strongly

Political Engagement (item-specific scale condition; random half of respondents in this condition were presented with response options in the reverse order):

How interested would you say you are in politics?

Very interested

Quite interested

Somewhat interested

Not very interested

Not at all interested 5

How often do you pay attention to what's going on in government and politics?

Always

Most of the time

About half the time

Some of the time

Never

Professed Democracy Support:

Would you say that having a democratic political system is a good or bad way of governing the United States?

Very good
Fairly good
Neither good nor bad
Fairly bad
Very bad

How important is it to you to live in a country that is governed democratically?

Very important
Important
Somewhat important
Not too important
Not at all important

Please rate how much you agree or disagree with this statement: Democracy may have problems, but it is better than any other form of government.

Strongly agree
Agree
Neither agree nor disagree
Disagree
Strongly disagree

Party Identity

Generally speaking, do you usually think of yourself as a Republican, a Democrat, an Independent, or what?

Republican
Democrat
Independent
Other

[If "Republican" or "Democrat" is selected]

Would you call yourself a strong [Republican/Democrat] or a not very strong [Republican/Democrat]?

Strong [Republican/Democrat]
Not very strong [Republican/Democrat]

[If "Independent" or "Other" is selected]

Do you think of yourself as closer to the Republican or Democratic party?

Closer to the Republican party
 Closer to the Democratic party
 Neither

Candidate Support

If the 2020 Presidential election were held today, for whom would you vote? (If you have already voted, please indicate who you voted for.)

Donald Trump
 Joe Biden
 A different candidate
 I would not vote

[if "A different candidate" or "I would not vote" is selected]

Between Donald Trump and Joe Biden, whom would you prefer to win the 2020 Presidential election?

Donald Trump
 Joe Biden
 No preference

Cultural Conservatism

Some people feel that the government should not restrict a woman's right to an abortion, and that women should be able to have them whenever they choose. Others feel that abortion is wrong and should not be allowed. Which is closer to the way you feel?

Strongly feel abortion is wrong and should not be allowed
 Somewhat feel abortion is wrong and should not be allowed
 I feel equally close to both views
 Somewhat feel the government should not restrict a woman's right to abortion
 Strongly feel the government should not restrict a woman's right to abortion

Do you support or oppose same-sex marriage?

Strongly oppose
 Somewhat oppose
 Neither support nor oppose
 Somewhat support
 Strongly support

Do you think the number of immigrants from foreign countries who are permitted to come to the United States to live should be increased, decreased, or left the same as it is now?

Decreased a lot
 Decreased a little
 Left the same as it is now

Increased a little
Increased a lot

Economic Conservatism

Some people think the government should provide fewer services even in areas such as health and education in order to reduce spending. Other people feel it is important for the government to provide many more services even if it means an increase in spending. Which is closer to the way you feel?

Reduce services and spending a great deal
Reduce services and spending somewhat
Keep services and spending the same
Increase services and spending somewhat
Increase services and spending a great deal

Some people feel the government in Washington should see to it that every person has a job and a good standard of living. Others think the government should just let each person get ahead on their own. Which is closer to the way you feel?

Strongly feel government should just let each person get ahead on their own
Somewhat feel government should just let each person get ahead on their own
I feel equally close to both views
Somewhat feel government should see to jobs and standard of living
Strongly feel government should see to jobs and standard of living

Some people feel there should be a government insurance plan which would cover all medical and hospital expenses for everyone. Others feel that all medical expenses should be paid by individuals through private insurance plans. Which is closer to the way you feel?

Strongly favor private insurance plans
Somewhat favor private insurance plans
I feel equally close to both views
Somewhat favor government insurance plan
Strongly favor government insurance plan

Openness to Authoritarian Actions

Next we will ask about your opinions of some actions that a future United States President might take to pursue the policies they want. For each question, please assume that the future U.S. President is someone you support and whose policies you strongly favor. In other words, you want this President to succeed in getting the policies they want.

If a future U.S. President was trying to pursue policies that you strongly favor but these policies were being blocked by opponents in Congress, would you support or oppose this President dissolving Congress and ruling without Congress?

Strongly support

Moderately support
 Slightly support
 Neither support nor oppose
 Slightly oppose
 Moderately oppose
 Strongly oppose

If a future U.S. President was trying to pursue policies that you strongly favor but journalists and political opponents were saying bad things about these policies that you believe to be untrue, would you support or oppose the arrest of these journalists and politicians?

Strongly support
 Moderately support
 Slightly support
 Neither support nor oppose
 Slightly oppose
 Moderately oppose
 Strongly oppose

If a future U.S. President was trying to pursue policies that you strongly favor but these policies were being blocked by the Supreme Court, would you support or oppose this President dismissing the Supreme Court and ruling without the Supreme Court?

Strongly support
 Moderately support
 Slightly support
 Neither support nor oppose
 Slightly oppose
 Moderately oppose
 Strongly oppose

Attention Check:

Now we are interested in how often you exercise. Really we want to make sure you are paying attention. To show that you are paying attention, please select the option "2" from the choices below.

- 1
- 2
- 3
- 4
- 5
- 6
- 7

Political Knowledge:

On the next several pages we will ask you a set of questions about different topics. Please do your best to answer each question. It is important to us that you do NOT use outside sources like the Internet to search for the correct answer. If you do not know an answer, just do your best to guess. It is okay if you get answers wrong; just try your best. First, we will ask you some questions about politics.

What job or political office does Nancy Pelosi now hold?

Governor of Pennsylvania
Majority Leader in the Senate
Speaker of the House of Representatives
Vice President
Chair of the Federal Reserve Board

What job or political office does John Roberts now hold?

Attorney General
Deputy Attorney General
Secretary of State
White House Chief of Staff
Chief Justice of the Supreme Court

How long is the term of office for a senator in the United States Senate?

1 year
2 years
4 years
5 years
6 years

Who is the current United States Secretary of Education?

William Barr
Rex Tillerson
Betsy DeVos
Kellyanne Conway
Mike Pompeo

Who was Hillary Clinton's running mate in the 2016 United States Presidential election?

Debbie Wasserman Shultz
Joe Biden
Elizabeth Warren
Tim Kaine
Martin O'Malley

Authoritarian Election Preference and Revealed Anti-Democracy Preference:

[wording for Trump supporters/leaners before the slash and for Biden supporters/leaners after the slash.]

Now we have a question about the 2020 Presidential election. Suppose the Presidential election is very close and eventually [Joe Biden / Donald Trump] is officially certified as the winner. If [Donald Trump / Joe Biden] were to say that the election was not valid because of [voter fraud / voter suppression] and that he should [remain / become] President, would you support or oppose the military and the secret service acting to [keep Donald Trump / put Joe Biden] in power?

Strongly support

Moderately support

Slightly support

Neither support nor oppose

Slightly oppose

Moderately oppose

Strongly oppose

[Respondents who selected one of the three support options above.]

