

Supplementary Material for:

Questionnaire Democrats? Reconsidering the Relevance of Abstract Democracy Support in the American Public

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Part 1

Illustrative Quotes About Abstract Democracy Support

“explicit support measures, especially those referring to “democracy,” raise validity questions. So-called “d-word” items assume respondents define “democracy” the same way when, in fact, they often attach meanings at odds with scholarly definitions of democracy. . . . Additionally, supportive responses to d-word questions may merely reflect interviewer/social desirability bias . . . or, more damningly, belie other values respondents hold that run counter to democratic norms . . . ” – Carlin, 2018, p. 401.
"Our findings thus suggest that conventional measures of support for democracy have a fundamental blind spot: they fail to capture voters' willingness to act on their commitment to democracy precisely when democracy is at stake." -- Graham & Svolik, 2020, p. 408.
". . . support for democracy in the abstract is not the best way to measure real-world support for democratic institutions." - Grossman et al., 2022, p. 39
“Although most cross-national surveys show a generalized preference for ‘democracy’ on the part of most citizens, a considerable segment of those who express such preference seems simultaneously comfortable with endorsing nondemocratic alternatives . . . ” – Torcal & Magalhães, 2022, p. 188
"Most opinion surveys show nominal adherence to democracy to be overwhelming across the world . . . Standard opinion surveys face, however, two important limitations. First, respondents may hide their nondemocratic opinions out of social desirability bias. Second, and more crucially, they are asked to state their preferences for democracy without having to bear any costs or confront any tradeoffs associated with their opinions and without engaging in any comparison with potentially different societal and institutional arrangements." -- Adserà, Arenas, & Boix, 2023, p. 1
". . . most widely used surveys simply ask respondents about their support for democracy, implicitly positing that everyone understands pertinent concepts in the same way . . . This assumption—that individuals share equal (and equally accurate) conceptualizations of democracy—potentially introduces bias into studies that posit (or reject) mass political opinion as a key mechanism in macro-level outcomes such as democratic backsliding." - Chapman, Hanson, Dzutsati, & DeBell, 2023, p. 97.
" substantial majorities of Americans profess support for a democratic system of government . . . But it is well known that some Americans who profess support for democracy simultaneously report being open to authoritarian actions . . . , sometimes rather flagrant ones . . . What is more, support for authoritarian actions rises to even higher levels when these actions are cued as instrumental to favored goals within the context of current political conflict . . . Indeed, vulnerabilities to American democracy seem to stem less from a weak commitment to the concept of democracy than from an openness to authoritarian actions carried out by favored political leaders to achieve specific goals in a polarized context. . . ." Malka & Costello, 2023, p. 327.
“Most existing research relies on survey questions that ask respondents to rate democracy or express their preference for democracy over authoritarian regimes. These questions have several weaknesses. Public understanding of the concept of democracy varies across contexts and individuals . . . and the word “democracy” is also believed to induce uncritically supportive responses . . . – Claassen et al. 2025, p. 2

Part 2

Data Sources

Cooperative Campaign Analysis Project / Democracy Fund VOTER panel (2011-2020 panel): This panel consists of a subset of respondents who were first selected from YouGov's opt-in internet panel to complete the 2012 Cooperative Campaign Analysis Project (CCAP) survey between December of 2011 and November of 2012. This sample was drawn using a matching procedure in which each panelist was selected to provide the closest match to an observation from a probability sample, with stratification on the basis of age, gender, race, and education. A subset of respondents was subsequently invited to complete follow-up VOTER surveys in December of 2016, July of 2017, April of 2018, January of 2019, November of 2019, September of 2020, and November of 2020. Items from all waves are used in the present analyses, and the presently used samples consist of respondents who completed the 2017 (5,000), the 2018 (6,005), and/or the November 2019 (5,900) surveys, in which abstract democracy support was assessed. Surveys were completed on the web. Regression analyses are conducted with weights provided.

World Values Survey (1995-2017): Data from five cross-sectional sample surveys administered to American national samples by the World Values Survey were used. The Wave 3 survey (N=1,542) was fielded from September to December of 1995 by The Gallup Organization to a national probability sample via face-to-face interviews. The Wave 4 survey (N=1,200) was fielded from November to December of 1999 by the Institute for Social Research at the University of Michigan to a national probability sample via face-to-face interviews. The Wave 5 survey (N=1,249) was fielded in September of 2006 by Knowledge Networks to a national probability sample via self-administered internet surveys. The Wave 6 survey (N=1,000) was fielded in June and July of 2011 by Knowledge Networks to a national probability sample as a self-administered internet survey. The Wave 7 survey (N=2,596) was fielded in April and May of 2017 by the National Opinion Research Center (NORC) via phone or as a self-administered internet survey to a sample selected from NORC's AmeriSpeak panel. Regression analyses are conducted with weights provided.

Latin American Public Opinion Project (2006 to 2021): Data from eight cross-sectional surveys administered to American national samples by the Latin American Public Opinion Project's (LAPOP) AmericasBarometer were used. The 2006 survey (N=609) was fielded by The University of Pittsburgh to a national probability sample selected with random digit dialing and interviewed by telephone. The remaining surveys were fielded by YouGov Politmetrix to separate demographically representative samples (each N = 1,500) selected from YouGov's panel using a matching procedure. Respondents to these completed self-administered internet surveys, and the surveys were conducted in 2008, 2010, 2012, 2014, 2017, 2019, and 2021. In the 2010, 2012, and 2014 surveys, the split ballot format randomly assigned respondents to receive different items measuring support for democracy-relevant attitudes. Regression analyses are conducted with weights provided and accounting for survey design, except those from 2006 (which was a self-weighted sample).

Lucid Surveys (2020 and 2023): Data from national samples of American adults selected from online pools of opt-in internet respondents were used, one fielded in September of 2020 (N=6,010; also reported in Malka & Costello, 2023) and one in March of 2023 (N = 3,485). The samples were selected to demographically represent the American adult population with respect to age, gender, ethnicity, and region. Samples were drawn by Lucid using the Lucid Theorem

Sampling tool. Regression analyses are conducted with weights computed to match the population on basic demographics.

American National Election Studies (2024). Data from the 2024 American National Election Studies (ANES) cross-sectional survey was used. Pre-election surveys were fielded between August 3 and election day (November 5), and post-election surveys were fielded between November 7 and February 17, 2025. Measures were formed with items from both surveys so only those respondents who completed both were included ($N = 4,964$). Survey mode varied across respondents and included face-to-face, phone, video, and self-administered web and paper-and-pencil surveys. Regression analyses were conducted with weights provided and accounting for survey design.