You have indicated that you would support the military and the secret service acting to [keep Donald Trump / put Joe Biden] in power if [Joe Biden / Donald Trump] is certified as the winner but [Donald Trump / Joe Biden] believes the election was not valid because of voter [fraud / suppression]. If you would like, we can provide you with more information about this course of action at the end of the survey. If you would like to receive this additional information, we would first ask you to respond to five extra questions so we can better understand people's support for this course of action. Or, if you would rather just skip to the last question of the survey instead, you may do so.

Answer five extra questions and receive more information about this at the end of the survey
Skip to the final question.

[The first of the five extra questions for those who opted to answer extra questions.]

For the first extra question, please tell us why you have chosen to answer the five extra questions. Please select all the reasons that apply. [All of the reasons above "Something else." were presented in a random order, with "Something else." always listed last.]

I enjoy answering these kinds of survey questions.

I want to find out more information about this course of action.

I want to help inform the American public and leaders that Americans like me would support this course of action.

I want to clarify that I actually would not support this course of action.

I want to stand up for what I believe.

I was curious about what you would ask.

I was bored or didn't have anything else to do.

I thought I might get extra pay or some other reward.

I am trying to be helpful to the people conducting the survey by answering more questions.

Something else.

Message displayed at the end of the survey to respondents who revealed an authoritarian election preference:

Please read the following before clicking the arrow on the bottom to end the survey.

In the survey you selected an option to obtain more information about the military and secret service placing [Donald Trump / Joe Biden] in power should he lose the election but claim that the election was not valid due to voter [fraud/suppression].

The Constitution states that the person having a majority of electoral college votes when officially counted in the presence of Congress shall begin their term as President on January 20, and the Constitution provides procedures for determining the President in the event that no one receives such a majority. Leaders of the military and secret service do not interfere with this process. Interfering with this process would violate the Constitution and the long-standing democratic procedures of the United States. Overwhelming majorities of Americans – both Republicans and Democrats – support democracy.

Thank you for answering our questions. Please click the arrow to end the survey.

Demographics (assessed in Lucid Background Survey):

What is your age?
[numeric, open-ended]

What is your gender?

Male
Female

What is the highest level of education you have completed?

3rd Grade or less
Middle School - Grades 4 - 8
Completed some high school
High school graduate
Other post high school vocational training
Completed some college, but no degree
Associate Degree
College Degree (such as B.A., B.S.)
Completed some graduate, but no degree
Masters degree
Doctorate degree
None of the Above

What is your race?

White

Black, or African American

American Indian or Alaska Native

Asian *** Asian Indian

Asian *** Chinese

Asian *** Filipino

Asian *** Japanese

Asian *** Korean

Asian *** Vietnamese

Asian *** Other

Pacific Islander *** Native Hawaiian

Pacific Islander *** Guamanian

Pacific Islander *** Samoan

Pacific Islander *** Other Pacific Islander

Some other race

Prefer not to answer

Are you of Hispanic, Latino, or Spanish origin?

No , not of Hispanic, Latino, or Spanish origin

Yes, Mexican, Mexican American, Chicano

Yes, Cuban

Yes, another Hispanic, Latino, or Spanish origin *** Argentina

Yes, another Hispanic, Latino, or Spanish origin *** Colombia

Yes, another Hispanic, Latino, or Spanish origin *** Ecuador

Yes, another Hispanic, Latino, or Spanish origin *** El Salvadore

Yes, another Hispanic, Latino, or Spanish origin *** Guatemala

Yes, another Hispanic, Latino, or Spanish origin *** Nicaragua

Yes, another Hispanic, Latino, or Spanish origin *** Panama

Yes, another Hispanic, Latino, or Spanish origin *** Peru

Yes, another Hispanic, Latino, or Spanish origin *** Spain

Yes, another Hispanic, Latino, or Spanish origin *** Venezuela

Yes, another Hispanic, Latino, or Spanish origin *** Other Country

Prefer not to answer

Yes, Puerto Rican

Part C

Attention check and tests of comparability of findings with those of a probability sample.

Analyses were conducted to test respondent attentiveness and the comparability of basic findings across this sample and the 2020 American National Election Studies time series (with all measures from the latter formed from pre-election survey items).

First, the following attention check item was included mid-way through the survey:

Now we are interested in how often you exercise. Really we want to make sure you are paying attention. To show that you are paying attention, please select the option "2" from the choices below.

- 1
- 2
- 3
- 4
- 5
- 6
- 7

Ninety-three percent of respondents passed this attention check.

Second, Trump vs. Biden support (high = Trump) and party identification (7-point scale; high=Republican) were very highly correlated as one would expect, $r = .79$ ($p < .001$), and this correlation was very close to that observed in the NES 2020 time series, $r = .81$ ($p < .001$).

Third, the correlation between a two-item self-report measure of political engagement taken at the beginning of the survey and a five-item political knowledge quiz administered closer to the end of the survey was $r = .29$ ($p < .001$), close to the correlation of $.27$ ($p < .001$) between a similar two-item political engagement measure and a four-item political knowledge measure from the NES 2020 time series.

Fourth, in the present sample, 40.6% of respondents identified with or leaned toward the Republican party compared to 42.0% of the NES 2020 time series sample, and the corresponding percentages for Democratic identifiers/leaners were 44.7 and 46.1, respectively.

These findings provide a degree of assurance about respondent attentiveness and comparability of basic findings with those obtained from a probability sample survey administered around the same time.

Part D. Factor analysis of democracy attitude items.

To evaluate the dimensional structure of the democracy attitudes items (i.e., those intended to reflect either professed democracy support or openness to authoritarian actions), we took several steps. First, we used parallel analysis, Velicer's MAP criteria, RMSEA, and BIC determine the number of factors in a data matrix comprising both sets of items. We used principal axis factor analysis and oblique ("Promax") rotation for these analyses. All of these exploratory tools suggested that a two-factor model best described the data.

Second, we used Confirmatory Factor Analysis (CFA) to compare the model fit of 1- and 2-factor models.

In the 2-factor model, professed democracy support items and openness to authoritarian actions items loaded onto separate (correlated) factors, with indicator cross-loadings fixed to zero. We conducted these CFAs in R with the lavaan package (Rosseel, 2012), using the robust diagonal weighted least squares estimator for its capacity to handle categorical and non-normally distributed indicators. To compare the models, we used sample size-independent goodness of fit indices with good cut-off values: the Tucker-Lewis index (TLI; with values ≥ 0.95 reflecting good fit) and the root-mean-square error of approximation (RMSEA; with values < 0.06 reflecting good fit), but also report the chi-square test.

Model fit for the 1-factor model was extremely poor, such that $\chi^2 = 4974.638$, $df = 9$, $p < .001$, $RMSEA = .303$, 90% CI [.296, .310], $TLI = .06$. Standardized factor loadings ranged from $|.88|$ to $|.19|$. In contrast, model fit for the 2-factor model was very good, such that $\chi^2 = 42.520$, $df = 8$, $p < .001$, $RMSEA = .027$, 90% CI [.019, .035], $TLI = .99$. Standardized loadings ranged from .76 to .89 for professed democracy support and from .78 to .90 for openness to authoritarian actions. Mirroring the correlation between professed democracy support and openness to authoritarian actions at the manifest level, the correlation between the two latent variables was $-.17$. Thus, consistent with our theoretical specification and as reported in the main text, the two sets of items reflect only minimal shared variance.