Part 3

Question Wording

Abstract Democracy Support Questions

Democratic System

I'm going to describe various types of political systems and ask what you think about each as a way of governing this country. For each one, would you say it is a very good, fairly good, fairly bad or very bad way of governing this country? . . . Having a democratic political system.

(All WVS and VOTER survey waves with 4-point scales. In VOTER surveys, first sentence was "Here are various types of political systems.")

Would you say that having a democratic political system is a good or bad way of governing the United States?

(Lucid surveys: 5-point scale with response options of Very good, Fairly good, Neither good nor bad, Fairly bad, and Very bad)

Democratic Importance

How important is it for you to live in a country that is governed democratically?

(WVS 2006, 2011, 2017 and all VOTER waves: 10-point scale from "not at all important" to "absolutely important". Lucid surveys: 5-point scale with response options of Very important, Important, Somewhat important, Not too important, and Not at all important).

Churchill Question

Democracy may have problems, but it is better than any other form of government

(LAPOP 2006: 7-point scale, "Not at all" to "A great deal". All other surveys from "Strongly Disagree" to "Strongly Agree". LAPOP 2008-2021: 7-point scale. WVS 1995, 1999: 4-point scale, no comma in question stem. Lucid 2020-2023: 5-point scale.)

Democratic Preference

With which one of the following three statements are you in most agreement? / With which of the following statements do you agree the most: / Which of the following statements do you agree with the most:

Democracy is preferable to any other form of government.

Under some circumstances an authoritarian government can [may] be preferable to a democratic one.

For people like me it doesn't matter whether a regime is democratic or non-democratic.

(LAPOP 2006-2014)

Please read the following statements and tell us which is closest to your view, even if none of them are exactly right.

Democracy is preferable to any other kind of government.

In some circumstances, a non-democratic government can be preferable

For someone like me, it doesn't matter what kind of government we have.

(VOTER surveys)

Democracy is always and under all circumstances preferable to any other kind of government.

(ANES 2024: 5-point scale from “Strongly disagree” to “Strongly agree”)

Openness to Anti-Democratic Actions Questions: Listed by survey, with subscales indicated.

Lucid 2020 and 2023:

Next we will ask about your opinions of some actions that a future United States President might take to pursue the policies they want. For each question, please assume that the future U.S. President is someone you support and whose policies you strongly favor. In other words, you want this President to succeed in getting the policies they want.

If a future U.S. President was trying to pursue policies that you strongly favor but these policies were being blocked by opponents in Congress, would you support or oppose this President dissolving Congress and ruling without Congress? (Constraints on power)

If a future U.S. President was trying to pursue policies that you strongly favor but journalists and political opponents were saying bad things about these policies that you believe to be untrue, would you support or oppose the arrest of these journalists and politicians? (Freedom of expression, press, and association)

If a future U.S. President was trying to pursue policies that you strongly favor but these policies were being blocked by the Supreme Court, would you support or oppose this President dismissing the Supreme Court and ruling without the Supreme Court? (Constraints on power).

(All rated on 7-point scales with response options of Strongly support, Moderately support, Slightly support, Neither support nor oppose, Slightly oppose, Moderately oppose, Strongly oppose)

LAPOP:

It is necessary for the progress of this country that our Presidents limit the voice and vote of opposition parties, how much do you agree or disagree with that view? [rated from 1 (strongly disagree) to 7 (strongly agree)]
(2008, 2010Y, and 2012Y: Constraints on power)

When the Congress hinders the work of our government, our President’s ministers should govern without the Congress. How much do you agree or disagree with that view? [rated from 1 (strongly disagree) to 7 (strongly agree)]
(2008 and 2010Y: Constraints on power)

When the Supreme Court hinders the work of our government, it should [not be paid attention to]/[disregarded] by our Presidents. How much do you agree or disagree with that view? [rated from 1 (strongly disagree) to 7 (strongly agree)]
(2008 and 2010Y: Constraints on power)

Of people participating in a group working to violently overthrow an elected government. How much do you approve or disapprove? [rated from 1 (strongly disapprove) to 10 (strongly approve)]
(2008, 2012, and 2014X: Citizen anti-democratic action)

Of people taking the law into their own hands when the government does not punish criminals. How much do you approve or disapprove? [rated from 1 (strongly disapprove) to 10 (strongly approve)]

(2006, 2008, 2010X, 2012X, and 2014X: Citizen anti-democratic action):

There are people who always say bad things about the American system of government, not just our elected officials but the system of government. On the scale of 1 to 10, where 1 is "strongly disapprove" and 10 is "strongly approve", how strongly do you approve or disapprove of such people's right to vote?

(2006, 2008, 2010, 2012, 2014, 2017, and 2019: Freedom of expression, press, and association)

[same preamble as above]. . . How strongly do you approve or disapprove of such people being allowed to conduct peaceful demonstrations in order to express their views?

(2006, 2008, 2010, 2012, 2014, 2017, and 2019: freedom of expression, press, and association)

[same preamble as above] How strongly do you approve or disapprove of such people being permitted to run for public office?

(2006, 2008, 2010, 2012, 2014, 2017, and 2019: Freedom of expression, press, and association)

[same preamble as above] How strongly do you approve or disapprove of such people making speeches on TV?

(2006, 2008, 2010, 2012, 2014, 2017, and 2019: Freedom of expression, press, and association)

Some people say that under some circumstances it would be justified for the military of this country to take power by a coup d'état (military coup). In your opinion would a military coup be justified under the following circumstances? . . . When there is high unemployment. Coded 0 for 'A military take-over of the state would not be justified' and 1 for 'A military take-over of the state would be justified'.

(2010Y and 2012Y: Elections determining power).

[Same preamble and coding of responses as above] When there is a lot of crime.

(2010Y, 2012Y, 2014Y, and 2017 (half sample): Elections determining power)

[Same preamble and coding of responses as above] When there is a lot of corruption.

(2010Y, 2012Y, 2014Y, and 2017 (half sample): Elections determining power)

Do you believe that when the country is facing very difficult times it is justifiable for the president of the country to close the Congress and govern without Congress? Coded 0 for 'No, it is not justified' and 1 for 'Yes, it is justified'.