Part E

Revealed Anti-Democratic Preference

Section E-1: Description of measure, distribution of responses, and self-reported reasons for making the undemocratic choice.

Background. Our original research plan included an effort to gauge the criterion validity of democracy attitude measures by assessing their correlation with a revealed anti-democratic preference measure. Criterion validity refers to whether the measure of a construct is associated with theoretically expected behaviors and outcomes. Criterion validity is critical when studying anti-democratic sentiment, as a key reason to care about individual differences in measures of anti-democratic sentiment among Americans is that these might have consequences for behavior. But designing a behavioral criterion for anti-democratic sentiment measures that is meaningful, feasible to administer to a large sample, and ethical poses a challenge. We incorporated a behavioral choice in the survey intended to serve as a criterion for evaluating the validity of anti-democratic sentiment measures, using an approach adapted from Graham and Huber (2020).

Toward the end of the survey, respondents who indicated support for or leaning toward Trump or Biden were asked if they would support the military and secret service placing their preferred candidate in power if the other candidate were certified as the election winner but their preferred candidate believed that the election was invalid due to voter fraud (for Trump supporters) or suppression (for Biden supporters). This item – the authoritarian election preference item described in the main text – was separate from the measure of openness to authoritarian actions, and it mimicked the real-world political context by pairing each Presidential candidate with a party-appropriate claim of democratic threat employed as justification for democracy subversion. Respondents who indicated some degree of support for the policy were then asked if they would like to receive more information about this policy in exchange for answering five extra questions about their support for this action, or if they would prefer to skip to the last question. We operationalized revealed anti-democratic preference as both (a) expressing support for the authoritarian election action, and (b) choosing to answer extra questions to receive more information about this action. As preregistered, Trump and Biden supporters were coded 1 for revealed anti-democratic preference if they both (a) indicated support for the authoritarian election action and (b) agreed to answer five extra questions in order to receive more information about this, and they were otherwise coded 0.¹

Our reasoning underlying this measurement strategy is that respondents who have already expressed support for an authoritarian election action and who then make this choice are likely to do the latter for one or both of the following reasons: (a) they wish to receive more information about the authoritarian election action, and/or (b) they desire to derive psychological value from continually expressing their support for this authoritarian election action. Although this measure

¹ Respondents who opted to skip to the final survey question were indeed skipped to that question; those who revealed an anti-democracy preference were asked five additional questions before the final question. The first of these questions gauged self-reported reasons for opting to answer the extra questions, and its associated findings are presented in an upcoming subsection. The other items are presented in the pre-registration document. Finally, those respondents who opted to receive more information were presented with a passage at the end of the survey that aimed to reinforce democratic commitment (see Part B of Supplementary Material).

cannot distinguish the extent to which each of these factors influences individual decisions, we reasoned that both of these motives are worrisome from a democratic standpoint. Those who actually want more information about a politically congenial authoritarian election action for which they have expressed support would seem to be displaying a concerning level of seriousness about, and amenability toward, this action. And those who derive expressive value from continually affirming their support for such an action are likely to continually indicate in polls that they support politically congenial authoritarian actions, polls that make it to the ears, and influence the incentives, of political elites. Though it is less than ideal for a revealed anti-democratic preference measure to reflect some unknown combination of expressive and instrumental value, both forms of value in this context can conceivably have negative implications for democracy.

Concerns about the Measure's Usefulness. Reviewers raised concerns about this measure. We agree with these concerns, and have therefore opted to relegate the description of and analyses involving this measure to the supplementary material. We are grateful to the reviewers for raising these issues, and we summarize them here.

First, some, perhaps many, respondents who opt to answer extra questions may do so not only because they derive psychological value from expressing support for authoritarian politically congenial actions per se, but because they would derive psychological value from expressing any type of support for their political side. While this would still be concerning for democracy, it clearly limits the measure's usefulness as an anti-democratic choice criterion.

Second, some, perhaps many, respondents who opt to answer extra questions may do so simply to satisfy their curiosity about what the researcher will ask, to be helpful to the researcher, or for some other benign reason. We discuss self-reported reasons for making this choice in an upcoming subsection, but for now we note that this also limits the measure's usefulness as an anti-democratic choice criterion.

Finally, it is possible that those most committed to anti-democratic action would sometimes be *less* likely to request additional information about this action, because they already feel completely certain about their opinion. If choice to obtain additional information reflects some degree of wavering about one's authoritarian election preference this would make the present measure unsuitable as an anti-democratic choice criterion.

In sum, the feedback provided by reviewers convinced us that our revealed anti-democratic preference measure has serious limitations as a criterion for gauging the validity of anti-democratic sentiment measures. Our hope is that it might spark better ideas about possibilities for anti-democratic action criterion variables that are feasible to administer within surveys.

Distribution of Responses. Forming the revealed anti-democratic preference measure as described above, 23% of Trump and Biden supporters, taken together, revealed an anti-democratic election preference by both supporting the military and secret service undemocratically placing their candidate in power and backing this up with a choice to answer five extra questions to receive more information about this course of action. This amounted to

44% of the respondents who expressed an authoritarian election preference, and therefore were given the option to obtain more information. Percentages who revealed an anti-democratic election preference were 27% among Trump supporters (47% of those with an expressed preference) and 20% among Biden supporters (42% of those with an expressed preference).

Self-reported reasons for making the anti-democratic choice. As discussed, it is possible that some respondents who indicated support for the democracy violation opted to answer extra questions for benign reasons only. Adapting the approach of Graham and Huber (2020), respondents who opted to answer five extra questions were asked to select reasons for their choice (see Table E-1), including six benign reasons (such as enjoying answering survey questions, thinking one might receive more pay for doing so, and wanting to be helpful to the researchers), three anti-democratic reasons (wanting more information about the undemocratic course of action, wanting to stand up for what one believes, and wanting to show political leaders that there is support for this action), and one reason that explicitly disavows the undemocratic action (wanting to clarify that one actually would not support the action). Table E-1 displays percentages that selected each of the reasons for the behavioral choice among all respondents, Trump supporters, and Biden supporters who made that choice. Most respondents who made the choice selected one or more of the anti-democratic reasons (66%) and only 15% selected the disavowal. A more stringent measure of revealed anti-democratic preference was computed by only coding as 1 those Trump and Biden supporters who revealed an anti-democratic preference, selected at least one of the anti-democratic reasons, and did not select the disavowal. This reduced the percentage who revealed an authoritarian preference from 23% to 16%.