(2006, 2010Y, 2012Y, 2014Y, 2017, and 2019 (half sample): Constraints on power)

Do you believe that when the country is facing very difficult times it is justifiable for the president of the country to dissolve the Supreme Court and govern without the Supreme Court? Coded 0 for 'No, it is not justified' and 1 for 'Yes, it is justified'.

(2006, 2010Y, 2012Y, and 2019 (half sample): Constraints on power)

There are people who say that we need a strong leader who does not have to be elected by the vote of the people. Others say that although things may not work, electoral democracy, or the popular vote, is always best. What do you think? Coded 0 for 'Electoral democracy is the best' and 1 for 'We need a strong leader who does not have to be elected'.
(2010Y and 2012Y: Elections determining power)

How strongly do you approve or disapprove of the government having the right to prohibit newspapers from publishing news that can be politically damaging to it? [rated from 1 (strongly disapprove) to 10 (strongly approve)].
(2012X: Freedom of expression, press, and association)

Do you believe that nowadays in the country we have very little, enough or too much freedom of press?
(2017: Freedom of expression, press, and association)

And freedom of expression. Do we have very little, enough or too much?
(2017: Freedom of expression, press, and association)

And freedom to express political views without fear. Do we have very little, enough or too much?
(2017: Freedom of expression, press, and association)

WVS (all 5 waves):

I'm going to describe various types of political systems and ask what you think about each as a way of governing this country. For each one, would you say it is a very good, fairly good, fairly bad or very bad way of governing this country? OR Various types of political systems are described below. Please think about each choice in terms of governing this country and indicate if you think that it would be a very good, fairly good, fairly bad or very bad way of governing the United States . . .

Having a strong leader who does not have to bother with parliament and elections. (Elections determining power)
Having the army rule. (Elections determining power)

VOTER (all three waves):

Here are various types of political systems. For each one, would you say it is a very good, fairly good, fairly bad or very bad way of governing this country?

Having a strong leader who does not have to bother with Congress and elections. (Elections determining power)
Having the army rule. (Elections determining power)

Please read the following statements and tell us which is closest to your view, even if none of them are exactly right. -- Since the president was elected to lead the country, he should not be bound by laws or court decisions that he thinks are wrong vs. The president must always obey the laws and the courts, even if he thinks they are wrong. Coded 0 for must always obey laws and courts and 1 for should not be bound by laws or court decisions.
(Constraints on power)

ANES 2024:

First, how important is it that news organizations are free to criticize political leaders? [Not important at all, a little important, moderately important, very important, or extremely important]

(Freedom of expression, press, and association)

How important is it that the executive, legislative, and judicial branches of government keep one another from having too much power? [Not important at all, a little important, moderately important, very important, or extremely important]

(Constraints on power)

How important is it that elected officials face serious consequences if they engage in misconduct? [Not important at all, a little important, moderately important, very important, or extremely important]

(Constraints on power)

Would it be helpful, harmful, or neither helpful nor harmful if U.S. presidents could work on the country's problems without paying attention to what Congress and the courts say? [Extremely helpful, Moderately helpful, A little helpful, Neither helpful nor harmful, A little harmful, Moderately harmful, Extremely harmful]

(Constraints on power)

Do you favor, oppose, or neither favor nor oppose elected officials restricting journalists' access to information about government decision-making? [Favor a great deal, Favor moderately, Favor a little, Neither favor nor oppose, Oppose a little, Oppose moderately, Oppose a great deal].

(Freedom of expression, press, and association)

The courts should be able to stop the government acting beyond its authority. [strongly agree, somewhat agree, neither agree nor disagree, somewhat disagree, or strongly disagree].

(Constraints on power)

Having a strong leader in government is good for the United States even if the leader bends the rules to get things done. [strongly agree, somewhat agree, neither agree nor disagree, somewhat disagree, or strongly disagree]

(Constraints on power)

Party Identity Question Wording

LAPOP

Main Party Identification Questions. 2006: Which political party do you favor? 2008 – 2012: Which political party do you identify with? Only asked of respondents who stated they have a party identification in an initial question. 2014 – 2021: Generally speaking, do you think of yourself as a Republican, a Democrat, an Independent, or what? Respondents who did not select one of the two parties were placed in partisan categories based on answers to other questions presented below.

Last Presidential Vote (2010 and 2012): Who did you vote for in the last presidential elections of 2008? [Response options of Obama, McCain, Other, Did not vote]

Vote Intention (2014, 2017, 2019, and 2021): If the next presidential elections were being held this week, what would you do? [Response options of Wouldn't vote, Would vote for a candidate from the

Democratic party, Would vote for a candidate from the Republican party, Would vote for a candidate from a third party, Would go to vote but would leave the ballot blank.]

WVS

1995 – 2006, 2017: If there were a national election tomorrow, for which party on this list would you vote? Just call out the number on this card. If DON'T KNOW: Which party appeals to you most? [Response options include Democratic Party and Republican Party]. 2011: Generally speaking, do you usually consider yourself a Republican, a Democrat, an Independent, or what?

VOTER (all three waves)

Generally speaking, do you think of yourself as a ...? [Response options of Republican, Democrat, Independent, or Other].

Would you call yourself a strong [Democrat/Republican] or a not very strong [Democrat/Republican]? Do you think of yourself as closer to the Democratic Party or the Republican Party?

LUCID (both surveys) and ANES 2024

Generally speaking, do you think of yourself as a Republican, a Democrat, an Independent, or what? Would you call yourself a strong Democrat [Republican] or a not very strong Democrat [Republican]? Do you think of yourself as closer to the Democratic Party or the Republican Party?

Vote Choice Questions

VOTER 2016: Who did you vote for in the election for president? [Response options: Hillary Clinton, Donald Trump, Gary Johnson, Jill Stein, Evan McMullin, Other]. (Asked of those who indicated that they had voted.)

VOTER 2020: Which candidate did you vote for in the 2020 Presidential election? [Response options: Donald Trump, Joe Biden, Someone else, Did not vote for President]. (Asked of those who indicated that they had voted.)

Lucid 2020: If the 2020 Presidential election were held today, for whom would you vote? (If you have already voted, please indicate who you voted for.) [Response options: Donald Trump, Joe Biden, A different candidate, I would not vote]

ANES 2024: Who did you vote for? [asked of those who indicated in the post-election survey that they had voted for President] [Response options: Kamala Harris, Donald Trump, Cornel West, Jill Stein, Another candidate]

Attention Checks

Lucid 2020: Now we are interested in how often you exercise. Really we want to make sure you are paying attention. To show that you are paying attention, please select the option "2" from the choices below. [Response options 1 to 7].

Lucid 2023.

To show that you are paying attention please do not select an answer to this question and just continue to the next question. [All previous questions required response to proceed, negating concerns about respondents inattentively skipping through questions. Based on random assignment, response options of either Strongly agree, Somewhat agree, Neither agree nor disagree, Somewhat disagree, and Strongly disagree OR A great amount, A good deal, A moderate amount, Not so much, Not at all].

Do you think that spending on social security should be increased, decreased, or left the same as it is now? To show that you are paying attention, do not give your real answer; just select "Decreased a little" from the options below. [Response options of Decreased a lot, Decreased a little, Left the same as it is now, Increased a little, Increased a lot].

Now we are interested in where Americans are most likely to get their news about important matters. Really we want to make sure you are paying attention. Please just select RealClearPolitics.com to show that you are paying attention. [Response options of Fox News, CNN, MSNBC, RealClearPolitics.com, and A different news source].

Who is the current Vice President of the United States? To show that you are paying attention please do not give your real answer but instead select Kevin McCarthy. [Response options of Kamala Harris, Nancy Pelosi, Charles Schumer, Kevin McCarthy, None of the above].

Part 4

Discriminant Validity Analyses

To test our argument that questions about abstract democracy support and questions about openness to specific authoritarian actions tap distinct evaluative dimensions, we conducted a series of exploratory and model fitting exercises. We focus here on the VOTER and Lucid surveys, which are the only surveys that include three items tapping each of our focal constructs. Because the VOTER survey is a panel, we limit our analyses of the 2018 and 2019 waves to fresh respondents.

We begin by conducting exploratory analyses to determine the most likely number of latent factors underlying the abstract support and authoritarian actions items in each of the five datasets. We use Horn's (1965) parallel analysis, a simulation-based method for determining the correct number of factors to extract in an exploratory factor analysis (EFA). Parallel analysis does this by checking whether the eigenvalues obtained from a correlation matrix are larger than what would be expected purely due to sampling error. If the first K number of eigenvalues is larger than what would be expected when no true relationships exist among the items, then that is the number of factors that best explains the observed correlations. In Figure S1 below, we report the results of parallel analyses conducted separately for each dataset. Two factors best explain the observed correlations among the items in four of the five samples. In the VOTER 2018 sample, three factors best explain the observed correlations. However, as is visible in Figure S-1, the third eigenvalue obtained from the actual data (0.041) is barely larger than those obtained from the simulated data (0.025) and the resampled data (0.033). Thus, overall these results strongly suggest that two factors underly the items, as would be expected if these items measure distinct constructs of abstract democracy support and openness to authoritarian actions.




Figure S-1. Parallel Analysis of Abstract Democracy Support and Openness to Authoritarian Actions Items. Note: Polychoric correlation matrix used. Missing data handled using pairwise deletion.

Next, we conduct EFAs in each dataset. Based on the results of our parallel analyses, we extract two factors from each dataset. We present these results in Table S-1. We bold factor loading equal to or greater than 0.4 to indicate substantively large loadings, following Stevens (1992). Consistent with our argument that the abstract support items and authoritarian actions items measure distinct constructs, we find that these sets of items consistently load on separate factors. The only item that shows substantial cross-loadings is the president obey item in the VOTER datasets. Overall, these exploratory analyses provide the strong support for our hypothesized factor structure.

Table S-1: Exploratory Factor Analysis of Abstract Democracy Support and Openness to Authoritarian Actions Items.

	VOTER 2017			VOTER 2018			VOTER 2019				Lucid 2020			Lucid 2023		
Items	I	II	U	I	II	U	I	II	U	Items	I	II	U	I	II	U
Democratic System	.687	-.078	.473	.004	.741	.454	.897	.056	.239	Democratic System	.020	.824	.326	.825	.015	.325
Democratic Importance	.966	.052	.111	.049	.783	.418	.729	.013	.478	Democratic Importance	-.036	.907	.165	.911	.006	.172
Democratic Preference	.685	-.069	.483	-.154	.538	.616	.604	-.210	.475	Churchill Question	.026	.835	.309	.825	-.024	.309
Strong Leader	.040	.986	.063	.895	.015	.211	.003	.893	.205	Dissolve Congress	.880	-.005	.224	-.005	.870	.240
Army Rule	-.087	.687	.466	.786	.002	.384	.007	.871	.247	Arrest Journalists and Politicians	.835	.030	.311	-.052	.738	.431
President Obey	-.313	.422	.604	.404	-.306	.636	-.345	.364	.632	Dismiss Supreme Court	.915	-.019	.156	.032	.893	.218
Factor Correlation	-.457			-.432			-.462				-.169			-.270		
Sum of Squared Loadings	2.073	1.728		1.672	1.610		1.905	1.820			2.310	2.199		2.200	2.105	
Proportion of Variance	.346	.288		.279	.268		.317	.303			.385	.366		.367	.351	

Exploratory factor analyses estimated using MinRes on polychoric correlation matrices. Results are Oblimin rotated. Missing data handled using pairwise deletion. I = first factor extracted; II = second factor extracted; U = item uniqueness; Sum of Squared Loadings = sum of squared factor loadings; Proportion of Variance = proportion of variance explained by factor. Loadings greater than 0.4 are bolded.

Next, we turn to confirmatory tests of our argument that the abstract support and authoritarian actions items measure distinct constructs. We proceed by fitting two different confirmatory factor models (CFA) in each of the 2017, 2018, and 2019 VOTER samples and the 2020 and 2023 Lucid samples. A “general factor” model serves as a test of the idea that the abstract support and authoritarian action items tap the same underlying construct. In this model, all items load on a single latent factor. A “correlated factors” model serves as a test of the idea that the abstract support and authoritarian action items tap two distinct but correlated constructs. In this model, the abstract support items load on one latent factor and the authoritarian actions items load on a different latent factor that is allowed to correlate with the other.