Table E-1
Percentages Selecting each Reason for Anti-Democratic Behavioral Choice among Respondents
who Made this Behavioral Choice

Reason	Trump and Biden Supporters Combined	Trump Supporters	Biden Supporters
“I want to find out more information about this course of action.”	36	33	42
“I want to help inform the American public and leaders that Americans like me would support this course of action.”	30	29	31
“I want to stand up for what I believe.”	30	31	29
<i>One or more of the above anti-democratic reasons</i>	66	66	67
“I am trying to be helpful to the people conducting the survey by answering more questions.”	30	29	31
“I enjoy answering these kinds of survey questions.”	29	29	28
“I was curious about what you would ask.”	29	27	31
“I want to clarify that I actually would not support this course of action.”	15	15	15
“I thought I might get extra pay or some other reward.”	15	16	13
“I was bored or didn’t have anything else to do.”	12	12	11
“Something else.”	2	1	3
N	1,326	780	546

Section E-2: Results of analyses with the revealed anti-democratic preference measure

Pre-registered analyses. As pre-registered, binary logistic regression analyses were conducted with revealed anti-democratic preference as the outcome variable (coded 0 and 1) and an anti-democratic sentiment variable – professed democracy support, openness to authoritarian action, or the composite, all mean-centered and scaled by two standard deviations – as a predictor. These analyses excluded the small percentage of respondents who did not support or lean toward one of the two major party candidates, and they were conducted once with and once without control variables (college, age, female, political engagement, political knowledge, and racial-ethnic group).

The anti-democratic sentiment composite significantly predicted revealed anti-democratic preference both without ($b = 1.06$, odds ratio = 2.90) and with ($b = .96$, odds ratio = 2.60) control variables. When openness to authoritarian actions was tested as a predictor, it displayed large, positive significant effects on revealed anti-democratic preference both without ($b = 1.76$, odds ratio = 5.82) and with ($b = 1.51$, odds ratio = 4.53) control variables. Meanwhile, professed democracy support not only failed to negatively predict revealed anti-democratic preference, but actually emerged as a significant positive predictor both without ($b = .26$, odds ratio = 1.30) and with ($b = .28$, odds ratio = 1.33) control variables.

Figure E-1 displays predicted probabilities of revealed anti-democratic preference across levels of expressed openness to authoritarian actions and professed democracy support. As shown, the predicted probability of revealing an anti-democratic preference rises substantially from the lowest level of openness to authoritarian actions (under 10%) to the highest (over 50%). Meanwhile, citizens at the lowest level of professed democracy support displayed an approximately 15% predicted probability while those highest in professed support displayed a predicted probability of close to 30%.


Analyses with stringent revealed anti-democratic preference measure. We repeated these analyses (not pre-registered) using the stringent revealed anti-democratic preference measure. The anti-democratic sentiment composite significantly predicted stringent revealed anti-democratic preference both without ($b = .76$, odds ratio = 2.14) and with ($b = .72$, odds ratio = 2.05) control variables. Openness to authoritarian governance significantly predicted stringent revealed anti-democratic preference both without ($b = 1.17$, odds ratio = 3.22) and with ($b = 1.06$, odds ratio = 2.88) control variables. The effects of professed democracy support, however, fell short of significance when predicting the stringent revealed anti-democratic preference outcome both without ($b = .13$, odds ratio = 1.14, $p < .09$) and with ($b = .12$, odds ratio = 1.13, $p < .05$) control variables. Figure E-2 displays predicted probabilities of stringent revealed anti-democratic preference across levels of expressed openness to authoritarian actions and professed democracy support.

Analyses separately predicting the two components of the revealed anti-democratic preference measure. The revealed anti-democratic preference measure was based on both an expression of support for a politically congenial authoritarian election action and a choice to answer additional questions about this course of action in exchange for receiving additional

information about it. Because the openness to authoritarian governance measure also involved expression of support for authoritarian actions, one might wonder if it only predicted the revealed preference measure because it correlated with expressed support for the authoritarian election action, without predicting propensity to make the anti-democratic behavioral choice above and beyond this expressed view. We conducted analyses (not pre-registered) to explore this possibility.


Openness to authoritarian governance was indeed a strong predictor of binary expressed support vs. opposition of the authoritarian election action both without ($b = 2.17$, odds ratio = 8.74) and with controls ($b = 2.11$, odds ratio = 8.26). But, even when only including those respondents who expressed support for the authoritarian election action, openness to authoritarian actions significantly predicted the behavioral choice to answer more questions in exchange for additional information both without ($b = .74$, odds ratio = 2.09) and with ($b = .46$, odds ratio = 1.58) controls. Thus, variation in openness to authoritarian governance not only corresponded with variation in expressed support for an authoritarian election action, but also with variation in willingness to follow this up with a choice among those who expressed such support.

Figure E-1. Predicted Probabilities of Revealed Anti-Democratic Preference.



Note. Openness to Authoritarian Actions and Professed Democracy Support are mean-centered and scaled by two standard deviations. Raw data plotted at '100%' denote respondents who revealed an anti-democratic preference and raw data plotted at '0%' denote respondents who did not.

Figure E-2. Predicted Probabilities of Stringent Revealed Anti-Democratic Preference.



Note. Openness to Authoritarian Actions and Professed Democracy Support are mean-centered and scaled by two standard deviations. Raw data plotted at '100%' denote respondents who revealed an anti-democratic preference and raw data plotted at '0%' denote respondents who did not.

Part F

Additional tests of predictors of democracy attitudes

Table F-1. Effects of Individually Entered Predictors on Democracy Attitudes.

Predictors	Professed Democracy Support				Openness to Authoritarian Actions				Anti-Democratic Sentiment Composite				Authoritarian Election Preference			
	Estimate		CI (low)	CI (high)	Estimate		CI (low)	CI (high)	Estimate		CI (low)	CI (high)	Estimate		CI (low)	CI (high)
Cultural Conservatism	-0.022	***	-0.035	-0.010	0.226	***	0.211	0.241	0.124	***	0.114	0.134	0.154	***	0.136	0.172
Economic Conservatism	0.033	***	0.021	0.046	0.160	***	0.144	0.176	0.063	***	0.052	0.074	0.086	***	0.067	0.104
College Educated	0.099	***	0.087	0.112	-0.002		-0.018	0.014	-0.051	***	-0.062	-0.040	-0.008		-0.027	0.011
Age	0.131	***	0.120	0.143	-0.190	***	-0.206	-0.175	-0.161	***	-0.171	-0.151	-0.162	***	-0.180	-0.143
Female	-0.068	***	-0.081	-0.056	-0.074	***	-0.091	-0.058	-0.003		-0.014	0.008	-0.019	.	-0.037	0.000
Political Engagement	0.158	***	0.146	0.170	-0.077	***	-0.093	-0.061	-0.118	***	-0.128	-0.107	-0.027	**	-0.046	-0.007
Political Knowledge	0.097	***	0.084	0.109	-0.282	***	-0.297	-0.268	-0.189	***	-0.199	-0.180	-0.204	***	-0.222	-0.186

Note. * $p < 0.05$ ** $p < 0.01$ *** $p < 0.001$. Democracy-attitude outcome variables are coded to range from 0.00 to 1.00, continuous predictor variables are mean-centered and scaled by two standard deviations, and binary predictor variables are coded 0-1. Analyses in the first three columns were pre-registered.