We fit these models using diagonally weighted least squares to account for the ordinal nature of the data and handle missing values using pairwise deletion. In the table below, we report fit statistics from each model as well as the results of scaled chi-squared difference tests (Satorra, 2000). These allow us to evaluate whether a general factor or a pair of correlated factors better accounts for the observed variances and covariances in the data. The p-value from the scaled chi-squared difference test tells us whether one model has a statistically significantly *worse* fit to the data than the other. These results unanimously favor the correlated factors model. Similarly, the robust RMSEA, robust CFI, robust TLI, and SRMR values all favor the correlated factors model. Thus, abstract democracy support appears to be psychometrically distinct from openness to authoritarian actions.

Table S-2. Confirmatory Factor Models

Sample	Model	Scaled χ^2 Difference Test (Satorra, 2000)	Scaled χ^2	Scaled df	Robust RMSEA	Robust CFI	Robust TLI	SRMR
VOTER 2017	General	774.15/1 (p < .000)	1551.884	9	.272	.736	.561	.106
	Correlated		114.388	8	.106	.964	.933	.048
VOTER 2018	General	291.65/1 (p < .000)	531.503	9	.261	.694	.490	.116
	Correlated		73.336	8	.130	.932	.873	.065
VOTER 2019	General	449.26/1 (p < .000)	899.903	9	.308	.679	.465	.123
	Correlated		160.912	8	.165	.918	.846	.075
Lucid 2020	General	3566.4/1 (p < .000)	10226.735	9	.604	.140	-.434	.325
	Correlated		75.890	8	.046	.996	.992	.020
Lucid 2023	General	1735.8/1 (p < .000)	4915.473	9	.512	.305	-.158	.259
	Correlated		53.668	8	.042	.996	.992	.020

Part 5

Additional Temporal Stability and Inattentive Responding Analyses

Here we address whether respondents who report low levels of abstract democracy support possess less stable attitudes over time, and the possibility that this may reflect relatively high levels of inattentive responding among these individuals. Recent research has demonstrated that normatively undesirable responses to survey questions – such as incorrect factual beliefs (Graham, 2023) and support for political violence (Iyengar, 2023) – are relatively unstable over time. Two types of explanations might account for this phenomenon. One is rooted in the conception of survey responses as on-the-spot inferences that can vary over time depending on what types of considerations are accessible for the individual (Zaller & Feldman, 1992). It may be that those who report normatively undesirable views tend to possess a relatively balanced set of considerations (e.g., 70% desirable, 30% undesirable), compared to those who report normatively desirable views (e.g., 95% desirable, 5% undesirable). This explanation does not suggest mismeasurement, but rather that greater response instability at the undesirable end of the continuum reflects a closer-to-balanced set of considerations. Applied to the present topic, this would suggest that reports of relatively low abstract democracy support reflect an ambivalence about a concept that has positive connotations in the United States.

Another explanation does suggest mismeasurement. It is well known that respondents vary in the extent to which they respond to survey questions attentively and effortfully (Berinsky, Margolis, & Sances, 2013). Some respondents – especially to self-administered online surveys – might haphazardly select responses. If a normatively undesirable view is low in prevalence, and if inattentive respondents answer questions haphazardly or repeatedly select the middle option, this will produce over-estimates of normatively undesirable attitudes (Westwood, Grimmer, Tyler, & Nall, 2022). This would also introduce a systematic source of error (propensity to respond inattentively) into measures of such attitudes.

We have shown that the bulk of the variability in democracy support items occurs between tepid and committed support, with minorities of respondents selecting opposition (or neutrality when this is available). We first sought to address whether, like other normatively relevant attitudes, individuals who report low commitment to democracy give more unstable responses over time. Analyses with the VOTER panel suggest that they do indeed. Figure S-2 below displays the mean within-person standard deviation in responses to each democracy item, conditional on level of democracy support reported on the first measurement occasion. The coefficients and 95% confidence intervals are obtained via a respondent-level bootstrap, which accommodates the non-normal and bounded distribution of the instability measure. The coefficients can be interpreted as showing the number of response categories that a person giving a particular initial response moved between any two waves, on average. For each item, people who expressed less commitment to democracy in July 2017 changed their responses more over the next two years. Meanwhile, people who expressed tepid support for democracy—saying that democratic government is “fairly good” or rating the importance of democracy at 6, 7, 8, or 9—held these attitudes with moderately less stability than people who expressed committed support but far more stability than those who expressed opposition.




Figure S-2. Attitude Instability Conditional on Initial Response (VOTER Data)

This phenomenon might result in part from a more balanced set of considerations among those who sometimes give an undesirable response and in part from less attentive responding among this subgroup. Given that the bulk of the variability in democracy support items occurs on the supportive side of the continuum, it is especially important to know if putatively tepid supporters are simply responding less attentively than committed supporters. To explore this, we examine variation in attentiveness across self-reported democracy opponents, neutral responders, tepid supporters, and committed supporters using the three democracy support questions in the Lucid surveys. Figure S-3 plots the percentage of each group that failed the single attention check in the 2020 survey and each of the four attention checks in the 2023 survey (Panel A) as well as the average number of attention checks (out of four) failed in each group in the 2023 survey (Panel B). In all but one case (the favorability item in 2020) there is a decline in attentive responding as one moves from support to opposition. However, attentive responding is not substantially different between tepid and committed supporters with an average percentage point difference of just 4.56 in favor of committed support. Though initially tepid supporters give slightly less stable responses over time, this might reflect a meaningful presence of anti-democracy considerations in addition to pro-democracy considerations. Furthermore, the presence of inattentive responders does not seriously bias estimates of the distribution of abstract support. In the table at the bottom of the next page, we report the percentage of the sample at each level of democracy support for each item, both for the entire sample and for attentive respondents only (i.e., those who passed the attention check in 2020 and those who passed at least 3 of 4 attention checks in 2023). In 2020, the distributions are nearly identical. In 2023, there are modest increases (about 4-5 percentage points) in the estimates of committed supporters and modest decreases of the same size in the estimates of neutral respondents when we screen for attentiveness, with estimates of tepid supporters and opponents being nearly identical across respondent attentiveness.




Figure S-3. Inattentive Responding Conditional on Democracy Support (Lucid Surveys)

Distributions of Abstract Democracy Support in the Lucid Surveys for All Respondents and Screened for Attentive Respondents

2020	System		Importance		Churchill	
	All	Attentive	All	Attentive	All	Attentive
Committed	40	40	45	47	41	42
Tepid	27	28	24	24	33	33
Neutral	21	20	18	18	19	18
Opposed	12	12	12	12	7	7

2023	System		Importance		Churchill	
	All	Attentive	All	Attentive	All	Attentive
Committed	32	36	41	46	39	44
Tepid	30	31	25	25	32	33
Neutral	24	20	20	16	21	17
Opposed	14	13	14	13	8	7

Part 6
Additional Tables

Table S-3: Abstract Democracy Support Item Availability Across Surveys

Survey	System	Importance	Churchill	Preference
LAPOP 2006	No	No	Yes	Yes
LAPOP 2008	No	No	Yes	Yes
LAPOP 2010	No	No	Yes	Yes
LAPOP 2012	No	No	Yes	Yes
LAPOP 2014	No	No	Yes	Yes
LAPOP 2017	No	No	Yes	No
LAPOP 2019	No	No	Yes	No
LAPOP 2021	No	No	Yes	No
WVS 1995	Yes	No	Yes	No
WVS 1999	Yes	No	Yes	No
WVS 2006	Yes	Yes	No	No
WVS 2011	Yes	Yes	No	No
WVS 2017	Yes	Yes	No	No
VOTER 2017	Yes	Yes	No	Yes
VOTER 2018	Yes	Yes	No	Yes
VOTER 2019	Yes	Yes	No	Yes
LUCID 2020	Yes	Yes	Yes	No
LUCID 2023	Yes	Yes	Yes	No
ANES 2024	No	No	No	Yes

Note. Democratic Preference only administered to Y Subsample in LAPOP 2014.

Table S-4: Descriptive Statistics for Abstract Democracy Support Scales

Survey	Number of Items	Mean	SD	Skewness	Kurtosis	Avg. Inter-Item r
LAPOP 2006	2	0.87	0.22	-1.84	2.76	.26
LAPOP 2008	2	.82	.23	-1.32	0.79	.38
LAPOP 2010	2	.82	.23	-1.58	1.84	.38
LAPOP 2012	2	.81	.23	-1.56	1.78	.37
LAPOP 2014X	1	.71	.27	-0.92	0.19	-
LAPOP 2014Y	2	.78	.24	-1.2	0.62	.35
LAPOP 2017	1	.74	.27	-0.99	0.44	-
LAPOP 2019	1	.74	.26	-0.91	0.11	-
LAPOP 2021	1	.76	.27	-1.16	0.88	-
WVS 1995	2	.80	.20	-.98	.78	.41
WVS 1999	2	.77	.22	-.96	.87	.40
WVS 2006	2	.80	.22	-1.22	1.33	.55
WVS 2011	2	.77	.22	-1.04	.76	.50
WVS 2017	2	.78	.23	-.97	.33	.51
VOTER 2017	3	.83	.22	-1.92	3.44	.44
VOTER 2018	3	.82	.23	-1.60	1.98	.47
VOTER 2019	3	.82	.23	-1.63	2.09	.47
LUCID 2020	3	.74	.25	-.85	.16	.64
LUCID 2023	3	.72	.25	-.73	-.08	.65
ANES 2024	1	.77	.27	-1.2	0.69	-

Note. Democratic Preference only administered to Y Subsample in LAPOP 2014.

Table S-5: Descriptive Statistics for Openness to Anti-Democratic Action Scales

Survey	Number of Items	Mean	SD	Skewness	Kurtosis	Avg. Inter-Item r
LAPOP 2006	9	0.21	0.18	0.73	-0.08	.24
LAPOP 2008	9	.29	.18	0.17	-0.97	.28
LAPOP 2010X	5	.30	.22	0.42	-0.66	.37
LAPOP 2010Y	13	.22	.18	0.8	-0.1	.26
LAPOP 2012X	7	.25	.20	0.44	-0.89	.27
LAPOP 2012Y	12	.21	.18	0.88	0.09	.21
LAPOP 2014X	6	.31	.18	.33	-.53	.28
LAPOP 2014Y	7	.29	.24	.59	-.61	.34
LAPOP 2017	9	.23	.20	0.98	0.66	.27
LAPOP 2019	5	.30	.25	0.51	-0.59	.47
LAPOP 2021	5	.25	.30	1.32	0.8	.38
WVS 1995	2	.18	.22	1.16	.87	.39
WVS 1999	2	.26	.23	.66	-.09	.55
WVS 2006	2	.28	.25	.53	-.72	.68
WVS 2011	2	.41	.26	.15	-.76	.60
WVS 2017	2	.32	.28	.55	-.72	.68
VOTER 2017	3	.19	.23	1.74	2.79	.36
VOTER 2018	3	.18	.23	1.61	2.11	.41
VOTER 2019	3	.19	.25	1.52	1.61	.41
LUCID 2020	3	.46	.32	-.01	-1.10	.71
LUCID 2023	3	.44	.30	.01	-.99	.65
ANES24	7	.27	.17	0.41	-0.36	.24

Note. Some differences in items administered to X and Y subsamples of LAPOP 2010, 2012, and 2014.

Table S-6. Full Results of Multinomial Logistic Regressions Predicting 2016, 2020, and 2024 Presidential Vote

Independent Variable	Dependent Variable Level (Ref. Level = Democratic Party Candidate Vote)	VOTER				Lucid	ANES
		2016		2020		2020	2024
		(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Party ID	Trump	6.05*** (0.21)	4.59*** (0.23)	6.93*** (0.31)	5.44*** (0.37)	6.40*** (0.17)	7.09*** (0.39)
	Other	4.13*** (0.27)	3.35*** (0.30)	5.26*** (0.68)	4.03*** (0.86)	3.08*** (0.23)	3.87*** (0.67)
	Did not vote	2.72*** (0.24)	2.40*** (0.28)	3.28*** (0.35)	3.06*** (0.55)	3.06*** (0.21)	3.58*** (0.29)
Ideology	Trump	5.30*** (0.29)	3.89*** (0.32)	4.90*** (0.41)	4.32*** (0.54)	4.94*** (0.26)	4.09*** (0.49)
	Other	2.76*** (0.36)	2.39*** (0.38)	0.64 (0.83)	0.78 (1.01)	0.82* (0.33)	0.85 (1.07)
	Did not vote	3.21*** (0.31)	2.60*** (0.36)	2.00*** (0.41)	2.16** (0.74)	0.72* (0.30)	1.71*** (0.38)
Democracy Support	Trump	-2.93*** (0.27)	-3.25*** (0.29)	-1.13** (0.37)	-1.51** (0.50)	-1.97*** (0.23)	-0.66* (0.32)
	Other	-1.53*** (0.34)	-1.60*** (0.36)	-1.45 (0.75)	-1.75* (0.89)	-2.65*** (0.30)	0.93 (0.68)
	Did not vote	-3.00*** (0.29)	-2.47*** (0.34)	-1.14** (0.42)	-1.17 (0.72)	-3.98*** (0.27)	-1.12*** (0.25)
Romney Vote (2012)	Trump		2.57*** (0.16)		2.84*** (0.21)		
	Other		1.12*** (0.22)		2.03*** (0.52)		
	Did not vote		1.27*** (0.23)		1.57*** (0.43)		
Other Vote (2012)	Trump		2.12*** (0.26)		1.03** (0.37)		
	Other		2.61*** (0.26)		2.05*** (0.56)		
	Did not vote		1.16** (0.40)		-0.11 (1.02)		
Did Not Vote (2012)	Trump		1.40*** (0.19)		1.40*** (0.29)		
	Other		1.23*** (0.23)		0.09 (0.98)		
	Did not vote		3.30*** (0.17)		3.05*** (0.34)		
Female	Trump	-0.74*** (0.11)	-0.71*** (0.12)	-0.35* (0.14)	-0.22 (0.18)	-0.02 (0.10)	-0.05 (0.16)
	Other	-0.66*** (0.14)	-0.62*** (0.15)	-1.14*** (0.34)	-0.83* (0.40)	0.10 (0.13)	-0.50 (0.33)
	Did not vote	-0.01	-0.15	-0.20	-0.18	0.03	0.01