Table F-2. Predictors of Democracy Attitudes Entered Simultaneously Among Respondents who Passed the Attention Check

	Professed Democracy Support	Openness to Authoritarian Actions	Anti-democratic Sentiment Composite	Support for Election Subversion
<i>Predictors</i>	<i>Estimates</i>	<i>Estimates</i>	<i>Estimates</i>	<i>Estimates</i>
Intercept	0.74 *** (0.70, 0.77)	0.48 *** (0.44, 0.52)	0.37 *** (0.35, 0.40)	0.62 *** (0.56, 0.67)
Cultural Conservatism	-0.07 *** (-0.08, -0.05)	0.17 *** (0.16, 0.19)	0.12 *** (0.11, 0.13)	0.14 *** (0.11, 0.16)
Economic Conservatism	0.04 *** (0.03, 0.05)	0.03 *** (0.02, 0.05)	-0.00 (-0.01, 0.01)	-0.00 (-0.02, 0.02)
College Educated	0.06 *** (0.05, 0.07)	0.01 (-0.01, 0.03)	-0.02 *** (-0.03, -0.01)	-0.01 (-0.03, 0.01)
Age	0.11 *** (0.10, 0.12)	-0.11 *** (-0.13, -0.10)	-0.11 *** (-0.12, -0.10)	-0.11 *** (-0.13, -0.09)
Female	-0.05 *** (-0.07, -0.04)	-0.01 (-0.02, 0.00)	0.02 *** (0.01, 0.03)	0.05 *** (0.03, 0.07)
Political Engagement	0.12 *** (0.10, 0.13)	-0.02 * (-0.03, -0.00)	-0.07 *** (-0.08, -0.06)	0.04 *** (0.02, 0.06)
Political Knowledge	0.03 *** (0.01, 0.04)	-0.20 *** (-0.21, -0.18)	-0.11 *** (-0.12, -0.10)	-0.14 *** (-0.16, -0.12)
White	-0.00 (-0.04, 0.03)	-0.02 (-0.06, 0.02)	-0.01 (-0.03, 0.02)	-0.03 (-0.08, 0.02)
Black	0.04 * (0.01, 0.07)	0.00 (-0.04, 0.04)	-0.02 (-0.05, 0.01)	0.02 (-0.04, 0.08)
American Indian	-0.05 (-0.14, 0.04)	0.01 (-0.10, 0.12)	0.03 (-0.04, 0.11)	0.05 (-0.10, 0.20)
Asian	0.00 (-0.03, 0.04)	-0.02 (-0.06, 0.03)	-0.01 (-0.04, 0.02)	-0.07 * (-0.14, -0.01)
Hispanic	0.02 * (0.00, 0.04)	-0.00 (-0.03, 0.02)	-0.01 (-0.03, 0.00)	-0.03 (-0.06, 0.00)
Observations	5580	5580	5580	5187
R ² / R ² adjusted	0.206 / 0.205	0.293 / 0.291	0.334 / 0.333	0.128 / 0.126

Note. * $p < 0.05$ ** $p < 0.01$ *** $p < 0.001$. Democracy-attitude outcome variables are coded to range from 0.00 to 1.00, continuous predictor variables are mean-centered and scaled by two standard deviations, and binary predictor variables are coded 0-1.

Part G

Predictors of democracy attitudes across partisan groups

Table G-1: Predictors of Democracy Attitudes Across Republicans and Democrats.

	Professed Democracy Support (Rs)	Professed Democracy Support (Ds)	Openness to Authoritarian Actions (Rs)	Openness to Authoritarian Actions (Ds)	Support for Election Subversion (Rs)	Support for Election Subversion (Ds)
<i>Predictors</i>	<i>Estimates</i>	<i>Estimates</i>	<i>Estimates</i>	<i>Estimates</i>	<i>Estimates</i>	<i>Estimates</i>
Intercept	0.69 *** (0.62, 0.76)	0.78 *** (0.75, 0.81)	0.60 *** (0.52, 0.68)	0.48 *** (0.43, 0.52)	0.61 *** (0.52, 0.70)	0.62 *** (0.56, 0.69)
Cultural Conservatism	-0.05 *** (-0.08, -0.03)	0.01 (-0.01, 0.02)	0.11 *** (0.08, 0.14)	0.17 *** (0.15, 0.19)	0.15 *** (0.12, 0.19)	0.12 *** (0.08, 0.15)
Economic Conservatism	0.13 *** (0.11, 0.16)	-0.00 (-0.02, 0.01)	-0.03 * (-0.05, -0.00)	0.11 *** (0.08, 0.13)	-0.00 (-0.04, 0.03)	0.03 (-0.01, 0.06)
College Educated	0.09 *** (0.07, 0.11)	0.02 * (0.00, 0.03)	0.03 * (0.01, 0.06)	-0.01 (-0.03, 0.01)	0.02 (-0.01, 0.04)	-0.03 * (-0.06, -0.00)
Age	0.11 *** (0.09, 0.13)	0.08 *** (0.07, 0.10)	-0.11 *** (-0.13, -0.08)	-0.10 *** (-0.12, -0.09)	-0.12 *** (-0.15, -0.09)	-0.09 *** (-0.11, -0.06)
Female	-0.10 *** (-0.12, -0.08)	-0.02 ** (-0.03, -0.00)	-0.03 ** (-0.06, -0.01)	0.00 (-0.02, 0.02)	0.02 (-0.01, 0.05)	0.06 *** (0.04, 0.09)
Political Engagement	0.09 *** (0.06, 0.11)	0.10 *** (0.08, 0.11)	0.01 (-0.01, 0.04)	-0.02 * (-0.04, -0.00)	0.05 *** (0.02, 0.08)	0.02 (-0.01, 0.05)
Political Knowledge	-0.00 (-0.03, 0.02)	0.03 *** (0.01, 0.05)	-0.22 *** (-0.25, -0.20)	-0.16 *** (-0.18, -0.14)	-0.18 *** (-0.21, -0.15)	-0.08 *** (-0.12, -0.05)
White	-0.01 (-0.07, 0.06)	0.03 (-0.00, 0.06)	-0.07 (-0.14, 0.01)	-0.02 (-0.06, 0.03)	0.01 (-0.08, 0.10)	-0.04 (-0.10, 0.02)

Black	0.07 (-0.01, 0.14)	0.02 (-0.01, 0.05)	-0.05 (-0.14, 0.04)	0.02 (-0.03, 0.07)	-0.05 (-0.16, 0.06)	0.04 (-0.03, 0.11)
American Indian	-0.06 (-0.23, 0.11)	-0.03 (-0.12, 0.06)	0.01 (-0.18, 0.21)	-0.02 (-0.15, 0.11)	0.09 (-0.14, 0.32)	0.01 (-0.18, 0.21)
Asian	0.02 (-0.06, 0.10)	-0.01 (-0.04, 0.03)	-0.08 (-0.17, 0.01)	-0.00 (-0.05, 0.05)	-0.06 (-0.16, 0.05)	-0.04 (-0.11, 0.04)
Hispanic	0.04 * (0.01, 0.08)	-0.02 (-0.03, 0.00)	-0.01 (-0.05, 0.03)	0.00 (-0.02, 0.03)	-0.03 (-0.08, 0.02)	0.02 (-0.02, 0.05)
Observations	2451	2731	2451	2731	2408	2634
R ² / R ² adjusted	0.202 / 0.198	0.223 / 0.219	0.217 / 0.213	0.410 / 0.407	0.140 / 0.136	0.130 / 0.126

Note. * $p < 0.05$ ** $p < 0.01$ *** $p < 0.001$. Democracy-attitude outcome variables are coded to range from 0.00 to 1.00, continuous predictor variables are mean-centered and scaled by two standard deviations, and binary predictor variables are coded 0-1.