Table S-6. Full Results of Multinomial Logistic Regressions Predicting 2016, 2020, and 2024 Presidential Vote

Independent Variable	Dependent Variable Level (Ref. Level = Democratic Party Candidate Vote)	VOTER				Lucid	ANES
		2016		2020		2020	2024
		(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Age	Trump	(0.12)	(0.14)	(0.17)	(0.29)	(0.12)	(0.13)
		2.65***	2.82***	0.20	-0.17	-0.43	-0.30
	Other	(0.27)	(0.31)	(0.43)	(0.56)	(0.23)	(0.37)
		-3.38***	-2.79***	-2.92**	-4.23***	-0.97**	-1.78**
Black	Trump	(0.39)	(0.41)	(0.93)	(1.13)	(0.32)	(0.62)
		-0.22	0.37	-0.94	-1.30	-1.70***	-1.55***
	Other	(0.31)	(0.37)	(0.51)	(0.88)	(0.29)	(0.30)
		-0.83***	-0.30	-1.45***	-1.45**	-1.56***	-0.88*
Hispanic	Trump	(0.19)	(0.20)	(0.35)	(0.50)	(0.20)	(0.36)
		-0.54*	-0.41	-0.70	-0.31	-0.17	-0.37
	Other	(0.24)	(0.25)	(0.78)	(0.96)	(0.20)	(0.65)
		-0.06	0.17	0.79**	0.17	-0.29	-0.14
Asian	Trump	(0.17)	(0.20)	(0.27)	(0.44)	(0.17)	(0.20)
		-0.19	-0.28	-0.05	0.11	-0.61**	-0.32
	Other	(0.16)	(0.17)	(0.21)	(0.30)	(0.19)	(0.29)
		0.19	0.16	-0.19	0.13	0.20	0.13
Other Race	Trump	(0.19)	(0.20)	(0.56)	(0.70)	(0.21)	(0.57)
		-0.41*	-0.47*	1.40***	-0.55	-0.47*	0.31
	Other	(0.19)	(0.22)	(0.22)	(0.58)	(0.20)	(0.19)
		-0.93**	-1.14**	-0.06	0.12	-0.95***	0.59
College Degree	Trump	(0.34)	(0.39)	(0.34)	(0.58)	(0.23)	(0.42)
		-1.60**	-2.18***	0.53	0.22	-0.24	-0.14
	Other	(0.50)	(0.54)	(0.63)	(1.06)	(0.29)	(0.79)
		-1.52**	-1.07	1.79***	1.66*	-0.11	0.44
Household Income	Trump	(0.55)	(0.57)	(0.33)	(0.66)	(0.24)	(0.35)
		-0.38	-0.33	0.39	0.40	-0.50	0.15
	Other	(0.24)	(0.25)	(0.30)	(0.39)	(0.39)	(0.39)
		-0.94**	-1.15**	0.44	0.88	0.62	0.78
Household Income	Trump	(0.35)	(0.37)	(0.64)	(0.67)	(0.41)	(0.62)
		-0.45	-0.40	0.53	-0.71	0.06	0.15
	Other	(0.30)	(0.33)	(0.43)	(0.94)	(0.42)	(0.31)
		-0.17	-0.14	-0.49**	-0.64**	-0.23*	-0.32
Household Income	Trump	(0.12)	(0.14)	(0.16)	(0.20)	(0.12)	(0.21)
		-0.43**	-0.22	0.26	0.27	-0.16	-0.12
	Other	(0.15)	(0.16)	(0.35)	(0.41)	(0.16)	(0.33)
		-1.15***	-0.99***	-0.88***	-0.92**	-0.68***	-0.79***
Household Income	Trump	(0.18)	(0.20)	(0.22)	(0.35)	(0.15)	(0.16)
		-0.26	-0.64	0.16	-1.08	0.36	-1.26***
	Other	(0.50)	(0.56)	(0.54)	(0.68)	(0.24)	(0.33)
		-0.50	-0.18	-2.54	-3.76	-0.94*	-0.83
Household Income	Did not vote	(0.64)	(0.65)	(1.60)	(1.97)	(0.39)	(0.62)
		-5.00***	-3.67***	-2.90**	-7.04***	-1.19**	-1.67***

Table S-6. Full Results of Multinomial Logistic Regressions Predicting 2016, 2020, and 2024 Presidential Vote

Independent Variable	Dependent Variable Level (Ref. Level = Democratic Party Candidate Vote)	VOTER				Lucid	ANES
		2016		2020		2020	2024
		(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Constant		(0.93)	(0.92)	(1.04)	(2.06)	(0.37)	(0.28)
	Trump	-3.58***	-3.13***	-4.48***	-4.06***	-3.87***	-4.62***
		(0.31)	(0.34)	(0.46)	(0.61)	(0.24)	(0.46)
	Other	-1.53***	-1.91***	-2.30**	-2.10*	-1.04***	-3.81***
		(0.36)	(0.38)	(0.85)	(1.04)	(0.29)	(0.99)
	Did not vote	-0.43	-2.00***	-2.16***	-2.83**	0.69**	0.21
		(0.31)	(0.38)	(0.52)	(0.88)	(0.25)	(0.32)
	Controls	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
N		5,828	5,828	3,535	3,255	6,010	4,388
Log Likelihood		-3249.72	-2765.21	-1391.71	-802.48	-3616.54	-3146.12

* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001

Part 7

RI-CLPMs with Openness to Authoritarian Governance Subscales

In Figure S-4, we present the RI-CLPM results displayed in Figure 7 in the main text (“Openness to Authoritarian Actions”) alongside results from models evaluating the two openness to authoritarian governance subscales. The Subvert Elections subscales consists of the “army rule” and “strong leader” items, and the Institutional Constraints subscale consists of the “president obey” item. We started by freely estimating all structural parameters of the RI-CLPMs. However, the Institutional Constraints model produced negative variance estimates. To address this, we constrained the variances of the residualized latent variables to be equal across waves and re-estimated the model. This version of the Institutional Constraints model yielded positive variance estimates and showed similar fit. Our conclusions do not change substantively when we free these latent variances.

We find that the results for the Subvert Elections subscale are nearly identical to those for the general authoritarian actions model (Dem. Support as IV, 2017 → 2018: -3.33 p.p., $p = .001$; Dem Support as IV, 2018 → 2019: -4.64 p.p., $p = .000$; Dem. Support as DV, 2017 → 2018: -0.67 p.p., $p = .614$; Dem. Support as DV, 2018 → 2019: -2.78 p.p., $p = .006$). In contrast, we find that deviations in democracy support did not significantly predict, and were not significantly predicted by, willingness to reduce institutional constraints (Dem. Support as IV, 2017 → 2018: 1.71 p.p., $p = .590$; Dem Support as IV, 2018 → 2019: 0.09 p.p., $p = .968$; Dem. Support as DV, 2017 → 2018: 1.89 p.p., $p = .277$; Dem. Support as DV, 2018 → 2019: -0.35 p.p., $p = .736$). There are a few potential explanations for this. One is a lack of variance in the “president obey” item, which features only two response options (the proportion of respondents choosing the anti-democratic answer was just 0.062 in 2017, 0.078 in 2018, and 0.101 in 2019). Alternatively it might reflect institutional constraints being less central to citizens’ notions of democracy (e.g., Chu et al., 2024).





Figure S-4. RI-CLPMs with Openness to Authoritarian Governance Subscales. Within-Person Temporal Effects of Abstract Democracy Support and Openness to Authoritarian Actions. Note: Models estimated using mean and variance-adjusted weighted least squares. Missingness handled using pairwise deletion. Scaled fit indices for Authoritarian Actions model: $\chi^2/df = 942.771/149$; CFI = .990; RMSEA = .024; SRMR = .044. Scaled fit indices for Elections Determining Power model: $\chi^2/df = 515.972/103$; CFI = .995; RMSEA = .021; SRMR = .026.

Scaled fit indices for Institutional Constraints model: $\chi^2/df = 443.187/68$; CFI = .992; RMSEA = .024; SRMR = .036.

Part 8

Predicted Probabilities of Vote Choice

Here we display and more thoroughly describe the results presented in Figure 9 from the main text, in which we use simulation from observed values to estimate predicted probabilities of voting for Trump, voting for the Democratic Party candidate, voting for a different candidate, and not voting as a function of abstract democracy support, controlling for partisan identification, ideology, and demographics.



When moving from the lowest to the highest level of support in the VOTER data, the predicted probability of voting for Trump in 2016 declines from ~0.61% to ~0.45%, and the predicted probability of voting for Trump in 2020 declines from ~0.49% to ~0.43%. In the 2020 Lucid data, the predicted probability of voting for Trump peaks at ~0.44% just below the scale midpoint but shrinks to ~0.41% at the lowest and highest levels of professed democracy support. This non-monotonic relationship appears to be due, in part, to high levels of reported abstention among citizens who are opposed to democracy in the 2020 Lucid survey. Here, the predicted probability of not voting declines from 30% at the lowest level of abstract democracy support to a miniscule 3% at the highest level – changing by a factor of 10. Though less dramatic, the VOTER data also showed declines in the predicted probability of abstaining, from ~0.17% to ~0.05% in 2016 and ~0.09% to ~0.05% in 2020. Lastly, the ANES data shows that there was little relationship between abstract democracy support and Trump vote in 2024, with the predicted probability of voting for Trump increasing only slightly from 0.32 to 0.33 across the range of the scale. However, abstract democracy support was once again strongly negatively related to abstention, with the predicting probability of not voting falling from 0.35 at the low end of the scale to 0.21 at the high end.

Part 9: Comparing Single-Item to Three-Item Scales

In the main text, we use multi-item scales, where possible, to measure abstract democracy support. This practice is beneficial because it reduces random measurement error and increases the likelihood of comprehensively covering the construct domain (Ansolabehere, Rodden, & Snyder, 2008; Bakker & Lelkes, 2018). To explore how use of multi-item abstract support scales might be beneficial, we present two sets of results below using the five surveys for which three-item scales could be formed, the VOTER and Lucid surveys.

First, we compare three-item abstract support composites to single-item measures in criterion validity, using unstandardized regression coefficients for the effects of abstract support on openness to authoritarian governance (with all variables coded to range from 0 to 1). As displayed below, coefficients were more strongly negative for the composite than for the average of the one-item scales, by an average of 61 percent across the surveys.

Sample	Avg. 1-Item Coefficient	3-Item Coefficient	% Increase in Strength
VOTER 2017	-0.256	-0.361	41.0
VOTER 2018	-0.222	-0.356	60.4
VOTER 2019	-0.266	-0.418	57.1
Lucid 2020	-0.173	-0.230	32.9
Lucid 2023	-0.215	-0.277	28.8

Second, we compute test-retest correlations for abstract support measures in the VOTER data from 2017-18, 2018-19, and 2017-19. For each interval, we compare the average coefficient for single-item measures with the coefficient for the three-item composite. As displayed below, correlations were meaningfully larger for the composite measure.

Test-Retest Interval	Ave. 1-Item Coefficient	3-Item Coefficient	% Increase in Strength
2017 → 2018	0.523	0.638	22.0
2018 → 2019	0.485	0.614	26.6
2017 → 2019	0.471	0.586	24.4

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