Table G-2: Predictors of Democracy Attitudes Across Republicans and Democrats who Passed the Attention Check.

	Professed Democracy Support (Rs)	Professed Democracy Support (Ds)	Openness to Authoritarian Actions (Rs)	Openness to Authoritarian Actions (Ds)	Support for Election Subversion (Rs)	Support for Election Subversion (Ds)
<i>Predictors</i>	<i>Estimates</i>	<i>Estimates</i>	<i>Estimates</i>	<i>Estimates</i>	<i>Estimates</i>	<i>Estimates</i>
Intercept	0.71 *** (0.64, 0.78)	0.78 *** (0.75, 0.81)	0.61 *** (0.52, 0.69)	0.48 *** (0.43, 0.53)	0.61 *** (0.51, 0.71)	0.62 *** (0.55, 0.69)
Cultural Conservatism	-0.06 *** (-0.09, -0.03)	0.00 (-0.01, 0.02)	0.11 *** (0.08, 0.14)	0.18 *** (0.15, 0.20)	0.16 *** (0.12, 0.19)	0.12 *** (0.08, 0.15)
Economic Conservatism	0.13 *** (0.10, 0.15)	-0.01 (-0.02, 0.01)	-0.04 ** (-0.07, -0.01)	0.09 *** (0.07, 0.12)	-0.00 (-0.04, 0.03)	0.02 (-0.02, 0.06)
College Educated	0.10 *** (0.07, 0.12)	0.01 * (0.00, 0.03)	0.03 * (0.00, 0.05)	-0.01 (-0.03, 0.01)	0.02 (-0.01, 0.05)	-0.03 * (-0.06, -0.01)
Age	0.11 *** (0.09, 0.14)	0.08 *** (0.07, 0.10)	-0.10 *** (-0.13, -0.08)	-0.11 *** (-0.13, -0.09)	-0.12 *** (-0.15, -0.09)	-0.09 *** (-0.12, -0.06)
Female	-0.09 *** (-0.12, -0.07)	-0.02 ** (-0.03, -0.01)	-0.04 ** (-0.06, -0.01)	0.01 (-0.01, 0.03)	0.02 (-0.01, 0.05)	0.07 *** (0.04, 0.10)
Political Engagement	0.10 *** (0.07, 0.12)	0.09 *** (0.08, 0.11)	0.00 (-0.02, 0.03)	-0.03 * (-0.05, -0.00)	0.05 *** (0.02, 0.08)	0.03 (-0.00, 0.06)
Political Knowledge	0.00 (-0.02, 0.03)	0.03 *** (0.01, 0.04)	-0.21 *** (-0.24, -0.19)	-0.16 *** (-0.19, -0.14)	-0.19 *** (-0.22, -0.16)	-0.08 *** (-0.12, -0.05)
White	-0.03 (-0.10, 0.04)	0.03 (-0.01, 0.06)	-0.07 (-0.15, 0.01)	-0.02 (-0.07, 0.03)	0.00 (-0.09, 0.10)	-0.04 (-0.11, 0.03)

Black	0.02 (-0.06, 0.11)	0.02 (-0.01, 0.06)	-0.05 (-0.15, 0.05)	0.02 (-0.03, 0.07)	-0.07 (-0.19, 0.04)	0.05 (-0.02, 0.12)
American Indian	-0.12 (-0.31, 0.08)	-0.01 (-0.11, 0.08)	0.06 (-0.16, 0.28)	-0.04 (-0.18, 0.10)	0.14 (-0.12, 0.40)	0.02 (-0.18, 0.22)
Asian	0.00 (-0.08, 0.09)	0.00 (-0.04, 0.04)	-0.08 (-0.18, 0.02)	-0.00 (-0.06, 0.05)	-0.05 (-0.17, 0.06)	-0.05 (-0.13, 0.02)
Hispanic	0.03 (-0.01, 0.07)	-0.01 (-0.03, 0.01)	-0.01 (-0.06, 0.03)	0.01 (-0.02, 0.03)	-0.04 (-0.09, 0.01)	0.00 (-0.04, 0.04)
Observations	2313	2527	2313	2527	2275	2450
R ² / R ² adjusted	0.213 / 0.209	0.211 / 0.207	0.204 / 0.200	0.388 / 0.385	0.140 / 0.135	0.123 / 0.118

Note. * $p < 0.05$ ** $p < 0.01$ *** $p < 0.001$. Democracy-attitude outcome variables are coded to range from 0.00 to 1.00, continuous predictor variables are mean-centered and scaled by two standard deviations, and binary predictor variables are coded 0-1.

Part H

Additional tests of involved-but-ignorant hypothesis

Table H1. Political Engagement X Knowledge as Predictor of Democracy Attitudes in Analyses Including Quadratic Terms

	Professed Democracy Support	Professed Democracy Support	Openness to Authoritarian Actions	Openness to Authoritarian Actions	Support for Election Subversion	Support for Election Subversion
<i>Predictors</i>	<i>Estimates</i>	<i>Estimates</i>	<i>Estimates</i>	<i>Estimates</i>	<i>Estimates</i>	<i>Estimates</i>
Intercept	0.72 *** (0.70, 0.73)	0.72 *** (0.68, 0.75)	0.46 *** (0.45, 0.47)	0.50 *** (0.46, 0.54)	0.63 *** (0.61, 0.64)	0.63 *** (0.58, 0.69)
Political Engagement	0.13 *** (0.12, 0.14)	0.11 *** (0.10, 0.12)	-0.02 * (-0.03, -0.00)	-0.01 (-0.03, 0.00)	0.03 ** (0.01, 0.05)	0.04 *** (0.02, 0.06)
Political Knowledge	0.08 *** (0.07, 0.09)	0.04 *** (0.03, 0.05)	-0.26 *** (-0.28, -0.25)	-0.23 *** (-0.25, -0.22)	-0.20 *** (-0.22, - 0.18)	-0.16 *** (-0.18, - 0.14)
Political Engagement Squared	-0.02 (-0.04, 0.00)	-0.02 * (-0.04, - 0.00)	-0.01 (-0.04, 0.01)	-0.01 (-0.04, 0.02)	-0.02 (-0.05, 0.02)	-0.02 (-0.05, 0.02)
Political Knowledge Squared	0.12 *** (0.09, 0.15)	0.09 *** (0.06, 0.12)	0.07 *** (0.03, 0.10)	0.06 ** (0.02, 0.09)	-0.01 (-0.06, 0.03)	-0.01 (-0.05, 0.04)
Political Engagement * Political Knowledge	-0.05 *** (-0.07, - 0.02)	-0.05 *** (-0.07, - 0.02)	-0.20 *** (-0.23, -0.17)	-0.19 *** (-0.22, -0.16)	-0.14 *** (-0.18, - 0.10)	-0.14 *** (-0.18, - 0.10)
College Educated		0.06 *** (0.05, 0.07)		0.00 (-0.01, 0.02)		-0.01 (-0.03, 0.01)
Age		0.10 *** (0.09, 0.11)		-0.07 *** (-0.09, -0.06)		-0.08 *** (-0.10, - 0.06)
Female		-0.04 *** (-0.06, - 0.03)		-0.04 *** (-0.06, -0.03)		0.02 * (0.00, 0.04)

White		0.00 (-0.03, 0.03)		-0.01 (-0.04, 0.03)		-0.01 (-0.06, 0.03)
Black		0.03 * (0.00, 0.07)		-0.00 (-0.04, 0.04)		0.03 (-0.03, 0.08)
American Indian		-0.03 (-0.12, 0.05)		0.00 (-0.10, 0.11)		0.04 (-0.11, 0.18)
Asian		-0.00 (-0.04, 0.03)		-0.03 (-0.07, 0.02)		-0.06 (-0.11, 0.00)
Hispanic		0.01 (-0.00, 0.03)		-0.01 (-0.04, 0.01)		-0.01 (-0.04, 0.02)
Observations	6010	6010	6010	6010	5540	5540
R ² / R ² adjusted	0.143 / 0.142	0.196 / 0.194	0.214 / 0.214	0.233 / 0.231	0.091 / 0.090	0.107 / 0.105

Note. * $p < 0.05$ ** $p < 0.01$ *** $p < 0.001$. Democracy-attitude outcome variables are coded to range from 0.00 to 1.00, continuous predictor variables are mean-centered and scaled by two standard deviations, and binary predictor variables are coded 0-1. Interaction term and quadratic terms formed with mean-centered and scaled predictors.

Table H2. Political Engagement X Knowledge as Predictor of Democracy Attitudes Across Republicans and Democrats

	Professed Democracy Support (Rs)	Professed Democracy Support (Ds)	Openness to Authoritarian Actions (Rs)	Openness to Authoritarian Actions (Ds)	Support for Election Subversion (Rs)	Support for Election Subversion (Ds)
<i>Predictors</i>	<i>Estimates</i>	<i>Estimates</i>	<i>Estimates</i>	<i>Estimates</i>	<i>Estimates</i>	<i>Estimates</i>
Intercept	0.71 *** (0.64, 0.78)	0.78 *** (0.75, 0.81)	0.63 *** (0.56, 0.71)	0.44 *** (0.39, 0.49)	0.65 *** (0.56, 0.75)	0.61 *** (0.54, 0.67)
Political Engagement	0.10 *** (0.08, 0.12)	0.10 *** (0.09, 0.11)	0.01 (-0.02, 0.04)	-0.04 *** (-0.06, -0.01)	0.06 *** (0.03, 0.09)	0.01 (-0.01, 0.04)
Political Knowledge	0.00 (-0.02, 0.03)	0.03 *** (0.02, 0.05)	-0.21 *** (-0.24, -0.19)	-0.24 *** (-0.27, -0.22)	-0.18 *** (-0.21, -0.15)	-0.13 *** (-0.16, -0.09)
Political Engagement * Political Knowledge	0.01 (-0.04, 0.05)	-0.04 ** (-0.07, -0.02)	-0.15 *** (-0.20, -0.10)	-0.17 *** (-0.21, -0.12)	-0.09 ** (-0.15, -0.03)	-0.14 *** (-0.20, -0.09)
College Educated	0.10 *** (0.08, 0.12)	0.02 * (0.00, 0.03)	0.02 (-0.00, 0.05)	-0.01 (-0.03, 0.01)	0.01 (-0.02, 0.04)	-0.03 * (-0.06, -0.01)
Age	0.12 *** (0.10, 0.14)	0.08 *** (0.07, 0.10)	-0.09 *** (-0.12, -0.07)	-0.08 *** (-0.10, -0.06)	-0.10 *** (-0.13, -0.07)	-0.07 *** (-0.10, -0.04)
Female	-0.10 *** (-0.12, -0.08)	-0.02 ** (-0.03, -0.01)	-0.04 *** (-0.06, -0.02)	-0.04 *** (-0.06, -0.02)	0.01 (-0.02, 0.04)	0.04 ** (0.01, 0.06)
White	-0.01 (-0.08, 0.06)	0.03 (-0.00, 0.06)	-0.06 (-0.14, 0.01)	-0.01 (-0.05, 0.04)	0.01 (-0.08, 0.10)	-0.04 (-0.10, 0.03)
Black	0.07 (-0.01, 0.15)	0.02 (-0.01, 0.05)	-0.05 (-0.14, 0.04)	0.06 * (0.01, 0.11)	-0.04 (-0.15, 0.07)	0.06 (-0.00, 0.13)

American Indian	-0.09 (-0.27, 0.08)	-0.03 (-0.12, 0.06)	0.05 (-0.14, 0.25)	-0.04 (-0.18, 0.10)	0.11 (-0.12, 0.35)	-0.01 (-0.21, 0.18)
Asian	0.03 (-0.06, 0.11)	-0.01 (-0.04, 0.03)	-0.08 (-0.17, 0.01)	0.02 (-0.03, 0.08)	-0.06 (-0.17, 0.05)	-0.02 (-0.10, 0.05)
Hispanic	0.04 * (0.01, 0.08)	-0.02 (-0.03, 0.00)	-0.01 (-0.05, 0.03)	0.02 (-0.01, 0.05)	-0.03 (-0.08, 0.02)	0.03 (-0.01, 0.06)
Observations	2451	2731	2451	2731	2408	2634
R ² / R ² adjusted	0.163 / 0.160	0.225 / 0.222	0.211 / 0.207	0.325 / 0.322	0.114 / 0.110	0.115 / 0.111

Note. * $p < 0.05$ ** $p < 0.01$ *** $p < 0.001$. Democracy-attitude outcome variables are coded to range from 0.00 to 1.00, continuous predictor variables are mean-centered and scaled by two standard deviations, and binary predictor variables are coded 0-1. Interaction term formed with mean-centered and scaled predictors.

Table H-3. Political Engagement X Knowledge as Predictor of Democracy Attitudes among Respondents who Passed the Attention Check

	Professed Democracy Support	Professed Democracy Support	Openness to Authoritarian Actions	Openness to Authoritarian Actions	Support for Election Subversion	Support for Election Subversion
<i>Predictors</i>	<i>Estimates</i>	<i>Estimates</i>	<i>Estimates</i>	<i>Estimates</i>	<i>Estimates</i>	<i>Estimates</i>
Intercept	0.74 *** (0.74, 0.75)	0.74 *** (0.70, 0.77)	0.47 *** (0.46, 0.48)	0.50 *** (0.46, 0.54)	0.61 *** (0.60, 0.62)	0.63 *** (0.58, 0.68)
Political Engagement	0.14 *** (0.13, 0.15)	0.12 *** (0.10, 0.13)	-0.01 (-0.03, 0.00)	-0.01 (-0.03, 0.00)	0.04 *** (0.02, 0.06)	0.05 *** (0.03, 0.07)
Political Knowledge	0.08 *** (0.07, 0.09)	0.04 *** (0.02, 0.05)	-0.26 *** (-0.28, -0.25)	-0.23 *** (-0.25, -0.22)	-0.20 *** (-0.22, - 0.18)	-0.16 *** (-0.18, - 0.14)
Political Engagement * Political Knowledge	-0.04 ** (-0.07, - 0.02)	-0.04 *** (-0.07, - 0.02)	-0.19 *** (-0.22, -0.15)	-0.17 *** (-0.20, -0.14)	-0.16 *** (-0.20, - 0.12)	-0.15 *** (-0.19, - 0.11)
College Educated		0.06 *** (0.05, 0.08)		0.00 (-0.01, 0.02)		-0.01 (-0.03, 0.01)
Age		0.10 *** (0.09, 0.11)		-0.07 *** (-0.09, -0.06)		-0.09 *** (-0.11, - 0.07)
Female		-0.05 *** (-0.06, - 0.04)		-0.04 *** (-0.06, -0.03)		0.03 ** (0.01, 0.05)
White		-0.01 (-0.04, 0.03)		-0.01 (-0.05, 0.03)		-0.02 (-0.07, 0.03)
Black		0.03 (-0.00, 0.07)		0.01 (-0.04, 0.05)		0.03 (-0.03, 0.09)
American Indian		-0.05 (-0.14, 0.05)		-0.01 (-0.13, 0.11)		0.04 (-0.11, 0.19)

Asian		0.00 (-0.04, 0.04)		-0.02 (-0.07, 0.03)		-0.08 * (-0.14, -0.01)
Hispanic		0.02 * (0.00, 0.04)		-0.01 (-0.03, 0.02)		-0.03 (-0.06, 0.00)
Observations	5580	5580	5580	5580	5187	5187
R ² / R ² adjusted	0.135 / 0.135	0.195 / 0.194	0.204 / 0.204	0.224 / 0.222	0.086 / 0.086	0.105 / 0.103

Note. * $p < 0.05$ ** $p < 0.01$ *** $p < 0.001$. Democracy-attitude outcome variables are coded to range from 0.00 to 1.00, continuous predictor variables are mean-centered and scaled by two standard deviations, and binary predictor variables are coded 0-1. Interaction term formed with mean-centered and scaled predictors.

Table H4. Political Engagement X Knowledge as Predictor of Democracy Attitudes Across Republicans and Democrats who Passed the Attention Check

	Professed Democracy Support (Rs)	Professed Democracy Support (Ds)	Openness to Authoritarian Actions (Rs)	Openness to Authoritarian Actions (Ds)	Support for Election Subversion (Rs)	Support for Election Subversion (Ds)
<i>Predictors</i>	<i>Estimates</i>	<i>Estimates</i>	<i>Estimates</i>	<i>Estimates</i>	<i>Estimates</i>	<i>Estimates</i>
Intercept	0.72 *** (0.65, 0.80)	0.78 *** (0.75, 0.82)	0.64 *** (0.55, 0.72)	0.43 *** (0.38, 0.48)	0.65 *** (0.56, 0.75)	0.60 *** (0.53, 0.67)
Political Engagement	0.11 *** (0.08, 0.13)	0.09 *** (0.08, 0.11)	0.01 (-0.02, 0.03)	-0.04 ** (-0.06, -0.01)	0.06 *** (0.03, 0.10)	0.02 (-0.01, 0.05)
Political Knowledge	0.01 (-0.01, 0.04)	0.03 *** (0.01, 0.04)	-0.21 *** (-0.23, -0.18)	-0.24 *** (-0.26, -0.22)	-0.18 *** (-0.21, -0.15)	-0.12 *** (-0.15, -0.09)
Political Engagement * Political Knowledge	-0.01 (-0.06, 0.03)	-0.03 * (-0.06, -0.01)	-0.14 *** (-0.20, -0.09)	-0.16 *** (-0.20, -0.11)	-0.10 ** (-0.16, -0.04)	-0.16 *** (-0.22, -0.10)
College Educated	0.11 *** (0.08, 0.13)	0.01 * (0.00, 0.03)	0.02 (-0.01, 0.05)	-0.01 (-0.03, 0.01)	0.01 (-0.02, 0.04)	-0.04 * (-0.06, -0.01)
Age	0.12 *** (0.10, 0.15)	0.08 *** (0.07, 0.10)	-0.09 *** (-0.12, -0.06)	-0.08 *** (-0.10, -0.06)	-0.10 *** (-0.13, -0.07)	-0.07 *** (-0.10, -0.05)
Female	-0.10 *** (-0.12, -0.08)	-0.02 ** (-0.03, -0.01)	-0.04 ** (-0.07, -0.02)	-0.03 ** (-0.05, -0.01)	0.01 (-0.02, 0.04)	0.05 *** (0.02, 0.07)
White	-0.03 (-0.10, 0.04)	0.03 (-0.01, 0.06)	-0.07 (-0.15, 0.01)	-0.01 (-0.06, 0.04)	0.01 (-0.09, 0.10)	-0.04 (-0.10, 0.03)
Black	0.02 (-0.07, 0.10)	0.02 (-0.01, 0.06)	-0.05 (-0.14, 0.05)	0.07 * (0.01, 0.12)	-0.06 (-0.18, 0.05)	0.08 * (0.01, 0.15)

American Indian	-0.16 (-0.35, 0.04)	-0.01 (-0.11, 0.08)	0.08 (-0.14, 0.31)	-0.06 (-0.21, 0.09)	0.14 (-0.12, 0.40)	-0.00 (-0.20, 0.20)
Asian	0.00 (-0.09, 0.09)	-0.00 (-0.04, 0.04)	-0.09 (-0.19, 0.01)	0.02 (-0.04, 0.08)	-0.06 (-0.18, 0.06)	-0.05 (-0.13, 0.03)
Hispanic	0.03 (-0.01, 0.07)	-0.01 (-0.03, 0.01)	-0.01 (-0.06, 0.03)	0.02 (-0.01, 0.05)	-0.04 (-0.09, 0.02)	0.01 (-0.03, 0.05)
Observations	2313	2527	2313	2527	2275	2450
R ² / R ² adjusted	0.178 / 0.174	0.212 / 0.209	0.195 / 0.192	0.307 / 0.304	0.111 / 0.107	0.111 / 0.107

Note. * $p < 0.05$ ** $p < 0.01$ *** $p < 0.001$. Democracy-attitude outcome variables are coded to range from 0.00 to 1.00, continuous predictor variables are mean-centered and scaled by two standard deviations, and binary predictor variables are coded 0-1. Interaction term formed with mean-centered and scaled predictors.

Figure H-1. Predicted Values of Democracy Attitudes Across High/Low Political Knowledge and Involvement among Republicans





Figure H-2. Predicted Values of Democracy Attitudes Across High/Low Political Knowledge and Involvement among Democrats



Part I

References

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